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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Most of t h e  manned s p a c e f l i g h t  programs planned by NASA f o r  t h e  l a t e  
1970's  and 1980's  a r e  concentra ted  on e a r t h  o r b i t a l  opera t ions .  Thesa w i l l  
use t h e  s h u t t l e  and a v a r i e t y  of manned and unmanned payloads d e l i v e r e d  t o  
o r b i t  by the  s h u t t l e .  
T h i s  12-month s tudy  examined f i v e  s p e c i f i c  s a f e t y  i s s u e s  a s s o c i a t e d  
wi th  t h e s e  opera t ions .  The s tudy  l o g i c  used i s  shown i n  F igure  1-1. The f i v e  
i s s u e s  were s t u d i e d  a s  f i v e  s e p a r a t e  t a s k s  i n  the  o rde r  shown. Hazards 
ana lyses  were used on t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  t a s k s  on ly ,  
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1.1 SCOPE 
h e  s tudy  scope covered t h e  v e h i c l e s  shown i n  Figure  1-2. 










Figure  1-2. Vehicles Considered i n  Study 
I n i t i a l  tasks w e r e  based on t h e  i n t e g r a l  t a n k  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ,  b u t  emphasis 
w a s  l a t e r  swi tched t o  t h e  drop tank o r b i t e r  ss t h i s  c m c e p t  developed. I h e  
assumptions made were broad enough t h a t  no r e s u l t s  were i n v a l i d a t e d  by t h i s  
change. 
S h u t t l e  payloads considered included manned and unmanned s o r t i e  payloads 
( i . e . ,  a t t ached  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r ) ,  s a t e l l i t e s  d e l i v e r e d  t o  e a r t h  o r b i t ,  and 
p o t e n t i a l  upper s t a g e  veh ic les ,  such as t h e  tug,  Agena, Centaur,  e t c . ,  used t o  
d e l i v e r  unmanned payloads t o  z r b i t s  beyond the  o r b i t e r ' s  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
The space  s t a t i o n s  considered were modular s t a t i o n s  d e l i v e r e d  t o  e a r t h  
o r b i t  and assembled by t h e  o r b i t e r .  I n i t i a l  6-man vers ions  and growth v e r s i o n s  
wi th  up t o  12 men, a s  def ined i-t recen t  Phase B s t u d i e s ,  were s t u d i e d .  
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To t h e  m a x i m u m  e x t e n t  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  analyses were per fo r~aed  w i t h  t h e  min- 
i m u m  conf igura t ion  o r i e n t e d  and o p e r a t i o n a l  assumptions p o s s i b l e ,  in order  t o  
have the  r e s u l t s  a p p l i c a b l e  over a s  wide a range of changes from c u r r e n t l y  
planned p r o g r a m  a s  poss ib le .  
Within t h e  scope of t h e  v e h i c l e s  descr ibed,  t h e  s tudy  is bounded by t h e  
fol lowing e tudy ground r u l e s  : 
The main concern is personnel  s a f e t y .  A l e s s e r  emphasis was 
placed on avoiding damage t o  o r  l o s s  of t h e  veh ic les .  
0 The a n a l y s i s  was conf ined t o  t h e  manned on-orbit  phase of 
miss ions .  Launch, boost ,  d e o r b i t ,  r een t ry  and l and ing  of 
t h e  o r b i t e r ,  o r  unmanned opera t ions  of t h e  s t a t i o n  and 
upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  away from t h e  o r b i t e r  were n o t  con- 
s i d e r e d .  
0 The s tudy  r e s u l t s  cover only t h e  s p e c i f i c  concerns of the  
s tudy .  They must n o t  b e  assumed t o  cover a l l  s a f e t y  
a s p e c t s  of the  re levan t  v e h i c l e s .  
1.2 STUDY 0.P; JECTIVES 
The s tudy  concerned i t s e l f  wi th  f i v e  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s .  These i s s u e s  and 
t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  are :  
Hazardous payloads. The o b j e c t i v e  was to  i d e n t i f y  hazards  
a s s o c i a t e d  wich c e r t a i n  o r b i t e r  payloads and t o  determine 
s a f e t y  requirements and g u i d e l i n e s ,  
Docking. The o b j e c t i v e  was t o  compare a number of d i f f e r e n t  
approaches f o r  docking an  o r b i t e r  t o  a space s t a t i o n ,  and t o  
recommend t h e  methods p r e f e r r e d  from a s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view. 
On-board s u r v i v a b i l i t y .  The o b j e c t i v e  was to  determine t h e  
c o n f i g u r a t i ~ n a l  and o t h e r  requirements f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  
s o r t i e  module and space s t a t i o n  to  allow personnel  t o  s u r v i v e  
on-boar d emergencies. 
Tumbling s p a c e c r a f t .  The purpose was t o  determine p r a c t i c a l  
means f o r  a r r e s t i n g  t h e  motion o f  out-of-control  tumbling 
s p a c e c r a f t  by e x t e r n a l  means, o r  t o  al low on-board personnel 
t o  escape from a s p a c e c r a f t  i f  tumbling cannot be a r r e s t e d .  
Escape and rescue.  The o b j e c t i v e  was t o  determine t h e  appl ic-  
a b i l i t y  of p r e v i r u s  o r  new concepts f o r  escape,  r escue ,  and 
ba i l -ou t  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  t o  the o r b i t e r ,  s o r t i e  modules and opace 
s t a t i o n .  
This  volume p r e s e n t s  a summary o f  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  r e s u l t s  and conclus ions  
of t h e  s tudy.  Tt is arranged by t a s k ,  Sec t ions  2 t o  6 each cover ing one of t h e  
t a s k s ,  i n  t h e  order  i n  which they were performed, a s  shown i n  Figure  1-1. The 
complete ana lyses  a r e  documented i n  Vol. I1 of t h i s  r e p o r t  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  
i t a s k s  and i n  Vol. I11 f o r  t h e  l a s t  two t a s k s .  
I 
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1.. 3 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER STUDIES 
The S a f e t y  i n  Ear th  O r b i t  Study was pe r fo r ;  ... . i n  t h e  con tex t  of a  wide 
range of r e l a t e d  s t u d i e s .  This  r e l a t j o n s h i p  i s  shown i n  Figure  1-3. 
The most i l lpor tan t  of t h e s e  s t u d i e s  a r e  t h e  Phase B s t u d i e s  on t h e  space 
s t a t i o n ,  s h u t t l e  and RAM (Research and Appl ica t ions  Modules) . These s t u d i e s  
were t h e  main . o-lrces of  d a t a  on t h e  s t a t  ion ,  s h u t t l e  and s o r t i e  module, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Phase A s t u d i e s  on t h e  Tug, Orbit- to-Orbit  S h u t t l e  (00s) and t h e  
Chemical Intero.:bi.tal S h u t t i e ,  and concurrent  systems s t u d i e s  on t h e  O r b i t a l  
Operat ions  and th2 In-Space P r o p e l l a n t  L o g i s t i c s  (ISPLS) S t u d i e s  provided addi-  
t i o n a l  info:metior,, both  on r e l e v a n t  hardware elements and on o p e r a t i o n a l  modes. 
A good i n t ~ r c u a n g e  o f  informat ion was p o s s i b l e  w i t h  a l l  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  f o r  
which NR was a prime c o n t r a c t c r  ( subcon t rac to r  on t h e  RAM). The in te rchange  of 
in fo rmat ion  and i d e a s  genera l ly  flowed i n  both d i r e c t i c i i s .  Th i s  i n t e r c h v g e  was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  f r u i t f u l  w i t h  t h e  O r b i t a l  Opera t in r~s  S tudy and the  s a f e t y  por t ion  
(Phase 2 )  of t h e  iSPLS s tudy . 
Addi t iona l  s a f e t y  background r-as obt;?ined from e a r l i e r  s a f e t y  s t u d i e s  by 
Boeing (on t h e  space  s t a t i o n ) ,  Lockheed (on t h e  s h u t t l e ) ,  and from ongoing 
s t u d i e s  by the  Aerospace Corporation (on :be s h u t t l e  and cn escape and r e s c u e ) .  
A p a r t i c u l a r l y  u s e f u l  coopera t ive  e f f o r t  was a l s o  e s t a b l i s h e d  w i t h  the  Pennsyl- 
v a n i a  S t a t e  Univers i ty  on t h e  dynamics of t u d l i n g  s p a c e c r a f t .  
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1.4 BASELINE MIDEL 
The b a s e l i n e  model d i scussed  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  desc r ibes  t y p i c a l  s h u t t l e  
o r b i t e r  conf igura t ions ,  s h u t t l e  miss ions ,  and t h e  i n t e r £  aces wi th  the  s h u t t l e  
payloade, s o r t i e  modules, and t h e  space  s t a t i o n .  
While this model is t y p i c a l ,  many v a r i a t i o n s  have been o r  a r e  being con- 
s i d e r e d .  The a t tempt  has  bzen made t o  make the  r e s u l t s  of t h e  e n t i r e  s tudy  as 
i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  concepts ,  conf igura t ions ,  o p e r a t i o n a l  modes, des ign d e t a i l s ,  
and program schedu les  as p o s s i b l e ,  s o  as n o t  t o  i n v a l i d a t e  the  s tudy as  t h e  
space  program evolves .  'Ihis has been done by d e a l i n g  wi th  the  problems para- 
m e t r i c a l l y ,  and n o t  typing t h e  ana lyses  t o  e p e c i f i c  des igns ,  s i z e s ,  o r  miss ions .  
Tnz d e s c r i p t i o n  of the  b a s e l i n e  model t h a t  fo l lows,  t h e r e f o r e ,  should  b e  read 
as d e s c r i b i n g  t y p i c a l  c u r r e n t  concepts ,  and n o t  t h e  concepts a s s m e d  f o r  t h e  
s tudy .  
1.4.1 Typical  S h u t t l e  Mission 
A t y p i c a l  s h u t t l e  miss ion,  shown i n  Figure  1-4, was generated from NR 
%ase B s h u t t l e  d a t a  t o  i d e n t i f y  approximate p r o j e c t i o n s  of s h u t t l e  func t ions  
and t i m e l i n e s ,  and t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  scope of t h i s  s tudy  w i t h i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  
miss ion.  Ear th  o r b i t  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  f o r  purposes of  the  s tudy  a s  encompassing 
t h a t  p o r t i o n  of the  miss ion t h a t  s t a r t s  wi th  o r b i t  i n j e c t i o n  and t e rmina tes  w i t h  
d e o r b i t .  On-orbit time can be up t o  30 days. 
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A t  launch ( t o )  t h e  o r b i t e r  and b o o s t e r  a r e  mated and remain mated u n t i l  
s t a g i n g ,  a t  which t i m e  s e p a r a t i o n  occurs  and t h e  b o o s t e r  f l i e s  back t o  a landing 
s i t e ,  whi le  t h e  o r b i t e r  i n i t i a t e s  a main eng ine  b u m  t o  e f f e c t  i n j e c t i o n  i n t o  a 
93 by 185 km (50 by 100 n m i )  o r b i t  a t  approximately to + 9 minutes.  Immediately 
a f t e r  p o s t - i n s e r t i o n  checks on o r b i t e r  s u b s y s t e m ,  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay doors 
are opened t o  expose t h e  o r b i t e r  space  r a d i a t o r s  on t h e  i n s i d e  of t h e  cargo bay 
doors t o  space.  This occurs  a t  approximately 9 t o  40 minutes a f t e r  launch.  A t  
approximately 50 minutes,  t h e  apogee of the  9 3  by 185 km (50 x 100 n mi) o r b i t  
is obta ined and a c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n  b u m  is performed t o  c i r c u l a r i z e  the  o r b i t e r  
i n  t h e  185 km (100 n mi) phasing o r b i t .  A f t e r  i n i t i a l  phasing r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  
t a r g e t  v e h i c l e  i s  accomplished, rendezvous and phasing adjus tments  a r e  made dur-  
ing  a s e r i e s  of Hohmann t r a n s f e r  burns t o  a c i r c u l a r  o r b i t  approximately 18.5 km 
(10 n mi) below the t a r g e t  veh ic le .  F i n a l  phase adjus tments  a r e  made p r i o r  t o  
i n i t i a t i n g  t h e  t e r m i n a l  phase i n i t i a t i o n  burn t o  complete t h e  rendezvous, s t a t i o n -  
keeping,  and docking o p e r a t i o n s .  
During t h e  subsequent on-orbi t  s t a y t i m e  a t  t h e  t a r g e t  v e h i c l e  o r b i t ,  t he  
o r b i t e r  can e i t h e r  be  a t t a c h e d  t o  o r  can s t a t ion-keep  a t  a  s a f e  d i s t a n c e  from 
the  t a r g e t  v e h i c l e  . 
S h o r t l y  b e f o r e  d e o r b i t ,  phasing wi th  a l and ing  s i t e  i s  accomplished, 
sys tem checks a r e  made, and t h e  cargo bay doors a r e  c losed .  The d e o r b i t  b u m  
which fol lows w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  e n t r y  t o  t h e  e a r t h ' s  atmosphere a t  approximately 
122 km (400,000 f e e t )  and subsequent  approach and l and ing  a t  t h e  p r e s e l e c t e d  
landing si te.  
I t  is s i g n i f i c a n t  to  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay doors would be  c losed 
f o r  only 112 hour  t o  1 hour  w h i l e  on o r b i t  f o r  a s h u t t l e  mission of any dura- 
t i o n .  
1.4.2 Typ ica l  O r b i t e r  Model 
The primary o r b i t e r  concepts considered i n  the  s tudy  a r e  shown i n  Figures  
1-5 and 1-6. The i n t e g r a l  tank o r b i t e r  concept r e s u l t i n g  from NR Phase B 
s h u t t l e  s t u d i e s  is shown i n  Figure  1-6 and inc ludes  such f e a t u r e s  a s  a 4.6 m 
15-ft-diameter by 18.3 m 60-ft- length cargo bay wi th  h inged cargo bay doors ,  
two manipula tors  w i t h  p e r i p h e r a l  i l l u m i n a t i o n ,  v i s u a l  and o p e r a t i n g  a i d s ,  a  
manipula tor  o p e r a t o r  s t a t i o n ,  and an a i r l o c k  docking p o r t  which i n t e r f a c e s  wi th  
the  crew and passenger compartments and w i t h  a personnel  t r a n s f e r  p o r t  l ead ing  
t o  t h e  ca rgo  bay. This conf igura t ion  inc ludes  i n t e g r a l  LH2 and ID2 p r o p e l l a n t  
tanks f o r  t h e  main propuls ion system used f o r  o r b i t  i n j e c t i o n ,  and t h e  a u x i l i a r y  
propuls ion sys tem used f o r  o r b i t  maneuvering and a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l .  An air- 
b r e a t h i n g  propuls ion system, which employs JP f u e l  and tu rbofan  engines,  is 
incorpora ted  t o  provide  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  shor t -d6ra t ion  powered descent  a f t e r  
v e h i c l e  en t ry ,  powered l and ing  and go-around, and v e h i c l e  f e r r y  opera t ione.  
The drop t ank  o r b i t e r  c o n f i g u r a t i ~ n  r e s u l t i n g  from NR Phase B e x t e n s i o n  
s t u d i e s  is shown i n  F igure  1-6 and d i f f e r s  from t h e  prevlous  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  . . 
pr imar i ly  i n  t h a t  i t  f e a t u r e s  an  e x t e r n a l  j e t t i s o n a b l e  L02/LH2 ascen t  p r o p e l l a n t  
tank,  employs s t o r a b l e  h y p e r g o l i c  p r o p e l l a n t s  (n i t rogen  t e t r o x i d e  and Aerozine 
50) f o r  t h e  o r b i t  p ~ p n e w e r i n g  and a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m .  It i o  a l i g h t e r  
v e h i c l e  than  the i n t e g r a l  tank o r b i t e r  w i t h  a geometry which requ i red  r e l o c a t i o n  


































































































































































Figure i - 6 .  Drop Tank Orbiter Concept 
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The i n i t i a l  MDAC o r b i t e r  concept ,  which i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  NR i n t e g r a l  
t ank  o r b i t e r ,  a l s o  employs i n t e g r a l  LO2 and LH2 p r o p e l l a n t  t anks .  H w e v e r ,  a  
r o t a c i o n  payload  deployment mechanism concep t  is used  i n  l i e u  o f  sn  a r t i c u l a t i n g  




Figu re  1-7. bDAC Payload  Deployment Mechanism 
1 .4 .3  Typ ica l  O r b i t e r  Pay l o i d s  
O r b i t e r  payloads  c c n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  s t u d y  i n c l u d e  t h e  fo l lowing :  
1. Unmanned p a l l e t - t y p e  s o r t i e  pay l o a d s ,  which remain a t t a c h e d  
t o  t h e  o r b i t e r .  These may remain i n  t h e  cargo  bay ,  o r  be  
deployed ou t  of i t  f o r  exposu re  t o  space .  
2 .  Manned s o r t i e  modules, which remain a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
These a l s o  may remain i n  t h e  c a r g o  bay ,  o r  b e  deployed  o u t  of  
i t  d u r i n g  o r b i t a l  o p e r a t i o n s .  These may b e  f lown combined 
w i  t h  an  unmmned p a l l e t  pay load .  
3. Automated pay loads .  These i n c l u d e  s a t e l l i t e s  and s u b s a t e l l i t e s  
d e l i v e r e d  t o  o r b i t  by t h e  o r b i t e r  and o p e r a t e  de t ached  from t h e  
o r b i t e r .  These a l s o  can be  r e t r i e v e d  f o r  s e r v i c i n g  o r  r e t u r n  
t o  e a r t h .  
4.  Upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  w i t h  t h e i r  pay loads .  These a r e  used as a  
s h u t t l e  t h i r d  s t a g e  t o  d e l i v e r  payloads  beyond t h e  o r b i t e r ' s  
c a p a b i l i t y .  The upper  s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  c a n d i d a t e s  
i n c l u d e :  
o  Agena 
o  Cen tau r  
o  Burner  Ii 
o T r a n s t a g e  
o  Apol lo  s e r v i c e  module (SM) 
o Tl fg o r  o r b i t - t o - o r b i t  s h u t t l e  (00s)  
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The Centaur ,  tug ,  and OGS, and p o s s i b l y  the  S;., a r e  cons ide red  r e u s a b l e  
and may b e  r e t r i e v e d .  The o t h e r s  a r e  expendable.  These i n c l u d e  t h e  modules 
r e q u i r e d  f o r  b u i l d u p  of t h e  permanent s t a t i o n ,  cargo  modules f o r  l o g i s t i c s  
r e supp ly ,  expe r imen t  modules, and replacement  modules as r e q u i r e d .  A 1  1 chese 
w d u l e a  a r e  r e t u r n a b l e  t o  e a r t h  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
1.4.4 T y p i c a l  Space S t a t i o n  Model 
The pr imary  modular  s p a c e  s t a t i o n  ( I S S )  concep t s  be ing  cons ide red  by NR 
and MDAC f o r  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t i o n  a r e  shown i n  M g u r e s  1-8 and 1-9. As shown 
i n  F igu re  1-8, t h e  NR i n i t i a l  s t a t i o n  c o n s i s t s  o f  n i n e  modules r e q u i r i n g  a 
l i k e  number o f  s h u t t l e  f l i g h t s  f o r  the s t a t i o n  b u i l d u p .  S i m i l a r  d a t a  f o r  t ' le 
MDAC i n i t i a l  modular  s t a t i o n  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  F igu re  1-9. 
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Figure 1-8. NR Modular Space S ta t ion  
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Figure 1-9. MDAC MSS L i l d u p  Sequence/ I n i t i a l  S t a t  ion 
Space Division 
' Narth Amencan Rockwell 
2.0 HAZARDOUS EARTH ORBITAL SHUTTLE PAYLOADS, 
CARGO TRANSFER, AND HANDLlNG 
Many d i f f e r e n t  kindq of  payloads w i l l  be c a r r i e d  i n t o  o r b i t  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay. The purpose ~f t h i s  t a s k  was t o  i d e n t i f y ,  analyze ,  and recornend 
so l t i t ions  of the  hazards  r e s u l t i n g  from (a )  the  d e l i v e r y ,  deployment, and 
r e t r i e v a l  of hazardous ?ayloads ,  and from (5) the  t r a n s f e r  and hand1ir.g of 
genera l  types  of cargo.  Three p a r t i c u l a r  a r e a s  of concern were i n v e s t i g a t e d  
s i n c e  they concern t h e  s a f e t y  of t h e  o r b i t e r  and its crew and passengers whi le  
i n  o r b i t .  These a r e :  
o Upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  as they a r e  t r a n s p o r t e d  i n  the  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay, deployed, and r e t r i e v e d .  These v e h i c l e s  i n c l u d e  
expendable s t a g e s ,  mainly u s i ~ . g  s t o r a b l e  o r  s o l i d  p r o p e l l a n t s ,  
azd reusable  cryogenic s t a g e s .  Hazards s p e c i f i c  t o  on-orbit  
o r b i t e r  a b o r t s  a r e  included.  
o Hazardaus f l u i d  v e s s e l s  t r a n s p o r t e d  and off-loaded i n  e a r t h  
o r b i t  i n  the o r b i t e r  as cargo o r  a s  p a r t  of  a payload. 
O r b i t e r  on-orbit  abor t  hazards a r e  included.  
o The handl ing and t r a n s p o r t  of cargo between t h e  o r b i t e r ,  s o r t i e  
modules, and space  s t a t i o n .  
I t  is  be l i eved  t h a t  the  assumptions inheren t  i n  t h i s  t a s k  a r e  few aud 
simple.  These are :  
o The s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  has  the  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  o p e r a t e  i n  e a r t h  o r b i t  
independently of o t h e r  v e h i c l e s  i n  o r b i t ,  of t h e  payload, o r  of 
t h e  ground. 
o The o r b i t e r  has  t h e  'nherent c a p a b i l i t y  t o  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  w i t h  
a l l  i ts  crew and passefigers. 
o The o r b i t e r  payload o r  ~ a y l o a d s  a r e  c a r r i e d  i n  a s i n g l e  cargo 
b3y. Th i s  cargo bay is p ro tec ted  dur ing boost  and r e e n t r y  by 
a cargo bay c?oor o r  doors, which form a p a r t  of the  o r b i t e r ,  
and can be opened and c losed by t h e  o r b i t e r  crew. The cargo 
bey is n o t  p ressur ized  o r  p r e s s u r i z a b l e  i n  o r b i t .  
o The o r b i t e r  h a s  the  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  deploy payloads ou t  of t h e  
cargo bay, when requ i red ,  and t o  r e t r i e v e  and stow recoverable  
modules and payloads.  
o The o r b i t e r  and space  s t a t i o n  have docking c a p a b i l i t y .  
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So long a s  t h e s e  assumptions remain v a l i d ,  the  r e s u l t s  of t h i s  t a s k  
should be  a p p l i c a b l e .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  assumptions a p p l i c a b l e  t o  s p e c i f i c  
hazards/emergency analyses  have been rdcorded i n d i v i d u a l l y  i n  t h e  p a r t i c u -  
l a r  analyses .  
2 .1  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main ou tpu t s  of t h i s  t a s k  a r e  t h e  s a f e t y  requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  
which r e s u l t  from t h e  hazardlemergency ana lyses .  Conclusions from t h i s  t a s k ,  
based on t h e  h ~ z a r d / e m e r g m c y  analyses  and o t h e r  suppor t ing ana lyses ,  a r e  pre- 
sen ted  i n  t h e  fol lowing pcragraphs.  
o The o r b i t e r  design is  extremely s e n s i t i v e  t o  even smal l  explosions  
i n  t h e  cargo bay. Uncontained exp los ions  equ iva len t  t o  as l i t t l e  
a s  5 g (0.01 l b )  of TNT may r e s u l t  i n  exceeding $he s t r u c t u r a l  
design l i m i t  of t h e  cargo bay s t r u c t u r e  (14 kN/m , 2 p s i )  from b l a s t  
overpressure .  By comparison, a hand grenade is equ iva len t  t o  10 g 
(0.025 l b )  of TNT and a f u l l y  loaded Centaur t o  approximately 
2700 kg (6000 l b )  of TNT. 
o Any s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  of a loaded upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  whi le  i n  
t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay which r c s u l t s  i n  l a r g e  lea!rs of both  f u e l  
and o x i d i z e r  w i l l  almost c e r t a i n l y  be c a t a s t r o p h i c  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
o The emergy con ten t  o f  even the  s m a l l e s t  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t  upper 
s t a g e  v e h i c l e ,  i f  r e l e a s e d  suddenly,  i s  f a r  more than can be 
t o l e r a t e d  by t h e  o r b i t e r .  The v e h i c l e  a c c e l e r a t i o n s  caused by t h e  
r e a c t i o n  of t h e  l eak ing  f l u i d s  w i l l  ensure  mixing, and an i g n i t i o n  
source  w i l l  almost c e r t a i n l y  be  p resen t  dur ing t h e  process  of 
s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e .  A chemical r e a c t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  can be  expected,  
and t h i s  w i l l  probably propagate  f a s t e r  than t h e  r a t e  a t  which 
t h e  f l u i d s  can d i s p e r s e  i n  space,  even wi th  t h e  cargo bay doors 
open. Every e f f o r t  must t h e r e f o r e  be made t o  prevent  s t r u c t u r a l  
f a i l u r e  of upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  whi le  i n  o r  near  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
Remedial measures a r e  no t  considered p r a c t i c a l ,  and have not  been 
recommended. 
o I f  t h e  leakage of l a r g e  q u a n t l t i e s  of payload f l u i d s  i n t o  t h e  
o r b i t e r  cargo bay i s  considered c r e d i b l e  dur ing boost  o r  whi le  
t h e  o r b i t e r  i s  i n  o r b i t  wi th  t h e  cargo bay doors c losed ,  then 
a d d i t i o n a l  ven t ing  of t h e  cargo bay beyond t h a t  provided by t h e  
o r b i t e r  f o r  normal ven t ing  may be  requ i red  t o  avoid p o t e n t i a l  
o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  cargo bay. This may need t o  b e  con- 
s i d e r e d  and provided f o r  i n d i v i d u a l l y  f o r  each payload which 
con ta ins  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of f l u i d s .  
o The chemical and phys ica l  behavior  of gases ,  l i q u i d s ,  and cryo- 
gen ic  f l u i d s  is n o t  w e l l  understood i n  t h e  zero-g and zero  o r  
very  low p r e s s u r e  environment encountered i n  space.  An important 
ares of u n c e r t a i n t y  as t o  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  o f  l e a k i n g  
f l u i d s  t h e r e f o r e  exists , and t h e  s e v e r i t y ,  o r  even t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  
of hazards  such as c o u h s t i o n ,  chemical r e a c t i o n ,  cor ros ion ,  
at tachment o f  f rozen  gases  t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e ,  e t c . ,  cannot be  
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proper ly  evaluated a t  p r e s e n t .  I n  t h e  hazardlemergency analyses  
.in t h i s  t a s k ,  t h e  worst-case assumption was made t h a t  e f f e c t s  
which a r e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e ,  such a s  sus ta ined  combustion 
of l eak ing  hypergo l ics ,  w i l l  indeed occur.  
o Launching a space s t a t i o n  o r  s o r t i e  modules p ressur ized  a t  
1 atmosphere can p resen t  t h e  o r b i t e r  v i t h  a cons iderab le  hazard.  
A t y p i c a l  s t a t i o n  mcdule of 140 m3 (5000 f t 3 )  volume has  an 
exp los ive  p o t e n t i a l  of 10 kg (22 l b )  TNT equ iva len t .  This a r i s e s  
because of the  energy which could be r e l e a s e d  i n  t h e  vacuum env i r -  
onment of space from t h e  conta ined atmosphere. I f  t h i s  energy i s  
ins tan taneous ly  r e l e a s e d ,  e . g , ,  by s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  mod- 
u l e ,  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  b l a s t  anl ,hrapnel would cause ca tas t ro~ ' - -LC 
damage t o  t h e  o r b i t e r .  A r a p i d  r e l e a s e  ~f t h e  con ten t s  of t h e  
module when t h e  cargo bay doors a r e  c losed ,  wi thout  any b l a s t  
e f f e c t s ,  could s t i l l  p r e s s u r i z e  t h e  cargo bay t o  about 20 kN/m 2 
( 3  p s i ) ,  o r  about 50 percen t  above i t s  presen t  des ign l i m i t .  
Rapid r e l e a s e  of t h e  module con ten t s  hhen t h e  cargo bay doors 
a r e  open, o r  a slow enough r e l e a s e  so  t h a t  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay 
vent  system can adequately r e l i e v e  t h e  p r e s s u r e ,  would n o t  
r e s u l t  i n  damage. 
o Many d i f f e r e n t  f l u i d s ,  of varying degrees  of hazard and i n  varying 
q u a n t i t i e s ,  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  planned f o r  t r anspor ta t5on  t o  and from 
space by t h e  o r b i t e r  and f o r  use i n  s o r t i e  modules and on t h e  space 
s t a t i o n .  While many genera l  s a f e t y  requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  
have been i d e n t i f i e d ,  and an adequate l e v e l  of s a f e t y  appears pos- 
s i b l e  t o  both  t h e  personnel  involved and t h e  s p a c e c r a f t ,  more 
s p e c i f i c  s a f e t y  f e a t u r e s  than ds f ined  i n  t h i s  s tudy must awai t  a 
more d e t a i l e d  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  s p a c e c r a f t ,  payloads,  a rd  t h e i r  
planned opera t ions  than is  c u r r e n t l y  a v c i l a h l e .  
o Cargo handl ing i n  space p r e s e n t s  some s p e c i g i c  hazards  a s s o c i a t e d  
wi th  t h e  zero-g environment and wi th  t h ?  l i m i t e d  remedial  and 
escape p rov i s ions  a v a i l a b l e .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  normal s a f e t y  f e a t u r e s  
requ i red  on t h e  ground, s p e c i f i c  requirements and g u i d e l i n e s ,  suck 
a s  t e t h e r i n g  of heavy cargo at  a l l  t imes ,  double-containing haz- 
ardous cargo,  and p r o . ~ i d i n g  mechanical a s s i s t  whers p ropu ls ive  
fo rces  a r e  p o s s i b l e ,  have been i d e n t i f i e d .  
The main recommendations from t h i s  t a s k  a r e  contained i n  t h e  s a f e t y  re- 
quirements and gu ide l ines  developed dur ing t h e  hazard/emergency analyses .  
S p e c i f i c  top- level  recommendations a r i s i n g  from t h e s e  and from support ing 
analyses  a r e  descr ibed i n  the  following paragraphs.  
o The cargo bay doors c n  t h e  o r L , i t e r  should be  opened a s  e a r l y  a s  
p o s s i b l e  and c losed  a s  l a t e  a s  p o s s i b l e  whi le  i n  o r b i t  when haz- 
ardous f l u i d s  o r  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of p r o p e l l a n t s  a r e  c a r r i e d  i n  
t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay. This  minimizes hazards  from leakage,  
exp los ions ,  contamination,  e t c .  
o The l i q u i d  con ten t s  3f upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  being re tu rned  t o  
e a r t h  should b e  dumped t o  space b e f o r e  d e o r b i t i n g  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
Tine purpose is t o  avoid t h e  p o ~ s i b i l i t y  of an uncontrol led  
i n c r e a s e  i n  i n t e r n a l  apper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  p r e s s u r e  dur ing r e e n t r y  
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o r  on t h e  ground, poss ib ly  from an unexpected h e a t  l eak .  The 
accep tab le  l e v e l  of r e s i d u a l  l i q u i d s  and gas be fore  r e t u r n i n g  
t o  e a r t h  should be such t h a t  an i n s u l a t i o n  f a i l u r e ,  leakage,  
o r  a c rash  l and ing  w i l l  not  r e s u l t  i n  o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  f i r s ,  
o r  a s i m i l a r  a c c i d e n t .  
o The c a p d b i l i t y  should be provided f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  d e o r b i t ,  
r e e n t e r ,  and l and  wi th  a f u l l y  loaded upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e .  
This  c.ondition may a r i s e  from a f a i l u r e  t o  deploy t h e  upper 
s t a g e  v e h i c l e  (perhaps because of l ack  of t i m e  fo l lowing an 
abor t  s i t u a t i o n )  and f a i l u r e  t o  dump upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  pro- 
p e l l a n t s .  While such a combination of even t s  may be q u i t e  
improbable, t h e  consequences could be c a t a s t r o p h i c ,  and t h e  
cond i t ion  should be  designed f o r  a s  being c r e d i b i e .  It is  
no t  recommended t h a t  reduced f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  be  con- 
s i d e r e d  f o r  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  b u t  t h e  r e e n t r y  and landing load 
c r i t e r i a  should be  l e s s  s e v e r e  than t h e  normal des ign  cases  
(e .  g. , 2 a condi t ions  i n s t e a d  of 3 a) f o r  t h i s  maximum weight 
cond i t ion ,  t o  avoid combining u n r e a l i s  t i c a l l y  s e v e r e  worst- 
case  des ign cases .  The p i l o t  i n  such s i t u a t i o n s  w i l l  undoubt- 
ed ly  t a k e  e x t r a  c a r e  t o  avoid a hard landing.  
o Upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  must b e  man-compatible; i . e . ,  man r a t i n g  
s a f e t y  c r i t e r i a  must b e  app l ied  t o  systems and func t ions  of t h e  
upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  which could c r e a t e  a hazard t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  
whi le  t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  is i n  o r  near  t h e  o r b i t e r .  These 
c r i t e r i a ,  which a r e  not  c u r r e n t l y  de f ined ,  must b e  de f ined  con- 
s i s t e n t l y  f o r  t h e  s h u t t l e  ar.d f o r  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s .  One 
p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t h a t  a f l i g h t  t e s t  of t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  be 
performed i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  using f l u i d s  which a r e  p h y s i c a l l y  
similar t o  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t s  b u t  which do no t  r e a c t  chemically.  
For example, LN2/Lii2 m y  be  used t o  s imula te  LO~/LH*.  Such a 
f l i g h t  test may be c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  because i t  can a l s o  r e p l a c e  
much of t h e  ground q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g .  
o Because of t h e  c r i t i c a l i t y  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  of a f a i l u r e  of a 
p ressur ized  s o r t i e  o r  space s t a t i o n  module i n  t h e  cargo bay 
whi le  i n  space,  two a r e a s  should be s t u d i e d  f u r t h e r :  
. I d e n t i f y  and e l i m i n a t e  f a i l u r e  modes which can cause  major 
s t r u c t u r a l  o r  o t h e r  f a i l u r e s  of p ressur ized  s o r t i e  o r  
space s t a t i o n  modules dur ing boos t ,  on-orbi t ,  and r e e n t r y  
phases.  
. Consider ven t ing  t h e  modules t o  space whi le  they are s t i l l  
i n  t h e  cargo bay,  t o  reduce t h e  exp los ive  p o t e n t i a l .  The 
necessary  atmosphere can b e  t aken  up i n  a number of high- 
p r e s s u r e  tanks w i t h i n  t h e  module. This h a s  t h e  e f f e c t  of re- 
ducing t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  damage, bo th  by reducing t h e  energy 
con ten t  p e r  tank,  and 5y  reducing p r e s s u r e  t h a t  can be 
generated i n  expanding t h e  gas  from a rup tured  tank t o  t h e  
cargo bay volume. 
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2.2 RESIDUAL HAZARDS AND HAZARDS RESOLUTION 
This s e c t i o n  summarizes t h e  hazards i d e n t i f i e d  and t h e i r  r e s o l u t i o n ,  and 
p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  requirements f o r  suppor t ing resea rch  and technology. 
2.2.1 Resolut ion 3f I d e n t i f i e d  Hazards 
The d i s p o s i t i o n  of t h e  25 hazards  i d e n t i f i e d  i s  shown i n  Table 2-1. This 
shows t h e  judgments of t h e  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  a s  t o  which hazards  would be  resolved 
by implementation of t h e  recommended requirements and g u i d e l i n e s ,  and which 
a r e  r e s i d u a l  hazards;  which of t h e  r e s i d u a l  hazards  r e p r e s e n t  accep tab le  r i s k s ;  
and which r e q u i r e  support ing resea rch  and technology (SRT) o r  must a t  p resen t  
be  considered unresolved s a f e t y  i s s u e s .  
2.2.2 Supporting Research and Technology Requirements 
The support ing resea rch  and technolopy requirements r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  
a r e a s  of u n c e r t a i n t y  of t h i s  t a s k  a r e  l i s t e d  below ( t h e  main o r i g i n a t i n g  
hazards/emergency a r e  i n d i c a t e d  i n  p a r e n t h e s i s ) :  
o The behavior of p r e s s v r i z e d  cryogenics ,  gases ,  and l i q u i d  as they 
explode i n t o  vacuum o r  i n t o  a l a r g e  evacuated con ta iner  should be 
understood. The purpose would be t o  determine t h e  exp los ive  con- 
t e n t s  under d i f f e r e n t  cond i t ions  and t h e  damage t h a t  can r e s u l t .  
The s u b j e c t  can i n i t i a l l y  be  s tud ied  a n a l y t i c a l l y  and t h e  key 
r e s u l t s  v e r i f i e d  by l a b o r a t o r y  t e s t s  (1.1001, 1.2.005). 
o Current and new techniques  f o r  des igning,  cons t ruc t ing ,  and oper- 
a t i n g  tanks  which can f a i l  under p r e s s u r e  wi thout  producing 
shrapne l  should be pursued (1.1001, 1.2.005).  
o The use of s t r a i n  measurements on p ressur ized  tanks  should be  
explored a s  a means of d e t e c t i n g  impending f a i l u r e s  on t h e  
tanks .  This method has  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  advantage over  conven- 
t i o n a l  raethods of monitoring temperatures and p ressures  of t h e  
con ten t s  t h a t  i t  can d e t e c t  f a i l u r e s  of t h e  tank due t o  imper- 
f e c t i o n s  o r  weaknesses of t h e  t ank ,  a s  w e l l  a s  overpressur iza-  
t i o n  (1.1.001, 1.2.GO5). 
o The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  chemical c ~ m b i n a t i o n  of mutually r e a c t i v e  
f l u i d s  and decomposition of m o n o p r o ~ e l l a n t s  i n  zero-g and low 
t o  zero  p ressure  e n v l r o n m ~ n t  should be  i n v e s t i g a t e d  t o  e v a l u a t e  
how severe  t h i s  hazard is .  Some i n s i g h t  can be gained by 
t h e o r e t i c a l  s t u d i e s ,  but  f u l l  confidence would r e q u i r e  small-  
s c a l e  l a b o r a t o r y  t e s t s  i n  s imulated o r  a c t u a l  zero-g cond i t ions .  
For monopropellant decomposition, t h e  c a t a l y t i c  e f f e c t  o f  d i f -  
f e r e n t  s p a c e c r a f t  m a t e r i a l s  should be  i n v e s t i g a t e d ,  a s  w e l l .  
This would r e q u i r e  v a l i d  p r e s s u r e s ,  temperatures ,  and concentra- 
t i o n s ,  b u t  t h e  zero-g environment could probably be dispensed 
wi th  except a s  a f i n a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n  (1.1.002 and 1.1.003). 
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Table 2-1 Hazards Resolut ion 
llazard 















Explosiun/rupture  of a  p ressur ized  1 
c o n t a i n e r  i n  an upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  
i n s i d e  o r  n e a r  s h u t t l e .  
Combination of mutual ly  r e a c t i v e  
upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  f l u i d s  i n  
explos ion o r  f i r e  i n s i d e  o r  
near s h u t t l e .  
Detonation of exp los ive  charge on 
tupper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  i n s i d e  o r  
near s h u t t l e .  
Kapid decomposit ion of mono- 
p r o p e l l a n t s  loca ted  i n  o r  
l eak ing  from t h e  upper s t a g e  
veh ic le  whi le  i n s i d e  o r  nea r  
s h u t t l e  . 
Uncontrolled combust ion  i n  a c t i v e  
lpper  s t a g e  ve l i i c l c  r e a c t i o n  
Zontrol  eng ines  whi le  nea r  thc  
s h u t t l e .  
.eakage o f  c o r r o s i v e  f l u i d s  from 
ipper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  tanks  whi l e  
l ~ l s i d e  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
Inadver ten t  s t a r t  of an  upper 
s t a g e  v e h i c l e  r o c k e t  engine  whi le  
i n s i d e  s h u t t l e  cargo bay. 
I n a d v e r t e n t  s e p a r a t i o n  of  any p a r t  
of  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  whi le  
a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  s h u t t l e .  
Loss of a t t i t u d e / t r a n s l a t i o n  
c o n t r o l  of  upper s t n g e  v e l ~ i c l e  
upon r e l e a s e  f  ron~ s h u t  t l c .  
llangup of upper s t a g e  vel i ic le  
d u r i n g  r e l e a s e  from s h u t t l e .  
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Table 2-1. Hazards Resolut ion  (Cont) 
lazard No. 
tup tu re  of common bulkhead t anks  i n  
lpper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  whi l e  i n  o r  
l e a r  s h l l t t l e .  
Loss of  p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  i n  p r e s s u r e  
s t a b i l i z e d  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  
I n a b i l i t y  t o  dump p r o p e l l a n t s  of 
p r e s s u r a n t s  i n  r e t r i e v e d  
I n a b i l i t y  t o  dump upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  
p r o p e l l a n t s  o r  p r e s s u r a n t s  dur ing  
s h u t t l e  a b o r t .  
I n a b i l i t y  t o  c l o s e  cargo bay doors  
a f t e r  r e t r i e v a l  of  upper s t a g e  
v e h i c l e  because o f  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
wi th  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e .  
Exposure o f  t h e  s h u t t l e  crew o r  
passengers  t o  a t o x i c  environment 
r e l e a s e d  from a v e s s e l  i n  t h e  payload 
c o n t a i n i n g  a t o x i c  f l u i d .  
A f i r e  i n  t h e  ca rgo  bay r e s u l t i n g  fro1 
r e l e a s e  and i g n i t i o n  of a flammable 
f l u i d  i n  an  unpressu r i zed  paylaod.  
A f i r e  i n  a p r e s s u r i z e d  payload i n  t h  
ca rgo  bay r e s u l t i n g  from r e l e a s e  and 
i g n i t i o n  of a flammable f l u i d .  
A c o r r o s i v e  environment i n  t h e  s h u t t l  
ca rgo  bay r e s u l t i n g  from leakage  o r  
r u p t u r e  o f  a payload v e s s e l  c o n t a i n i n  
a c o r r o s i v e  f l u i d .  
Space Division 
North Amertcan Rockwell 
Hazard No. 
Table  2-1. Hazards Resolut ion  (Cont) 
- 
Hazard 
An exp los ion  i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  cargo bay 
of a p o t e n t i a l l y  e x p l o s i v e  paylcad 
v e s s e l .  
S p i l l a g e  o r  l eakage  of hazardous f l u i d  
o r  m a t e r i a l  du r ing  manual t r a n s f e r  i n  
p r e s s u r i z e d  modules. 
S p i l l a g e  o r  l eakage  -f hazardous f l u i d s  
o r  m a t e r i a l s  dur ing  mechanical ly  
a s s i s t e d  o r  remote t r a n s f e r  i n  
p r e s s u r i z e d  modules. 
S p i l l a g e  o r  l eakage  of hazardous f l u i d  
o r  m a t e r i a l  du r ing  remote t r a n s f e r  i n  
unpressu r i zed  a r e a .  
F a i l u r e  of  t r a n s f e r  mechanism and /o r  X 
l o s s  o f  c o n t r o l  of cargo dur ing  
t r a n s f e r  i n  p r e s s u r i z e d  o r  un- 
p r e s s u r i z e d  a r e a s .  
A r a d i o a c t i v e  environment i n  s s o r t i e  
module o r  space  s t a t i o n ,  r e s u l t i n g  
from exposure  o r  e scape  o f  r a d i o a c t i v e  
material dur ing  r a n s f e r  and handl ing 
o f  r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l s .  
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o  The behavior  of c o r r o s i v e  f l u i d s  i n  z e r o  g  should  b e  i n v e s t i g a t e d  
t o  determine how s e r i o u s  t h e  hazard  of a  l eak ing  c o r r o s i v e  f l u i d  
could be ,  and t o  determine p r a c t i c a l  p r o t e c t i o n  methods and remed- 
i a l  measures. Meilrls f o r  d e t e c t j n g  t h e  l o c a t i m  of t h e  c o r r o s i v e  
f l u i d  o r  of the  c o r r o s i v e  a c t i o n  should a l s o  be  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  r h i s  
r e sea rch  should  cover t h e  range of p ressures  from f u l l  s p a c e c r a f t  
p r e s s u r e s  dawn t o  a  vacuum. A p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t  t o  b e  i n v e s t i g a t e d  
should  b e  t h e  behavior  of c o r r o s i v e  f l u i d s  which a r e  f rozen in a  
space  environment and 'haw o u t  and become n o r e  a c t i v e  upon r e t u r n  
t o  an e a r t h  environment (1.1006, 1.2.004). 
o  The f lammabi l i ty  and chemical r e a c t i v i t y  o f  s p a c e c r a i t  and payload 
m a t e r i a l s  under low p r e s s u r e  cond i t ions  representative of f l u i d  
leakage i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay should  be  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  The 
r e a c t i v e  gases  shou ld  b e  f l u i d s  such a s  oxygen, hydrogen, N204, 
e t c . ,  which may be c a r r i e d  a s  p r o p e l l a n t s ,  cargo,  o r  experiment 
f l u i d s .  The purpose would be  (a)  t o  unders tand t h e  mechanics and 
dynamics of chemical r e a c t i o n s  under zero-g and low-pressure con- 
d i t i o n s ,  and (b) t o  map a reas  of f lammabi l i ty  and r e a c t i v i t y  i n  
terms of m a t e r i a l s ,  p ressures ,  temperatures ,  e t c . ,  f o r  use  a s  a  
guide i n  m a t e r i a l ,  s e l e c t i o n  f o r  forthcoming s p a c e c r a f t  (1.2.002). 
o  Means f o r  d e t e c t i n g  and suppress ing  f i r e s  i n  a  zero-g p r e s s u r i z e d  
environment shou ld  b e  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  This r e sea rch  should  inc lude  
unders tanding of i g n i t i o n ,  h e a t  t r a n s f e r ,  and flame propagat ion;  
e f f e c t s  of a i r  c u r r e n t s  due t o  fo rced  convect ion and low-g acce l -  
e r a t i o n ;  and t h e  convection e f f e c t s  of applying f i r e  e x t i n g u i s h e r s  
t o  tile f i r e .  Both manned and unmanned s i t u a t i o n s  should  b e  ron- 
s i d e r e d .  The i n v e s t i g a t i o n  should cons ide r  a  broad systems 
approach t o  t h e  problem s o  as  t o  l e a d  t o  p r a c t i c a l  recommendations 
f o r  space  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  Tes t s  should  b e  considered f o r  t h e  Skylab 
program t o  supplement t h e  c u r r e n t  y roposed e f f o r t  (1.2 .OO3) . 
o Means should  b e  ckveloped f o r  l o c a t i n g  s p i l l e d  hazardous f l u i d s  
and m a t e r i a l s  i n  a  zero-g manned environment and f o r  n e u t r a l i z i n g  
o r  c o l l e c t i n g  and disposing of  t h e s e  (1.3.001, 1.3.002). 
2.3 UPPER STAGE VEHICLES AS SHUTTLE PAY LOADS 
The purpose of t h i s  s u b t a s k  was t o  i d e n t i f y  the  hazards  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  deployment, and r e t r i e v a l  i n  e a r t h  o r b i t  of upper s t a g e  
v e h i c l e s ,  and t o  determine t h e  s a f e t y  measures r equ i red  t o  d e a l  w i t h  these .  
Both expendable s t a g e s  and reusab le  s t a g e s  were considered.  'Ihe o r b i t e r  on- 
c r b i t  a b o r t  hazards  subsequent t o  t h e s e  types of payloads were a l s o  analyzed.  
A l a r g e  range of upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s ,  i d e n t i f i e d  below, is c u r r e n t l y  
be ing  considered f o r  use  i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r .  These s t a g e s  w i l l  b e  used t o  
launch unmanned payloads i n t o  h i g h e r  o r b i t s  than  t h e  o r b i t e r  c a p a b i l i t y .  
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2.3 .1  Hazardous Elements of Upper S t a g e  Vehicles -
The upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  considered i n  t h i s  sub task  were: 
o Agena 
o Centaur 
o Transtage  
o Burner I1 
o Apollo s e r v i c e  module 
o Orb i t - to -o rb i t  s h u t t l e  (OOS)/tug 
I t  i s  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  the  hazards  i d e n t i f i e d  from t h e s e  v e h i c l e s  a r e  t y p i c a l  
of a l l  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  t h a t  may be  c a r r i e d  i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  i n  the  
f o r e s e e a b l e  f u t u r e .  The modific:d v e r s i o n s  of t h e  Agena and t h e  Centaur a s  
p r e s e n t l y  conceived d i f f e r  only i n  t h e  s i z i c g  of t h e  tanks .  The subsystems 
w i l l  b e  t h e  same a s  on t h e  c u r r e n t  s t a g e s .  The OOS and t h e  tug a t  the  t ime 
t h i s  r e p o r t  was prepared were i n  Phase A d e f i n i t i o n  and :herefore exac t  d a t a  on 
t h e  subsystems t o  be  used a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .  Hmever ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  of the  Phase A 
s t u d i e s  a t  Korth American Rockwell i n d i c a t e  t h a t  the  OOS/tug hazards  a r e  f u l l y  
covered by the  o t h e r  v e h i c l e s  considered.  
Hazardous elements of t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  considered a r e  l i s t e d  i n  
Table 2-2. 
2 .4  HAZARDOUS FLUID VESSELS AS SHUTTLE PAYLOADS 
I n  genera l ,  hazards  e x i s t  e i t h e r  because the  f l u i d  i s  i n h e r e n t l y  hazard- 
ous, e .g. ,  t o x i c  o r  co r ros ive ,  o r  because  of the  cond i t ions  under which i t  is 
t ranspor ted ;  e . g . ,  a t  h igh p r e s s u r e  o r  a s  a cryogen. The s h u t t l e  crew o r  
passengers  a r e  normally only d i r e c t l y  exposed t:, the  hazard  when a manned 
p r e s s u r i z e d  experiments module is c a r r i e d  on t h e  o r b i t e r  as p a r t  of a s o r t i e  
module. S i t u a t i o n s  i n  which crew o r  passengers  have exposed themselves t o  t h e  
l-azardous f l u i d s  i n  e x t r a v e h i c u l a r  l c t i v i t y  (EVA) have a l s o  been considered.  
The main s a f e t y  concern h a s  turned c u t  t o  invo lve  damage t o  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  pzr- 
titularly t h e  cargo bay a r e a ;  and t h i s ,  of course ,  j eopard izes  personnel  
s a f e t y  i n d i r e c t l y  by p rec lud ing  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h .  
A major a r e a  n o t  covered i n  t h i s  s tudy  is t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  i n t o  space  
by t h e  s h u t t l e  of  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of p r o p e l l a n t s  f c r  l o g i s t i c  resupply of 
such v e h i c l e s  a s  a tug,  o r b i t a l  p r o p e l l a n t  depot,  and chemical o r  n u c l e a r  
p ropu l s ion  s t a g e s .  The reason is t h a t  t h e  en : . i r e  s u b j e c t  of l o g i s t i c s  resupply 
of p r o p e l l a n t s  and p r o p e l l a n t  t r a n s f e r  is be ing  s t u d i e d  i n  a concur ten t  NASA 
s tudy  a t  t h e  Space Div i s ion ,  In-Space P r o p e l l a n t  Logis t i c s  and S a f e t y  Study, 
Contract  NAS8-27692. P r o j e c t  11 of t h i s  s tudy  is s p e c i f i c a l l y  concerned w i t h  
t h e  s a f e t y  aspec t s .  
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Table 2-2. H a z a r d c ~ s  Elements o f  Upper S tage  Vehicles 
Fluid P r o p e l l a n t s  : 






l a t e r /Glyco l  
Jnsymnetrical  Dimethyl 
Hydraz i n e  
I n h i b i t e d  Red Fuming N i t r i c  
Acid 
Pressur ized Conta iners  : 
ie l ium Tanks 
J i t rogen  Tanks 
Vitrogen Tetroxide  Tanks 
4erozene -50 Tanks 
Hydrogen Peroxide Tanks 
Liquid Oxygen ~ a n f i s  
Liquid dydrogen Tanks 
Monomethyl Hydrazine Tanks 
h'ater/Glycol Tanks 
Unsymmetrical Dimethyl 
Hydra;: i ne 
I n h i b i t e d  Red Fuming N i t r i c  
Acid 
RCS P r o ~ e l l a n t s :  
Aerozene -50 + Nitrogen 
Te t r o x i d e  
Monomethyl Hydrazine + 
Nitrogen Tetroxide  
Hydrogen Gas + Nitrogen 
Te t rox ide  
Corros ive  F lu ids  : 
Nitrogen Tetroxide  
Hydrogen Peroxide 
Liquid Oxygen 
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Table 2-2. Hazardous Elements of Upper Stage Vehicles (Cont; 
















Eonnections Between Modules - 
Cutters  
Helium Valves 
Solid Propellant Ign i t e r s  
Turbine S t a r t  Solid Pro- 
pe l l an t  Charges 
Explosive Bolts - Payload 
Separation 
Linear Shaped Charge - Panel 
Separation 
Destruct Shaped Charges 
External Extensions - 
Antennae 








Attachment Metnods : 
Explosive Bolts 
Linear Shaped Charge 
Not Defined 
Att i tude Hold/Translation 




Att i tude Hold - RCS Couples 
- Off-Center 
Translat ion - Main Engine 
* ( ) Number of d i rec t ions  
a:. 
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The following s e c t i o n  i d e n t i f i e s  hazardous f i u i d s  involved i n  t h e  
o r b i t e r  pavloads (except upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s )  . 
2.4.1 Hazardous Experiment F l u i d s  
Hazardous experiment f l u i d s  were i d e n t i f i e d  by a review of Volumes I1 
through V I I I  of the  "Blue Book", (Ref. 1 ) .  This  document was s e l e c t e d  
because i t  i s  csed a s  a b a s e l i n e  NASA document t o  d e f i n e  a manned space- 
f l i g h t  r e sea rch  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  be  conducted i n  e a r t h  o r b i t a l  space s t a t i o n s  
and s h u t t l e s  and is t h e r e f o r e  n o t  o r i e n t e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  any s i n g l e  
program. 
The r e s u l t s  of t h e  Blue Book review a r e  summarized i n  Table 2-3. 
2 . 4 . 2  Hazardous S o r t i e  Module F lu ids  
S o r t i e  modules i n c l u d e  resea rch  and a p p l i c a t i o n s  module (RAM), R A M  
support  module (RSM), mission suppor t  module (%ISM), and p a l l e t i z e d  experimen 
payloads which remain a t t ached  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  and a r e  used as reusab le  space  
l a b o r a t o r i e s  o r  suppor t  f a c i l i t i e s .  
For a t y p i c a l  seven-day experiment s o r t i e  miss ion,  it  w i l l  r e q u i r e  f l u i d s  
i n  the approximate q u a n t i t i e s  and wi th  approximate con ta ine r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
as  l i s t e d  i n  Table 2-4. 
Hazardous f l u i d s  o t h e r  than dlose  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  s o r t i e  miss ions  which 
were i d e n t i f i e d  dur ing review of  the  19 71 N.4SA Experiment Blue Book were n o t  
i d e n t i f i a b l e .  
2 . 4 . 3  Hazardous S t a t i o c  F lu ids  
Hazardous f l u i d s  a r e  r equ i red  by both  the  SD and McDonnell Douglas (MDAC) 
designs of the  modular space  s t a t i o n s  dur ing  the  s t a t i o n  bui ldup and normal 
opera t ions  phases.  S t a t i o n  modules con ta in ing  hazardous f l u i d s  f o r  a t t f t u d e  
con t ro l ,  e l e c t r i c a l  power genera t ion,  and p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  w i l l  b e  d e l i v e r e d  by 
the  s h u t t l e  dur ing  t h e  bu i ldup  phase. Resupply of  s t a t i o n  subsystem consum- 
ab les  w i l l  be accomplished under t h e  p r e s e n t  concepts v i a  an o r b i t e r  d e l i v e r e d  
cargo o r  l o g i s t i c s  module. 
The SD s t a t i e n  is planned t o  genera te  GO2 and GH2 by wa te r  e l e c t r o l y s i s  
during normal opera t ions .  During bui ldup,  i t  r e q u i r e s  d e l i v e r y  of high- 
p ressure  gases  on the  i n i  ti a1  modules t o  suppor t  subsequent bui ldup o p e r a t i o n s .  
Af te r  s t a t i o n  bui ldup,  d e l i v e r y  of w a t e r  f o r  e l e c t r o l y s i s  and GN2 f o r  atmos- 
phere leakage makeup v i a  the  cargo m d u l e  w i l l  be  t h e  primary s t a t i o n  subsystem 
resupply f l u i d s .  The expected f l u i d  q u a n t i t i e s ,  tank q u a n t i t i e s ,  and p r e s s u r e s  
f o r  the  SD s t a t i o n  core  and power module bu i ldup  launches and t h e  cargo w d u l e  
resupply f o r  s t a t i o n  subsystems a r e  shorn  i n  Table 2-5. This  inc ludes  f l u i d  
q u a n t i t i e s  required f o r  s t a t i o n  r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  EVA suppor t ,  and 48-hour 
emergency suppor t .  
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EXPERIMENT I OTHER UPPER STAGE VEHICLE 
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Carbon T e t r z f l o u r i d e  (CF4) 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) 
Carbon Dioxide (C02j 




X  X  
X X X X  
X 
X 
Footnotes:  A = Simple asphyxfant C = Extremely t o x i c  when 
B = Can cause severe  burns and heated t o  decomposition 
t i s s u e  damage on con tac t  X = Applicable o r  p resen t  
wi th  s k i n  
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Trimethlaluminwn (AL (iH3) 3) 
Freon 




Potassium Sodium Niobate 
Potassium Sodium S i l i c a t e  
Solvent  
Gallium Arsenide So lu t ion  
Liquid Gallium 
Fused S i l i c a t e  So lu t ions  
Hexane (CH3 (CH2) 4CH3) 
Methanol (CH$N!j 
Pent ane (CH3(CH2) 3CH5) 
Ethanol (CH3CH20H) 
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Table 2-3. Sumnary o f  Hazardous Fluid  Vessais i n  O r b i t e r  Payloads (Cont) 
- 
HAZARDOUS F L U 1  D 
LIQUID (Continued) 
IITRI IN0 S i l i c o n e  (5-13) 
IITRI ZSO S i l i c a t e  (2-9) 
LMSC Thermqtrol T L O ~  
S i l i c o n e  (t 4-300) 
Sch te ldah l  GT-,015 
Lubr icants  
Hydroquinones 
C2H4 
Nitrogen Tet roxide  (N204) 
A-50 (50% UDbM + 50% 
Hydraz ine )  
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Table  2 - 4 .  RAM Support  Module F lu ids  f o r  Seven-Day Miss ion  
0. 23 ( 7 .  1) 
0. 36 (12. 6 )  







T a b l e  2-5. Expected Hazardous F l u i d s  - N R  Modular S t a t i o n  Subsystems 
I lContainer Characteristics 
No. of 
Containers  1 Fluid Quantity kg (lb) 







F l b i d  
kgClb) m3(ft3) 
p s i ) .  
Container Characteristics 
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2.5  CARGO HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION BETWEEN SHUTTLE ORBITER, SORTIE 
MODULES, AND S2ACE STATION 
The purpose of  t h i s  sub task  was t o  i d e n t i f y  the  hazards  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  
the  hand l ing  and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of cargo between t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ,  s o r t i e  
nodules ,  and space  s t a t i o n  i n  e a r t h  o r b i t ,  and t o  determine t h e  s a f e t y  
requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  t o  d e a l  wi th  t h e s e  hazards .  
Table 2-6 shows t h e  cargo t h a t  i s  needed f o r  space  s t a t i o n  o p e r a t i o n s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  hazardous cargo.  The cargo t h a t  has  t o  be  t r a n s f e r r e d  between t 5 ~  
va r ious  s p a c e c r a f t  i n  t h e  miss ion  model a r e  shown i n  Table  2-7. 
Table 2 - 6 .  Space S tatfon Logistiat Resupply 
Cargo Item 
* Liquid hydrogen 
Liquid oxygen 
* Liquid ni t rogen 
* Liquid helium 








* Cal ibra t ion  gas 
Miscellaneous cryo 
Water-animals 
Water-no meta l l ic  content 
Water-s ter i le  t r i p l e  
d i s t i l l e d  







S ta t ion  spares 
* Hazardous Items 
Carno Item 




F i l m  16 mn 
Film-9 x 14 mm 
Cultures (food) 




Tape and microfilm 
Magnetic tapes 
Specimens spares  
Logist ics  
Micrometeroid co l l ec to r  
Ballooms 
Dry samples 
Diary, l o g i s t i c s  
Lab suppl ies  
Physiological Measurement 
suppl ies  
Accessories 
F i l m  p l a t e s  
Probes 
Nas r e  ( re  turn)  
Tab1 e 2-7,  Cargo Handling and Transfer Model 
7 
EOS' Crew Oompart- 
ment o r  Airlock 
- - . . . - . 
*EOS+ Prope 11 ant  
Tanks 
-- - - 
RAhlX Support Module 
Experiment P a l l e t  
RANX (7 -30  Da;. 
S o r t i e )  
R . W X  (Free F lye r )  
- - - - - - . - . . 
Space S t a t i o n  
Space S t a t  ion 
Cargo Module 
-- ~ 
F l i  s s i on Support / 
Adapter Module 
0 
USV (Upper Stage 
L'ehicle) 
USV' Payload 
EOS+ Serv iceab le  
Automated Payloads 
Legend: N = Non-hazardous cargo ( f i l m ,  t a p e ,  s e r v i c e  i tems) 
H = Hazardous cargo ( p r o p e l l a n t s ,  hazardous f l u i d s  and m a t e r i a l s )  
- = Not a p p l i c a b l e  o r  no cargo t r a n s f e r  
Notes: * Considers p o t e n t i a l  payload use  o f  EOS r e s e r v e  p r o p e l l a n t s  
** Considers p o t e n t i a l  use  o f  EOS p r o p e l l a n t s  s t o r e d  i n  cargo bay 
t o  extend EOS c a p a b i l i t y  . 
+ EOS = Earth  O r b i t a l  S h u t t l e  ( o r b i t e r )  
x RAM = Research Appl ica t ions  Module ( s o r t i e  module) 
O USV = Upper Stage Vehicle 
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P o t e n t i a l  hazards  which can occur dur ing carga handl ing and t r a n s f e r  
opera t ions  were i d e n t i f i e d  by consider ing p o s s i b l e  conhinations of the follow- 
ing:  
o  Candidate cargo,  both  hazardous and nonhazardous 
o  The cargo handl ing and t r a n s f e r  model 
o  The d i f f e r e n t  methods of cargo handl ing and t r a n s f e r  
The hazards o r  emergendies were considered t o  a r i s e  from two source ,  as 
follows : 
e F a i l u r e s  o r  a c c i d e n t s  r e l a t e d  t o  hazardous cargo i tems i n  
otherwise  normal hand l ing  and t r a n s f e r  opera t ions  
o  Malfunctions,  f a i l u r e s ,  o r  acc iden t s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  cargo 
hand l ing  and t r a n s f e r  mechanisms, inc lud ing  human e r r o r s ,  
consider ing both  hazardous and nonhazardous cargo 
Maximum Safe  Tank Contents 
Gaseous leakage from a  p ressur ized  tank i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay cannot 
be allowed t o  overpressa r ize  the  bay. The r e s u l t i n g  damage t o  t h e  sh .  c t l e  
s t r u c t u r e  and cargo bay doors could,  i n  extreme cases ,  cause l o s s  of A e  e n t i r e  
v e h i c l e ,  i i ic luding the  crew, dur ing reen t ry  . Limiting t.he gaseous contents  of 
r i q  one tank t o  t h e  v a l u e  shown f o r  a  t y p i c a l  case  i n  Figure 2 - . '  w i l l  prevent  
overpressure  i n  the  event of rup tdre .  This r e s u l t  takes advantage of t h e  
decrease  i n  gas temperature dur ing expansion t o  allow high i n i t i a l  t ank  p res -  
s u r e s  i n  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  tank volumes. The f i n a l  low temperature reduces t h e  
immediate s p e c i f i c  volume, s o  t h a t  a  l a r g e r  weight of gas i s  accep tab le  t o  t h e  
s h u t t l e  s t r u c t u r a l  s t r e n g t h .  K t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  b e t t e r ,  from t h e  p o i n t  of view of 
p o t e n t i a l  cargo bay o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  t o  t r a n s p o r t  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of gas i n  
t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay a t  h igh  r a t h e r  than low p r e s s u r e  (assuming t h e  same s t o r -  
age temperature) .  
3  For example, a  t y p i c a l  space s t a t i o n  module con ta ins  156 n (5500 f t 3 )  o f  
a i r  a t  105 ~ / m ~  (14.7 p s i ) .  This  p o i n t  is on t h e  unsafe s i d e  of t h e  curve,  
i . e . ,  a  massive l e a k  from t h e  module could damage t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay. If 
t h e  same q u a n t i t y  o f  a i r  i s  s t o r e d  i n  a  tank of 1.56 m3 (55 f t 3 )  a t  a  p r e s s u r e  
of l o7  ~ / m 2  (1470 p s i ) ,  and t h e  module is  now vented t o  space dur ing launch 
and only p ressur ized  a f t e r  s t a t i o n  assembly, a r u p t u r e  of t h e  tank w i l l  n o t  
now o v e r p r e s s u r i z e  t h e  cargo bay,  a s  shown by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  p o i n t  now 
l i e s  on t h e  s a f e  si.de of t h e  curve. 
?: Maximcm Safe  Tank Contents - Liquid 
S a f s  l i q u i d  content  of upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  tanks is a func t ion  of t h e  
mount  of gas generated when l i q u i d  leakage occurs .  ' S t o r a b l e  p r o p e l l a n t s  
r e l e a s e  s small amount o f  gas because of r a p i d  s o l i d i f i c a t i o n .  The d i f f e r -  
ence between s o l i d i f i c a t i o n  temperature and normal opera t ing  tercperature i s  
smal l  and t h e  h e a t  l o s t  through evaporat ion is l a r g e ,  e.g., one pound of 
water  a t  21°c (70'~) r e q u i r e s  only 0.073 kg (0.16 l b )  of water  evapora t ion  t o  
f r e e z e .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  cryogenic p r o p e l l a n t s  vapor ize  a l a r g e r  percentage o f  
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t h e  l i q u i d  b e f o r e  t h e  remainder i s  s o l i d ;  e .g . ,  a t  l e a s t  25 percent  f o r  hydro- 
gen and 53 pe rcen t  f o r  oxygen. Expansion t o  a h i g h e r  p ressure  than vacuum 
may r e s u l t  i n  a decrease  i n  the  amount of gas genera ted,  b u t  a t  a  h i g h e r  temp- 
e r a t u r e .  S p e c i f i c  a n a l y s i s  i s  requ i red  f o r  each combination of l i q u i d  and 






I s e n t r o p i c  expansion of d ia tomic  g a s  frcm 
tank i n t o  18.3 nl (60 f t )  x 4 .6  m (15 f t j  
SAFE 
I 
I9 ! 105 1 Oh 10 - ~ / m *  abs 
Bay Pressure  
. 13,800 ~ / m 2 ~  
!nit i a l  Tank I ' ressure 
1 . 4 5  14.5 14.5 1350 p s i  
10- 
Figure 2-1 Saf c Content of Gas Tanks 
"\ ( 2  p s i a )  \ 
\ 
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The TNT e q u i v a l e n t  of hydrogen (parahydrogen) a s  i t  expands from cyp ica l  
s u b c r i t i c a l  cond i t ions  t o  vacuum i s  shown i n  Figure  2-2, a s  b e i n g  t y p i c a l  
of cryogenic  f l u i d s .  This is p l o t t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  temperature  of t h e  f l u i d .  
The i n i t i a l  cond i t ions  on t h e  r i g h t  a l l  r e p r e s e n t  d i f f e r e n t  combinations of 
temperature and p ressure ,  k i t h  t h e  f l u i d  f u l l y  s a t u r a t e d ;  i . e . ,  100 pe rcen t  
gas f o r  t h e  two top curves ,  and 100 percent  l i q u i d  f o r  the  two bottom curves .  
The four  curves  are. character ized,  by the  c - ~ t r o p y ,  which i s  assumed t o  remain 
cons t a n t  dur ing  expansion.  The v a r i a t i o n  of the  corresponding "qual i ty" ,  o r  
p ropor t ion  of gas ,  during t h e  expansion is shown f o r  the  f o u r  curves i n  Fig- 
u r e  2-3. 
I f  the  expansion s t a r t s  o r  t e rmina tes  a t  p ressures  and temperatures  w i t h i n  
the  range shown i n  F igure  2-2, t h e  TNT e q u i v a l e n t  of t h e  expansion i s  repre-  
s e n t e d  by t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  o r d i n a t e s  f o r  t h e  two po in t s .  S ince  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  
expansions of i n t e r e s t  n e i t h e r  proceed t o  a vacuum, n o r  proceed i s e n t r o p i c a l l y ,  
i t  i s  seen t h a t  the  curves i n d i c a t e  t h e  maximun p o t e n t i a l  TNT e q u i v a l m t  
(remembering t h a t  entropy can only i n c r e a s e  dur ing a r e a l  process ,  not  decrease) .  
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Figure 2-2. TNT Equivalent of Cryogenic Hydrogen 
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I t  is  a l s o  of i n t e r e s t  t o  n o t e  how non l inea r ly  t h e  p r e s s u r e  decreases  
wi th  t h e  temperature ,  as  shown by the  bottom s c a l e  of Figure 2-2. 
Typ ica l ly ,  t h e  TNT e q u i v a l e n t  of c ~ y o g e n i c s  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  low. A s  i3 
comparison, Table  2-8 compares th.: TNT equ iva len t  of hydrogen a t  t y p i c a l  
s u b c r i t i c a l  cryogenic  s t o r a g e  c o n d i t i o n s  as a l i q u i d ,  wi th  t h e  same tempera- 
t u r e  and p r e s s u r e  a s  a gas ,  and wi th  t y p i c a l  h igh p r e s s u r e  s t o r a g e  cond i t ions  
a s  a gas a t  room temperature .  
Table 2-8. TNT Equivalent  o f  liydrogen Stored a t  'Typical Cryogenic 
- . 
and High Pressure  Gas ~ o n d i  t ionJ 
Pressure  Temperature TNT Equivalent  
A t m .  , I 'a (OR) I Phase I hg/kg H2 (lb/lbl12) 





Face and s i d e  on overpressures  r esu l  t i n g  from an exploeic?  a r e  shown i n  
Figure  2-4 a s  a func t ion  of b l a s t  s c u r c e  TNT equ!velent and d i s t a n c e  from 
the  source .  
The maximum al lowable  cargo bay p r e s s u r e  f o r  a t y p i c a l  o r b i t e r  des ign of 
1.3,800 N/m2 (2 p s i )  i s  shown f o r  r e f e r e n c e  cogether wi th  the  maximun a l lowable  
face-on overpressure ,  20,700 ~ / m 2  ( 3  p s i ) ,  pe rmiss ib le  f o r  personnel  exposure 




The f i g u r e  shows t h a t  cons ide rab le  cargo bay darnage could r e s u l t  from a n  
uncontained explos ion w i t h i n  the  bay wi th  l e s s  than 0.0045 kg (0.91 l b )  TNT 
equ iva len t .  For example, i f  a b l a s t  of  t h i s  energy e q u i v a l e n t  were detonated 
i n  the  c e n t e r  of a 4.6 m(15 f t )  d iamete r  by 18.3  m (60 f t )  l eng th  cargo bay, 
the  s t r u c t u r e  l o c a t e d  a t  a d i s t a n c e  of 2.3 m (7.5 f t )  would b e  exposed t o  an 
overpressure  i n  excess  of 69,000 N/m2 (10 p s i ) ,  w h i l e  the  ends of t h e  bay 
would be exposed t o  s l i g h t l y  g r e a r e r  than 6900 ~ / m 2  (1 p s i ) .  
Figure 2-5 shmw t h e  TNT e q u i v a l a c  per  u n i t  vclume ?f d ia tomic  gases as  
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Maximum Tole rab le  Leak Rate i n t o  S h u t t l e  Cargo Bay 
An i n v e s t i g a t i o n  was made t o  determine the  maximum a l lowable  l e a k  r a t e  
which can b e  t o l e r a t e d  i n t o  the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay from a  p r e s s u r i z e d  payload 
v e s s e l .  The s h u t t l e  cargo bay doors were assumed t o  b e  c losed and t h e  bay 
piovided w i t h  ven t s  t o  l i m i t  cargo bay d i f f e r e n t i a l  p r e s s u r e s  t o  l e s s  than 
13,800 X/m2 (2  p s i ) .  A vent  a r e a  t o  cargo bay volume r a t i o  of approximately 
13.8 cm2/m3 (0.05 i n 2 / f t 3 )  whlch has  been p rev ious ly  used i n  NR s h u t t l e  ven t ing  
s t u d i e s ,  was assumed t o  e s t i m a t e  the  vent ing a r e a  f o r  any known cargo bay vol- 
ume. 
The maximum t o l e r a b l e  l e a k  r a t e  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of vent a r e a  is shown i n  
Figure  2 4  and assumes a  gas  temperature  of -2050C (-328OF) 
( t y p i c a l  temperatures  of gases  t h a t  have leaked i n t o  t h e  cargo bay) ,  a  maxi- 
mum al lowable  cargo bay d i f f e r e n t i a l  p ressure  of 13,800 ~ / m 2  (2  p s i ) ,  and a  
d i scharge  c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  ven t  of 0.85. The l e a k  r a t e  is r e l a t i v e i y  
i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  gas temperature,  va ry ing  i n v e r s e l y  a s  - the  square  r o o t  of 
the  a b s o l u t e  temperature.  
I t  is seen  t h a t  t h e  maximum l e a k  r a t e  which can be  t o l e r a t e d  is  l a r g s r  
f o r  gases  of h i g h  -01ecular  weight than gases of low molecular weight ,  and 
t h a t  leakage of hydrogen r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  wors t  case .  
Current  N R  o r b i t e r  des igns  use always-open cargo bay v e n t s  of approxi-  
mately 0.37 m2 (4  f t 2 )  a r e a .  The maximum t o l e r a b l e  s t eady  s t a t e  leakage r a t e  
i n t o  t h e  cargo bay, w i t h  doors c losed ,  i s  of t h e  o r d e r  of 2.5 kg l sec  (5.5 l b /  
s e c j  f o r  hydrogen and 20 kg / sec  (45 l b l s e c )  f o r  a i r ,  oxygen o r  n i t r o g e n .  
Larger  leakage r a t e s  i n t o  t h e  cargo bay can be  t o l e r a t e d  f o r  s h o r t e r  dura t ions ,  
u n t i l  the  cargo bay p r e s s u r e  goes from vacuun t o  t h e  t o l e r a b l e  l i m i t .  Such a  
l a r g e  leakage r a t e  f o r  a  prolonged pe r iod  ja approaching,  i n  i ts  damaging 
e f f e c t s ,  an  exp los ive  r u p t u r e  of a  tank r a t h e r  than leakage.  
I t  can be  coscluded t h a t  o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  of t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay f o r  
normal cargb is not a major hazard .  It must be  considered,  however, f o r  pay- 
l o a d s  con ta in ing  mostly p r o p e l l a n t s ,  such a s  upper s t z g e  v e h i c l e s  o r  p r o p e l l a u t  
l o g i s t i c s  resupply .  The hazard  is then s e r i o u s ,  however, oa ly  dur ing t h e  t i m e  
t h e  cargo bay doors remain c losed .  
Man-Compatibility of  Tug whi le  i n  2r Near O r b i t e r  
Upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  must b e  man-compatible; i .e.  , man r a t i n g  s a f e t y  
c r i t e r i a  must be  a p p l i e d  t o  systems a:.d func t ions  of  t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  
which could c r e a t e  a  hazard  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  whi le  t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  is 
i n  o r  near  t h e  o r b i t e r .  The term man-rating, w%ile  n o t  s t r i c t l y  de f ined ,  
means t h a t  t h e  s a f e t y ,  i . e . ,  l a c k  of hazards  t o  t h e  s h u t t l e  and s h u t t l e  
pe r sonne l ,  has  been adequate ly  demonstrated s o  t h a t  t h e  r e s i d u a l  r i s k s  t o  
personnel  a r e  judged t o  be  accep tab le .  Th i s  is,  of  course ,  a s u b j e c t i v e  mat te r  
and no d e f i n i t e  man-rating c r i t e r i a  can be  c i t e d .  
On t h e  Sa tu rn  S-I1 and Apollo CSE1 programs, two s u c c e s s f u l  unmanned f l i g h t s  
were t h e  last  phases o f  man-rating a new launch veh ic le .  It is n o t  c l e a r  what 
t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  requirement is  f o r  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s ,  s i n c e  t h e  miss ion phases 
which r e q u i r e  man-compatibil i ty a r e  t h e  r e l a t i w l y  p a s s i v e  phases  of  launch,  
b o o s t ,  on-orbi t  deployment and r e t r i e v a l ,  d e o r b i t ,  r e e n t r y ,  and landing.  
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The t e s t  requirements  f o r  man-compatibil i ty must t h e r e f o r e  be developed,  
and must be c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  t h e  corresponding man-rating requirements on t h e  
s h u t t l e .  
One p o s s i b i l i t y  is  t h a t  a s a f e  unmanned t e s t  be performed on the  s h u t t l e ,  
i n  which one o r  both  p r o p e l l a n t s  a r e  r ep laced  by e q u i v a l e n t  f l u i d s  which cannot 
r e a c t  chemically.  For example, L02/LH2 v e h i c l e s  may be launched i n t o  o r b i t  and 
r e t u r n e d  t o  e a r t h  using L N ~ / L H ~ .  The l i q u i d  n i t r o g e n  w i l l  p rovide  an adequate 
s imula t ion  of t h e  l i q u i d  oxygen, b u t  n e i t h e r  the  n i t r o g e n  nor  the  hydrogen on 
t h e i r  own, nor i n  combination, can produce a chemical r e a c t i o n .  Other propel-  
l a n t s  can be rep laced  by chemically i n e r t  f l u i d s  wi th  analogous d e n s i t y ,  
thermal ,  and o t h e r  p r o p e r t i e s .  Such a f l i g h t  t e s t  can b e  used t o  s a t i s f y  man- 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  requirements ;  b u t  i t  can a l s o  b e  used as a p a r t  of t n e  v e h i c l e  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g  because t h e  s h u t t l e  environment is p e r f e c t l y  reproduced. 
Such combined t e s t i n g  may prove very  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e ,  r e p l a c i n g  a l a r g e  p o r t i o n  
of t h e  ground q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g ,  a s  w e l l  a s  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  man-compatibility 
requirement.  
An a l t e r n a t i v e  man-compatibil i ty t e s t  may c o n s i s t  of  launching t h e  upper 
s t a g e  v e h i c l e  i n t o  o r b i t  a s  a k i c k s t a g e ,  u s i n g  a b o o s t e r  which e x h i b i t s  environ- 
ments a t  l e a s t  a s  s e v e r e  a s  the  s h u t t l e .  Such a t e s t  imposes des ign c o n s t r a i n t s  
on new upper step v e h i c l e s  ( i .  e .  , the  tug/OOS) t o  make i t  compatible wi th  t h e  
s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  and wi th  the  o t h e r  b o o s t e r .  
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3.0 SHUTTLE TO SPACE STATION DOCKING OPTIONS 
The Space S t a t i o n  Program Fhase B d e f i n i t i o n  s t u d i e s  i d e n t i f i e d  a  concern 
a s  t o  t h e  b e s t  way t o  e f f e c t  dockir~g between t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  and t h e  space 
s t a t i o n .  The s a f e t y  a s p e c t s  of b r ing ing  t h e s e  tw l a r g e  and massive v e h i c l e s  
togo the r  were a  prime c o n s i d e r a t i a n  i n  t h e  suggested docking methods. 
Among t h e  systems t h a t  have been considered f o r  docking a re :  
. The d i r e c t  docking of ;he s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  t o  t h e  space s t a t i o n ,  
a s  i n  t h e  Apollo Progran. 
. The use  of manipula tors ,  on e i t h e r  th,? o r b i t e r  o r  s t a t i o n ,  t o  
e f f e c t  a  more mechanically de te rmina te  docking maneuver, and 
a t  a  much lower con tac t  v e l o c i t y  than i s  p r a c t i c a l  wi th  d i r e c t  
docking . 
. An extendable  soft-dock system which provides  a  l a r g e  d i s t a n c e  
between t h e  docking v e h i c l e s  a t  i n i t i a l  c o n t a c t ,  and reduces  
t h e  docking loads  through t h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  of t h e  system. 
. Free-f ly ing and docking t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  space   tat ion o r  o t h e r  
nodu les  between o r b i t e r  and s t a t i ~ n ,  so  a s  t o  avoid t h e  c l o s e  
proximity  of o r b i t e r  and s c a t i o n .  The s t a t i o n  and t h e  o r b i t e r  
s t a t ionkeep  a t  some d i s t a n c e  from each c t h e r .  
The purpose of t h i s  t a s k  was t o  i d e n t i f y ,  analyze  and recommend r e s o l u t i o n  
of t h e  hazards  involved i n  t h e  suggested methods f o r  docking t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  t h e  
modular space s t a t i o n ;  and to  make recommendations a s  t o  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  docking 
methods from t h e  s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view. 
Three k inds  of opera t ions  were c o n s i t s r e d :  
. Assembly of  t h e  moduiar space  s t a t i o n  
. Normal resupply  d o c k j ~ g  
. Emergency docking 
The comparison of  t h e  va r ious  docking op t ions  was divided i n t o  two 
e s s e n t i a l l y  uncaupled t radeof  fs . One t r a d e o f f  was between t h r e e  docking sys tems,  
and t h e  o t h e r  between two docking modes. The t h r e e  docking systems (Fig. 3-la) are: 
. D i r e c t  docking system 
. Extendable tunne l  docking system 
. Mantpulator docking system 
The two docking modes (Fig. 3-2b) ' a r e :  
. O r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode 
. Free-flying module docking mode 
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The hazards  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h i s  t a s k ,  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  ana lyses ,  a r e  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  any combination of docking v e h i c l e s  which use  t h e  docking systems 
and modes considered h e r e ,  providing a t  l e a s t  one of t h e  v e h i c l e s  is  manned. 
The c o n c l u s i o r ~ s  and recommendations reached,  however, cannot be app l i ed  t o  a l l  
such v e h i c l e  combinations without c a r e f u l  re-evaluat ion.  The reason i s  t h a t  
t \ e  e f f e c t s  and c r i t i c a l i t y  of the  hazards  may d i f f e r  according t o  t h e  con- 
f i g u r a t i o n ,  s i z e ,  mass, c o n t r o l  systems,  and o t h e r  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  v e h i c l e s .  
The f u r t h e r  t h e s e  f e a t u r e s  vary from t h e  o r b i t e r ,  space s t a t i o n ,  and i n d i v i d u a l  
f r e e - f l y i n b  modules considered he re ,  t h e  l e s s  t h e  confidence t h a t  can be placed 
on t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of  t h e  r e s u l t s  and conclus ions ,  
F u r t h e r  d i f f e r e n c e s  which may i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h i s  t a s k  a r i s e  
when a d d i t i o n a l  hazards  e x i s t  because of t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  v e h i c l e s .  For 
example, when one of  t h e  docking v e h i c l e s  i s  a  p ropu l s ion  s t a g e  (e.g.,  a  tug)  
o r  con ta ins  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of p r o p e l l a n t s  (e.g. ,  a p r o p e l l a n t  d e p o t ) ,  hazards  
a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  p r o p e l l a n t  s l o s h ,  l e a k s ,  e t c . ,  must be a d d i t i o n a l l y  considered.  
ho the r  example i s  a  r eusab le  nuc lea r  s h u t t l e ,  which poses nuc lea r  r a d i a t i o n  
hazards .  For such v e h i c l e s ,  t h e  conc lus ions  of t h i s  t a s k  must be re-assessed.  
D l  RECT 
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Figure  3-l(b!. Docking Modes 
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3 .1  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The conclus ions  reached i n  the  eva lun t ion  of t h e  docking systems a r e  a s  
follows.  
. Each of t h e  t h r e e  docking systems--direct  docking, extendable  
tunnel  and mani~u la to r - -can  be made adequate ly  s a f e .  
. The s t a t i o n k e e p i n g  and t h e  d u a l  manipula tor  methods of us ing 
t h e  manipula tor  docking system have t h e  p o t e n t i a l  of personnel  
l o s s  i n  t h e  event  of l o s s  of manipula tor  c o n t r c l  be fa re  a 
manned a t t a c h e d  module i s  docked. This  remains a r e s i d u a l  
hazard even when zomplex emergency l i f e  suppor t  requirements 
s r e  added t o  t h e  manned modules. The d u a l  docking method 
r e q u i r e s  more o p e r a t i o n s  t o  e f f e c t  docking, bu t  does n o t  have 
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  l o s s  of personnel .  
. A l l  t h r e e  docking s y s t e m  have t h e  p o t e n t i a l  of ctamage t o  t h e  
docking system and damage t o  t h e  v e h i c l e s .  The damage t o  t h e  
s p a c e c r a f t  could ,  i n  c e r t a i n  c i rcumstances ,  be c r i t i c a l  enough 
t o  r e s u l t  i n  l o s s  of v e h i c l e  o r  l o s s  of  personnel .  
. The d i r e c t  docking system has  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  in-  
adver ten t  c o l l i s i o n  because of t h e  c l o s e  proximity of t h e  
docking veh ic les .  
. The manipula tor  docking system has  t h e  minimum p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
i n a d v e r t e n t  c o l l i s i o n  between v e h i c l e s  because of t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  
l a r g e  s e p a r a t i o n  d i s t a n c e  a t  i n i t i a l  c a p t u r e ,  bu t  has  more p o t e n t i a l  
f a i l u r e  modes which car. r e s u l t  i n  i n a d v e r t e n t  con tac t  and damage. 
, The d i r e c t  docking can perform a t ime c r i t i c a l  emergency docking 
quicker  than t h e  o t h e r  systems. The manipula tor  docking system 
has  more p o t e n t i a l  f o r  docking wi th  an ou t -o f -con t ro l ,  tumbling 
o r  spinning s p a c e c . a f t .  
, The h ~ z a r d s  and r i s k s  of t h e  t h r e e  systems a r e  no t  e q u a l l y  we l l  
understood because of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  development s t a t u s  of t h e  
systems. The d i r e c t  docking system i s  relatively wel l  understood 
from Gemini and Apollo exper ience;  t h e  manipula tor  system has  
been de f ined  t o  some e x t e n t  i n  t h e  S h u t t l e  Phase B s t u d i e s .  b u t  
h a s  n o t  been t e s t e d  o r  s imulated a t  t h e  time of t h i s  s t v i y ;  and 
t h e  extendable  t u n n e l  system is  only  i n  a conceptual  s t age .  
, T:le s a f e t y  advantages  and disadvantages  of t h e  t h r e e  systems a r e  
s u f f i c i a n t l y  balanced and u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n  t h e  c a r r e n t  system 
d e f i n i t i o n  a r e  such t h a t  a ranking of t h e  system from t h e  s a f e t y  
p o i n t  of view cannot be made a t  p resen t .  
. I f  t h e  docking systems,  when developed, o p e r a t e  a s  assumed i n  t h e  
s tudy,  i . e . ,  wi thout  any major a d d i t i o n a l  compl icat ions  i n  t h e  
des ign  o r  a d d i t i o n a l  haza rds ,  then t h e  extendable  tunne l  system 
appears  t o  r e q u i r e  t h e  l e a s t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  make it adeqliately s a f e ,  
and t h e  manipula tor  system t h e  most. 
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The conc lus ions  reached on t h e  docking modes a r e  summarized a s  fol.lows: 
. The f r e e - f l y i n g  docking mode has  a p o t e n t i a l  f o r  pe r sonne l  l o s s  
when used t o  t r a n s f e r  personnel  between o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n .  The 
necessa ry  s a f e t y  r e q ~ i i r e m e n t s  f o r  6 men on t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  module reduce 
t h e  payload c a p a b i l i t y  by 500 kg (1200 l b )  and 3 m j  (100 f t 3 ) ,  
b u t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  pe r sonne l  l o s s  remains a  r e s i d u a l  hazard.  
. The f r e e - f l y i n g  module docking mode p rec ludes  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  
a  s i n g l e  a c c i d e n t  r e s u l t i n g  i n  l o s s  of both t h e  o r b i t e r  and 
s t a t i o n .  
. No s i g n i f i c a n t  s a f e t y  d i f f e r e n c e s  e x i s t  between t h e  i n t e g r a l  
systems modules, space-based mini  tug ,  and ground-based mini  
tug  methods of us ing t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  module docking mode. 
. The o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode has  more p o t e n t i a l  of  c a s i n g  
major damage t o  the  o r b i t e r  and /o r  s t a t i o n  than t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  
docking mode, b u t  does n o t  d i r e c t l y  l e a d  t o  pe r sonne l  l o s s .  Loss of  
pe r sonne l  o r  l o s s  of a v e h i c l e  a s  a r e s u l t  of t h e  damage is  p o s s i b l e  
b u t  n o t  l i k e l y .  
. Use of t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  mode f o r  t r a n s f e r r i n g  only  unmanned modules 
between o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n  e l i r n i n a ~ e a  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  of p e r s a m e 1  
l o s s  dur ing  t r a n s f e r .  I t  a l s o  h a s  a  reduced p o t e n t i a l  f o r  v e h i c l e  
c o n t a c t  and damage compared t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode 
because of t h e  s impler  geometry and s m a l l e r  docking energy involved.  
. The o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  dockin: mode p r o v i d e s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  qu icke r  
docking than t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  mode i n  t h e  event  of a  t i m e  c r i t i c a l  
docking requirement.  
The recommendations t h a t  r e s u l t  from t h i s  t a s k  a r e  based on t h e  fo l lowing  
precedence of s a f e t y  s e l e c t i o n  c r i t i e r a :  
. A system o r  mode which h a s  t h e  lesser p o t e n t i a l  f o r  personnel  
l o s s  i s  p r e f e r r e d .  
. Of t h e  remaining cho ices ,  t h e  system o r  mode i n  which t h e  s a f e t y  
requirements  can r e s u l t  i n  a  s i g n a f i c a n t i y  lesser r i s k  ( i n  terms 
of p r o b a b i l t t y  and s e v e r i t y  o f  damage) i s  p r e f e r r e d .  
. Libere t h e  requirements  r e s u l t  i n  e s s e n t i a l l y  equa l  r i s k ,  t h e  <choice 
i n  which t h e  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  r e s u l t  i n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
less des ign  impact i s  p r e f e r r e d .  
. The c a p a b i l i t y  t o  b e t t e r  d e a l  wi th  a n  emergency s i t u a t i o n  is 
cons ide red  i n  t h e  recommendations, bu t  is  weighted r e l a t i v e l y  
l i g h t l y  because t h e r e  is no c lea r -cu t  advantage t o  any o f  t h e  
systems o r  modes, and because  o f  i h e  low p r o b a b i l i t y  of an 
emergency docking being requ i red .  
I f  mini  tugs  (such a s  remote maneuvering u n i t s )  o r  modules wi th  
s e l f  -contained p ropu l s ion ,  c o n t r o l  and docking c a p a b i l i t i e s  (such 
a s  t h e  space tug)  a r e  developed f o r  o t h e r  purposes and a r e  a v a i l -  
a b l e ,  t h e i r  use i n  t r a n s f e r r i n g  unmanned r.odules o r  payloads between 
o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n  should  be  considered a s  an accep tab le  dccking 
mode. Use of t h i s  f r e e - f l y i n g  module mode f o r  unmanned pavloads 
i n  conjunct ion wi th  t h e  use of  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  mode f o r  
a l l  manned modules h a s  s i g n i f i c a n t  s a f e t y  advantages.  
3.2 RESIDUAL HAZARDS AND HAZARDS RESOLUTION 
This  s e c t i o n  summarizes t h e  hazards  i d e n t i f i e d  and t h e i r  r e s o l u t i o n  and 
p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  requirements f o r  suppor t ing  resea rch  and techn7logy.  
3.2.1 Resolut ion of Tdentif  i e d  Hazards 
Tine 23 hazards  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h i s  t a s k  and t h e i r  d i s p o s i t i o n  is shown i n  
Table 3-1. Th i s  shows t h e  judgments of t h e  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  a s  t o  which haza rds  
should be  resolved by implementation of t h e  recommended requirements and 
g u i d e l i n e s ;  which a r e  r e s i d u a l  hazards ;  which of t h e  r e s i d u a l  hazards  r e p r e s e n t  
accep tab le  r i s k s ;  and which r e q u i r e  suppor t ing  resea rch  and technology (SRT) 
o r  must a t  p r e s a t  b s  consjdered as unresolved s a f e t y  i s s u e s .  
3.2.2 Suppcr t ing  Research a.id Technology Requirements 
The suppor t ing  rcsea rch  and technology requirements  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  
a r e a s  of u r , ~  a r t a i n t y  of t h i s  t a s k  a r e  l i s t e d  below. The main o r i g i n a t i n g  
hazardslemez mcy a r e  i n d i c a t e d  i n  p a r e ~ . t h e s i s .  
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These recommendations a r e :  
. The d i r e c t  docking, ex tendab le  tunne l ,  and manipula tor  docking 
systems should a l l  be considered a s  accep tab le  docking systems 
from t h e  s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view. 
The s t a t ionkeep ing  and dua l  manipula tor  methods of us ing t h e  
manipula tor  docking system should be r e j e c t e d  a s  p r a c t i c a l  
op t ions  f o r  personnel  t r a n s f e r  i n  normal o p e r a t i o n s  because of 
t h e i r  h igh p o t e n t i a l  f o r  personnel  l o s s .  The methods a r e  
accep tab le  f o r  t r a n s f e r  of unmanned modules o r  f o r  emergencies. 
, The use  of t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  docking mode f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of 
manned modules should be r e j e c t e d  f o r  normal o p e r a t i o n s  because 
of t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  personnel  l o s s .  This  mode may be used i n  
emergencies. 
. The o r b i t e r - t o - s t a t i o n  docking mode should be considered accept-  
a b l e  from t h e  s a f e t y  p o i n t  c f  view wi th  any of t h e  accep tab le  
docking systems. 
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Table 3-1. Hazards Resolut ion 
Hazard 
Impairment o r  v i s i b i l i t y  a t  c r i t i c a l  
moment. 
Loss of v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  p r i o r  t o  
docking c o n t a c t .  
Loss of v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  
i n l t i a l  c o n t a c t .  
F a i l u r e  t o  i n h i b i t  a t t i t u d e  hold  of  
one v e h i c l e  a f t e r  capture .  
Loss of docking system f u n c t i o n  o r  
c o n t r o l .  
F a i l u r e  of o r b i t e r  payload module 
deployment mechanism. 
Hardware p r o t r u s i o n s  i n  the  docking 
tunnel .  
Unsecured equipment and personnel  
dur ing  docking. 
Degradation of l i f e  suppor t  system. 
Docking ha tch  opened when p y a s u r e  
e q u a l i z a t i o n  incomplete.  
E l e c t r i c  d i scharge  dur ing  i n i t i a l  
c o n t a c t .  
Loss of  v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  i n  c l o s e  
proximity  t o  o t h e r  veh ic le .  
08s of  a t t e n u a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t y .  L
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Table 3-1. Hazards Resolut ion (Cont .) 
Hazard 
Loss of  v e h j c l e  c o n t r o l  p,-.. f i o r  t o  
docking c o n t a c t  by extendable  
t unne 1. 
Loss of v r h i r l e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  
cap tu re  by ex tendab le  t u n n e l  
docking system. 
Loss of  p r e s s u r e  i n  the  pneumatic 
ex tens ion  and energy absorp t ion  
s y s  tern. 
Loss of v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  p r i o r  t o  
cap tu re  by manipula tor .  
Loss of v e h t c l e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  
cap tu re  by manipula tor .  
Loss of manipula tor  j o i n t  n o t o r  
c u n t r o l .  
Loss of manipulator cis-puter 
a ided c o n t r o l  svst2n. 
Loss of  Comunications/Command 
c a p a b i l i t y  dur ing  docking by 
unmanned f t e e  f i y i n g  mcdule . 
Loss o f  p ropu l s ion  o r  c o n t r o l  
c a p a b i l i t y  dur ing  docking by 
named f r e e  f l y i n g  module. 
Loss of l i f e  suppor t  c a p a b i l i t y  
during docking by manned f r e e  
f l y i n g  module. 
. The f e a s i b i l i t y  u s ing  a  n o n - c u l l i s i o n  approach p a t h  d u r i c g  t h e  
docking maneuver u n t i l  t h e  approach v e l o c i t y  is  reduced t o  w i t h i n  
t h e  docking a t t e n u a t i a n  c a r a b i l i t y  should  be i n v e s t i g a t e d .  O r b i t a l  
mechanics,  guidance, p r o p e l l a n t s  pena l  t i e s ,  o p t i c a l  a i d s  and human 
f a c t o r s  should  be cons ide red ,  and d e t a i l e d  p rocedures  developed.  
The r i s k s  and n t h e r  f a c t o r s  of t h i s  method should  be w a l u a t e d  and 
compared w i t h  t h e  d i r e c t  ( c o l l i s i o n  p a t h )  approach,  (F ig .  3-12) . 
. The dynamics of t h e  docking maneuver under v a r i o u s  nominal and 
worat  c a s e  c o n d i t i o c s  should  be i n v e s t i g a t e d  t o  a s s i i r e  t ' u t  d e s i g n  
requi rements  and o p e r a t i o n a l  p rocedures  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  unuer a l l  
c r e d i b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  s a f e t y  of t h e  v e h i c l e s .  Spec ia l  
a t t e n t i o n  should  be giyren t a  v e h i c l e  c o n d i t i o n s  wi th  maximum cf f -  
sets of  t h e  docking p o r ~  from t h e  c e n t e r  o f  g r a v i t y ,  and t o  c o n t r o l  
system o r  p r o p u l s i o n  f a i l u r e s  immediatzly bc fo re  o r  a f t e r  c o n t a c t .  
. Simula t ion  s t u d i e s  of  t h e  dynamics and crew c a p a b i l i t i e s  of  t h e  
man ipu la to r  d ~ c k i n g  system snould  be conducted a t  t h e  e a r l i e s t  
p o s s i b l e  time i n  o r d e r  t o  unders tand  t h e  dynamic c h a r a c t c r i s t i c s  
of t h e  system and t o  i d e n t i f y  and r e s o l v e  h a z a r d s  which a r e  n o t  
appa ren t  from conceptua l  s r u d i e s .  A s a f e t y  a n a l y s ~ s  should  be 
an  i n t e g r a l  I ~ a r t  of such  s i m u l a t i o n s .  
3 . 3  EASELINE MODEL 
The b a s e i i n e  model d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i l l u s t r a t e s  che f e a t u r e s  of 
t h e  t h r e e  docking s y s t e m ,  t h e  two docking modes, and t h e  assembly, normal 
r e supp ly  docking and emergency docking o p e r a t i o n s  which were cons ide red  du r ing  
t h i s  t a sk .  
D i r e c t  Docking System 
- 
The use  of t h e  d i r e c t  docking system is i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F i g u r e  3-2Ca) for 
t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking.  D i r e c t  dockicg  may a l s o  o c c u r  when a f r e e -  
f l y i ~ g  module docks e i t h e r  t o  a  s t a t i o n  o r  t o  an  o r b i t e r ,  I t  i n v o l v e s  t h e  
approach of  t h e  t-rn irockir:? v e h i c l e s  r i g h t  up t o  each  o t h e r  s o  t h a t  t h e  i n t ~ ~ r a l l y  
a t t a c h e d  docking n;eciianisms can  make c o n t a c t  f o r  i d t i a l  cap tu re .  The d i r e c t  
docking system r e q u i r e s  t h e  d i s s i p a t i o n  o f  relatively l a r g e  energy  l e v e l s  be- 
ause  of t h e  c o a r s e  v e l o c i t y  c o n t r ~ l  expected  f o r  p r o p u l s i v e  maneuvers of t h e  
l a r g e  masses involved.  
3.3.2 Extendable  Tunnel D n r k i n i y s t e m  
The e x t e n d a b l e  t u n n e l  dscicing s y s t e a  u s e s  a n  e x t e n s i o n  mechanism o f  some 
k ind  s o  as t o  ex tend t h e  docking m e c h s n i m  on one of t h e  two docking v e h i c l e s  
some d i s t a n c e  from c!ie v e h i c l e  b e f o r e  effe1:ting i n i t i a l  c o n t a c t  and c a p t u r e ,  
and i s  then  r e t r a c t e d  t o  draw t h e  two v e h i c l e s  t o g e t h e r  f o r  r i g i d i z i n g .  Th-: 
d i s t i n g a i s h i n g  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  ex tendab le  t u n n e l  docking system o r e  t h a t  i t  
p r o v i d e s  a long  7 e p a r a t i o n  d i s r a n c e  o f  t h e  tw v e h i c l e s  a t  t h e  i n s t a n t  o f  f i r s t  
c o n t a c t ,  i t  p r o v i d e s  a t a b i l i t y  a f t e r  capture.  and d u r i n g  drawn dos::, m d  a f f o r d s  
a long  s t o r k e ,  low s t i f f n e s s  a t t e n u a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t y .  
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Figure  3-2(a). D i r e c t  Docking S y s t e ~  Operat ions  
One extendable  tunne l  docking system concept adapted from a concept con- 
s i d e r e d  f o r  t h e  Apollo,  i s  shown i n  F igure  3-2(b). It employs a docking p o r t  
a t t a c h e d  t o  one end of an accordian- l ike  bpllows tube,  ex tendab le  t o  approxi-  
mate ly  3 m (10 f t )  i n  l eng th .  T e s t s  i n  two-dimensional s imulated docking of 
t h e  Apollo of t h i s  system showed t h a t  i t  was f e a s i b l e  and had no major problems. 
DROGUE 
/ 6  HATCH TUNNEL REEL MECHANISM 
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F i g u r e  3-2(b). Extendable Tunnel Dacking System Concept 
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The extendable  tunnel  system can be used i n  two d i f f e r e n t  methods. I n  
t h e  f i r s t  method, i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure  3-3, t h e  docking system i s  f i r s t  f u l l y  
extended,  and i n i t i a l  con tac t  and c a p t u r e  a r e  e f f e c t e d  by p ropu l s ive  maneuvering 
of t h e  whole v e h i c l e .  In the  second method, i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure  3-4, t h e  two 
v e h i c l e s  s t a t i o n k e e p  a t  a  r e l a t i v e l y  c l o s e  d i s t a n c e  before  t h e  docking system 
is  extended,  and i n i t i a l  c o n t a c t  and c a p t u r e  a r e  e f f e c t e d  by extending the  
docking system r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  v e h i c l e .  The r e s u l t s  of t h e  ana lyses  
and t h e  conclus ions  a r e  a p p l i c a b l e ,  however, whichever method is  used. 
3.3.3 Manipulator Docking System 
The manipula tor  docking system u s e s  a  manipulator on one of t h e  docking 
v e h i c l e s  t o  e f f e c t  cap tu re  of t h e  o t h e r  one and t o  b r i n g  t h e  two v e h i c l e s  
t o g e t h e r  f o r  docking, l a t c h i n g  and r i g i d i z i n g .  The main f e a t u r e s  which make 
t h e  manipulator docking system d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  o t h e r  systems a r e  t h a t  
t h e  two docking v e h i c l e s  s t a t i o n k e e p  a t  some stand-off  d i s t a n c e  b e f o r e  docking, 
and t h a t  t h e  manipula tor  b r ings  t h e  two v e h i c l e s  toge the r  a t  a  low c o n t r o l l e d  
v e l o c i t y .  The energy a t t e n u a t i o n  requirements  a r e  low. 
Three b a s i c  methods can be used f o r  manipulate: docking and a r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  
i n  Figure  3-5. These a r e  r e s p e c t i v e l y :  
. Stat ionkeeping method 
. Dual dock method 
. Dual manipula tor  method 
A l l  t h r e e  methods have be considered I n  t h e  s tudy  t a sk .  
3.3.4 O r b i t e r  t o  S t a t i o n  Docking Mode 
Two d i f f e r e n t  modes of  docking a r e  p o s s i b l e  wi th  each of t h e  docking 
systems d e s c r i b e r  e a r l i e r .  These a r e  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode and 
t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  module mode. 
The o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F igure  3-6. The two 
v e h i c l e s  approach each o t h e r  t o  w i t h i n  t h e  d i s t a n c e  requ i red  by t h e  p a r t i c b l a r  
docking system used; i . e . ,  w i t h i n  0.3 t o  20 m ( 1  t o  60 f t ) .  Th i s  mode r e s u l t s  
i n  t h e  at tachment through t h e  docking p o r t  i n t e r f a c e  of two l a r g e  masses, namely 
t h e  o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o c ,  which a r e  each of t h e  o r d e r  o f  90,000 kg (200,000 l b )  
3.3.5 Free-Fly ing Module Docking Mode 
The f ree - f ly ing  module docking mode, i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure  3-7, uses  a  
f r e e - f l y i n g  module t o  f l y  between and dock t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n .  I n  
t h i s  way t h e  o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n  can s t and  o f f  from each o t h e i  i n  s t a t i o n -  
keeping modes a t  a  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  d i s t a n c e ,  which may i n  p r a c t i c e  be 150 m 
t o  1.5 km (500 f t  t o  1 mi). The f r e e - f l y i n g  module may be manned o r  unmanned. 
A l l  dockings occur between an i n d i v i d u a l  module, t y p i c a l l y  of 9,000 kg (20,000 
l b )  mass, and t h e  s t a t i o n  o r  o r b i t e r .  Docking impact e n e r g i e s  a r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
only  20 pe rcen t  o r  s o  of those  involved i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode 
( a t  t h e  same v e l o c i t y ) .  
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Figure 3-3. Extendable Tunnel Docking System, Docking Vehicle Active 
STEP 1 \ 
Figure 3-4. Extendable Tunnel 
STEP 2 \ 
Dockilg System - Docking Vehicle Station- 
Keeping, Doc~cing System Active 
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STATIONKEEPI NG DOCKING METHOD DUAL MANIPUiATOR DOCKI NG 
METHOD 
DUAL DOCK DQCKI NG METHOD 
Figure 3-5. Stationkeeping, Dual Manipulator and Dual Dock Methods 
Space Division 
North Amercan Rockwell 
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockwell 
A t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l ,  propuls ion,  guidance and communications c a p a b i l i t y  may 
be achieved i n  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  ways: 
. I n t e g r a l  systems module, i.e., a l l  func t ions  a r e  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  
f ree - f ly ing  module 
. Space-based min i  tug,  i . e . ,  brought up i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  
. Ground-based mini tug,  i . e . ,  normally based on t h e  space s t a t i o n  
3.3.6 Emergency Docking 
Analysis  of t h e  docking system included cons idera t ion  of emergency docking 
t o  i d e n t i f y  hazards  and cons idera t ions  i n  t r adeof f  eva lua t ions .  
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and e v a l u a t i o n  of p o t e n t i a l  emergencies has  shown t h a t ,  s o  
f a r  a s  docking i s  concerned, emergency docking is  charac te r ized  by one of t h e  
following two s i t u a t i o n s :  
1. A time c r i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  on t h e  o r b i t e r ,  f r ee - f ly ing  module, 
o r  s t a t i o n ,  i n  which a  docking i s  required t o  save o r  prevent  
i n j u r y  t o  personnel  o r  damage t o  t h e  v e h i c l e s ,  o r  o therwise  
prevent a  hazardous o r  dangerous s i t u a t i o n  from reaching 
c a t a s t r o p h i c  propor t ions .  
Examples of time c r i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  f i r e ,  fumes, impending 
explosion,  leakage,  atmospheric d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  f a i l u r e  of 
l i f e  suppor t ,  power f a i l u r e ,  and i n j u r e d  personnel.  
2. Docking t o  a  v e h i c l e  which has  l o s t  o r  experienced dcg;,adation 
of a  c r i t i c a l  docking funct ion.  
Examples a r e  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  f a i l u r e  and uncont ro l l ed  tumbling. 
Both of t h e s e  emergency docking o p e r a t i o n s  have been considered i n  t h e  
subsequent analyses .  
3.4 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION 
P o t e n t i a l  hazards  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  docking systems and modes were 
i d e n t i f i e d  by s e t t i n g  o u t  t h e  func t ions  which have t o  be performed, and then 
consider ing what hazards may a r i s e  i n  each func t ion  from equipment f a i l u r e s ,  
o p e r a t i o n a l  e r r o r s ,  unexpected environments m d  major malfunct ions  o r  acc iden t s .  
3.4.1 Funct ional  Analysis  of Docking Systems 
Top-level f u n c t i o n s  requ i red  f o r  docking of tw s p a c e c r a f t  are l i s t e d  i n  
Table 3-2. These a r e  genera l ,  and a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  an; set of v e h i c l ~ s ,  and 
t o  a l l  t h e  docking systems and docking modes considered.  
@A!!! Space Division North Arnercan Rockwell 
Table 3-2.  Top-Level Functions Required f o r  Docking 
Pre-Contact F l i g h t  Phase 
Acau is i t ion  - One v e h i c l e  must l o c a t e  t h e  o t h e r  e i t h e r  v i s u a l l y  
o r  e l e c t r o n i c a l l y .  
Gross O r i e n t a t i o n  - Gne v e h i c l e  must maintain a t t i t u d e  ho ld ,  
-
while  t h e  o t h e r  t r a n s l a t e s  and r o t a t e s  i n t o  al ignment.  The 
v e h i c l e  mainta ining a t t i t u d e  hold  w i l l  be c a l l e d  the "passive" 
veh ic le .  
S t a t i o n  Keeping - The a c t i v e  v e h i c l e  must s t a t i o n  keep wi th  t h e  
pass ive  v e h i c l e  f o r  i n s p e c t i o n  of t h e  docking p o r t  cond i t ion .  
Active v e h i c l e  a t t d t u d e  hold  is requ i red .  
Deploy Docking System - The a c t i v e  v e h i c l e  must deploy o r  arm 
the  a c t i v e  p o r t i o n  of t h e  docking system. 
Fine O r i e n t a t i o n  - The a c t i v e  v e h i c l e  must f i n e  a l i g n  t h e  a c t i v e  
docking system with  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  pass ive  v e h i c l e  docking p o r t  
i n  both  t r a n s l a t i o n  and r o t a t i o n .  
F i n a l  Closure - The a c t i v e  v e h i c l e  docking i n t e r f a c e  must be 
maneuvered t o  con tac t  t h e  pass ive  v e h i c l e  docking p o r t .  L a t e r a l  
d r i f t  and r e s i d u a l  a t t i t u d e  misalignment must be cor rec ted  
dur ing  a x i a l  c losure .  
Contact Phase 
1. Energy At tenuat ion - The a c t i v e  veh ic le  docking system must 
absorb t h e  energy of r e l a t i v e  motion between t h e  two veh ic les .  
Pos t-Contact Phase 
1. Capture - The a c t i v e  v e h i c l e  mating system must provide connection 
t o  t h e  pass ive  veh ic le .  
2. A t t i t u d e  Alignment - Residual  a t t i t u d e  misalignments between t h e  
v e h i c l e s  must be  cor rec ted  e i t h e r  by a c t i v e  v e h i c l e  maneuvering 
o r  by t h e  cbpture  mechanism p r i o r  t o  s e a t i n g  t h e  mating i n t e r -  
f aces .  I f  t h e  cap ture  mechanism provides  a t t i t u d e  alignment,  
t h e  a c t i v e  v e h i c l e  must be  placed i n  t h e  f r e e  mode ( i . e . ,  no 
a t t i t u d e  hold) .  The pass ive  v e h i c l e  remains i n  t h e  a t t i t u d e  
hold  mode. F a i l u r e  t o  i n h i b i t  a t t i t u d e  hold  on one o f  t h e  
v e h i c l e s  w i l l  cause both  c o n t r o l  syste,ms to  f i g h t  t o  hold t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  misal igned a t t i t u d e s .  
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Table 3-2. Top-Level Func t iona  Required for Docking (Cont . ) 
- . .---- . --- .- - - . -  
- -. 
Pos t-Contact Phase (Continued) 
3 .  Eraw Down - T h r  docking i n t e r f a c e s  must be drawn t o y u t i ~ e ~ '  t o  
remove r e u i d u , ~ :  a t t e n u a t i o n  s t r o k e  and s e a t  the i n t e r f a c e s .  
4. K ~ r i  A L L A ~ &  - The docking i n t ~ t  t ~ c e s  nust  be s t r u c t u r a l l y  connected 
c.ither au tomat ica l ly  o r  mrr:18J..::v tc, provide the requ i red  i n t e r -  
veh icu la r  s : if  f n e s s  f o r  crmbl rwd veh l r l e  m;lnc?uvtr I nr. This  
func t ion  aha con s e a t  p r c s s u r r  +o;r l  i t ! ~ i t f i r v e ! ~  i V ~ I '  ar press-  
u r i  t a t  ion  is required.  
Undocklnp f h,izL 
1. U n r l g l J i z r  - The docking i n t e r f aces  must bt. strut: ' tural lv Jis-  
connected t o  provide a  f l e x i b l e  c o u p l i n g  fo r  independent v e h i c l e  
maneuvering. Th i s  func t ion  can alsc\ uriscat p ressure  s e a l s  and 
be combined vi t h  '-,he s e p a r a t i o n  fuiict ion.  
I 
2.  Separate  - The docking i n t e r f a c e s  must be : ~ h > ~ s i c a l l y  separa ted .  
Energv s t o r e d  i n  t h e  docking system may I - .  used t o  provide o r  
auEment sepiirilt I t ~ r l  f o rces .  
3 ,  Kesvcle uccking System - The dockin,p i n t e r f a c e  must be l e f ~  Ln a 
cond i t ion  t o  dock again ,  The r i g i d i z i n g  l a t c h e s  s h a l l  e x t r n d  
thr. a t t e n ~ l a t o r s  t o  t h e  unstroked p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  capture  l a t c h e s  
s h a l l  be unlocked and rccvc led ,  and the  dockine: svstems s t o r e d .  
-. 
-- .-.- - - _ - - - - - - - .  ___-.------__I 
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Table 3 - 4 .  Comparison of Operat ions  f o r  Manipulator Docking Methods 
- 
Operation 
Attach manipulator t o  module i n  carga 
bay 
Extend manipulator 
At tach manipula tor  t o  s t a t i o n  
Attach manipulator t o  module i n  carga 
bay 
Extend manipulator 
Dock module t o  s t a t i o n  
Release  manipulator from module 
R e t r a c t  manipulator 
Dock s t a t i o n  t o  o r b i t e r  
Release manipulator from s t a t i o n  
At tach manipulator t o  module i n  carga 
bay 
Extended manipulator 
Dock modde t o  s t a t i o n  
Release manipulator from module 
Attach manipulator t o  s t a t i o n  
Undock s t a t i o n  from o r b i t e r  
Extend manipulator 
Release manipula tor  from e t a t i o n  
R e t r a c t  manipulator 







1)-  Manip U1 
2)= Manip # 2  
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Table 3-5. Funct ional  Comparison of O r b i t e r  t o  S t a t i o n  
and Free-Flying Module Docking Modes 
Function 
- 
) Undock from s t a t i o n  
Free-fly t o  orbi  t e r  
Dock t o  de l ive red  payload 
module 
Undock d e l i v e r e d  payload 
module from o r b i t e r  
3 Free-fly ( o r  f l y )  t o  s t a t i o n  
3 Dock de l ive red  payload modul~ 
t o  s t a t i o n  
3 Undock from d e l i v e r e d  pavloa 
module 
Free-f ly  ( t r anspose )  t o  e a r t  
bound module 
D Dock t o  earthbound module 
o Undock earthbound module f r o  
s t a t i o n  
o Free-fly t o  o r b i t e r  
c Dock t o  o r b i t e r  
o  Undock from earthbound modul 
o  Free-fly t o  s t a t i o n  
o Dock t o  J t a t i o n  
X- = ~ e l l v e r  a d  dock a module. 




I Free-Fly Module 
O r b i t e r  I~nregral 
S t a t i o n  I Module 
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Table 3-6. Correlation of Common Hazards x i t h  Docking Functions 
Docking 
~ u n c  t ion 
?re-~ontac t 
Flight Phase : 
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3.5 COMPARISON AND EVALL ;ION OF DOCKING SYSTEKS 
Comparisons of t h e  docking systems were made on t h e  fo l lowing f h c t o r s :  
. Nuinber of hazards  
. C r i t i c a l i t y  of hazards  
. Risk,  o r  combination of p r o b a b i l i t y  and c r i t i c a l i t y  
. Operat ional  complexity 
. Design impact of  applying t h e  s a f e t y  requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  
. Residual  hazards  
Comparisons on t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  f a c t o r s  i s  summarized i n  Figure  3-8. The 
manipulator system h a s  t h e  worst combination of number 02 hazards ,  c r i t i c a l i t i e s  
and p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of occurrence,  with t h e  s t a t ionkeep ing  and dua l  manipulator 
methods having two hazards  with t h e  worst  p o s s i b l e  combination of c r i t i c a l i t y  
and p r o b a b i l i t y .  
The next  coaparison i s  on t h e  b a s i s  of o p e r a t i o n a l  complexity. The 
s y s t m  w i t h  t h e  most o p e r a t i o n s  is  exposed t o  t h e  g r e a t e s t  r i s k .  The s i g n i f i c a n t  
o p e r ~ t i o n s  were taken t o  be t h e  f  ree-f l y  maneuver, t h e  at tachment and detachment 
of a mani.mlator t o  a module, and t h e  docking and undocking of a module, inc lud ing  
r i g i d i z i n g  a t  a  docking p o r t .  The comparison is shown i n  Table 3-7. Th i s  t a b l e  
covers  t h e  normal resupply docking, when a new module i s  being d e l i v e r e d  t o  t h e  
s t a t i o n  and another  one is re tu rned  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  f o r  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h .  
The t h r e e  methods f o r  t h e  manipula tor  docking systems a r e  shown s e p a r a t e l y ,  
s i n c e  they d i f f e r  i n  t h e  number of  opera t ions .  There is a l s o  a p o s s i b l e  v a r i a -  
t i o n ,  a s  shown by t h e  a s t e r i s k e d  numbers, according t o  whether t h e  r e t u r n e d  
module can be reached by t h e  o r b i t e r  manipula tor  wi thout  r e p o s i t i o n i n g  from i t s  
d e l i v e r y  p o s i t i o n ,  o r  whether t h e  o r b i t e r  must r e p o s i t i o n  i t s e l f  by a f ree - f ly ing  
maneuver t o  r each  t h e  re tu rned  module. 
No c lear-cut  s ta tment  can be made t h a t  one system r e q u i r e s  more a p e r a t i o n s  
than another .  
In  o rde r  t o  compare t h e  docking systems on t h e  b a s i s  of des ign  impact of 
applying t h e  s a f e t y  requirements and g u i d e l i n e s ,  on ly  those  s a f e t y  requirements  
and g u i d e l i n e s  which a r e  s p e c i f i c  t o  one o r  o t h e r  of  t h e  systems and which have 
a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on t h e  des ign need be considered.  S i g n i f i c a n t  des ign  i m -  
pac t  i s  considered t o  mean t h e  a d d i t i o n  of mechanisms, motors,  a c t u s t o r s ,  and 
s l m i l a r  l e v e l s  of hardware, f o r  s a f e t y  reasons.  
The fol lowing have s i g n i f i c a n t  des ign impact : 
Extendable Tunnel 
. Extendable docking s y s t e n s  s h a l l  be designed so  t h a t  t h e  ex tens ion  
mechanisms s h a l l  r e t a i n  s u f f i c i e n t  r i g i d i t y  fo l lowing any s i n g l e  
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~ t t a c h / D e t a c h  
*The h igher  number a p p l i e s  when the  o r b i t e r  must be repos i t ioned  
t o  reach t h e  module be ing  re turned.  
- 
Manipulators 
. A r m  j o i n t s  s h a l l  be designed t o  lock on i n d i c a t i o n  o f  j o i n t  
motor f a i l u r e .  Lock s h a l l  incorpora te  a s l i p  c l u t c h  c a p a b i l i t y  
t o  prevent s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e s .  
. Two o r  more manipula tors  s h a l l  be provided i n  a manipulator 
docking system. Each manipulator s h a l l  br capable  of performing 
docking by i t s e l f ,  and s h a l l  a l s o  be capable  of cont inuing any 
docking func t ion  i n  t h e  event  of a f a i l u r e  of t h e  o t h e r  manipulator 
a t  any s t a g e  of t b e  docking. 
. An emergency j e t t i s i o n i n g  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided f o r  
manipula tors ,  independent of t h e  normal manipula tor  system. 
This  s h a l l  be capable  of j e t t i s o n i n g  t h e  manipulator fo l lowing 
a f a i l u r e  o r  acc iden t  which does n o t  a l l o w  stowage o f  t h e  
manipula tor  and conf igur ing t h e  o r b i t e r  f o r  r e e n t r y  and landing.  
I f  t h e  manipulator docking system is considered f o r  t r a n s f e r r i n g  personnel  
- 7 
between o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n  us ing t h e  s t a t ionkeep ing  o r  t h e  d u a l  manipula tor  
methods, t h e  fol lowing two a d d i t i o n a l  requirements have a major des ign  impact. 
. Modules which are used f o r  personnel  t r a n s f e r  by manipulator docking 
s h a l l  be providsd w i t h  EVA p r e s s u r e  s u i t s  f o r  a l l  onboard 
personnel ,  and with EVA e x i t  c a p a b i l i t y  s o  t h a t  t h e  personnel  
can escape t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  o r  t h e  space s t a t i o n  i n  t h e  event  t h e  
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. Modules which a r e  used f o r  personnel  t r a n s f e r  by manipula tor  
docking s h a l l  be provided wi th  EVA p r e s s u r e  s u i t s  f o r  a l l  
onboard personnel ,  and wi th  EVA e x i t  c a p a b i 1 4 t y  s o  t h a t  t h e  
personnel  can e s c  pe t o  the  o r b i t e r  o r  the  space s t a t i o n  i n  the  
event  the  modu1.e~ becomes strandr!d between v e h i c l e s  by a  
manipula tol  f a i l u r e .  
. Modules which a r e  used f o r  personnel  t r a n s f e r  by manipula tor  
docking s h a l l  provide  emergency l i f e  suppor t  f o r  a l l  onboard 
pe r sonne l ,  u n t i l  they r a n  escape u r  be rescued by e x t e r n a l  
means i n  thc  event  t h e  module becomes s t r anded  between v e h i c l e s  
by a  manipu1;tor f a i l u r e .  
The l a s t  compsri;on i s  i n  terms of r e s i d u a l  hazards .  The comparison 
shows : 
. D i r e c t  d o c ~ i n g  system - 2 r e s i d u a l  hazards  
. Extendable tunne l  system - 3 r e s i d u a l  hazards  
. Manipulator docking system - 4 r e s i d u a l  hzsa rds  
3.6 COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF DOCKING MODES 
The o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  and f r e e - f l y i n g  module modes were compared on t h e  
fo l lowing f a c t o r s :  
. The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  crew i n j u r y  o r  l o s s  
. The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  v e h i c l e  l o s s  
. The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  v e h i c l e  damage 
, The c o s t  and payload impact of r e q u i r e d  s a f e t y  
3.6.1 O r b i t e r  t o  S t a t i o n  Dockine Yode 
The hazards  i d e n t i f i e d  f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode have t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  of causing major damage t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  and/or  the  s t a t i o n ,  bu t  do 
no t  d i r e c t l y  l ead  t o  personnel  i n j u r y  o r  l o s s .  The damage would r e s u l t  from 
i n a d v e r t e n t  con tac t  of p a r t s  of  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  no t  in tended t o  make c o n t a c t .  
Because bo th  v e h i c l e s  a r e  l a r g e  and have complex geometr ies ,  w i t h  many pro- 
t ruberances ,  such a s  cargo bay doors ,  wings and manipula tors  on t h e  o r b i t e r ,  
and s o l a r  p a n e l s ,  antennas  and experiments a i r l o c k s  gn t h e  s t a t i o n ,  almost  
any cnprogrammed motion can l ead  t o  c o n t a c t  and damsge. 
General ly  t h e  e f f e c t s  would be l i m i t e d  t o  damage t o  t h e  v e h i c l e ,  and t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  personnel  in j l l ry  o r  l o s s  should be assessed  as a  second o r d e r  
e f f e c t .  The proximity  of t h e  o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n ,  e i t h e r  o f  which can provide  
f o r  t h e  lcng-term s a f e t y  of p e r a o w c l  (one by r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  and t h e  o t h e r  by 
v i r t u e  of i t s  inherer- t  long-dura t ion  c a p a b i l i t y ) ,  and t h e  assumed EVA c a p a b i l i t y  
v i r t u a L l y  ensure  t h a t  p e r s m n e l  who s u r v i v e  t h e  immediate a c c i d e n t  can be sa fe -  
guarded. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y  of l o s s  of one v e h i c l e  f o l l r w i n g  a  docking a c c i d e n t  i s  
q c ~ i t e  r e a l ,  however. The o r b i t e r  i s  vu lne rab le  i n  a  number of ways. The cargo 
bay doors  must be c losed  b e f o r e  r e e n t r y ;  damage t o  t h e  c l o s i n g  mechanism, o r  t o  
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t h e  doors  themselves,  could r e s u l t  i n  the  i n g e s t i c n  of hot  r e e n t r y  gases ,  
l e a d i n g  t o  thermal degradat ion of t h e  i n t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  The wings, fuse lage  
and t a i l  s u r f a c e s  a r e  p a r t  of t h e  aerodynamic c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  and damage can 
a f f e c t  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  and c o n t r o l  of t h e  v e h i c l e  i n  t h e  atmosphere. The crew 
cabin  a l s o  i s  n e a r  t h e  docking p o r t ,  and damage t o  t h a t  could preclude r e t u r n  
t o  e a r t h .  I f  an  assessment of t h e  damage p reven t s  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h ,  a  very 
complex and c o s t l y  r escue  and r e p a i r  s h u t t l e  miss ion would be r e q u i r e d ,  pro- 
bably wi th  much EVA maintenance. I n  extreme cases  t h e  o r b i t e r  would be w r i t t e n  
off  a s  a complete l o s s ,  a ~ d  t h e  rescue  miss ion would c o n c e n t r a t e  on saving t h e  
pe r sonne l  a n d p l a c i n g  t h e  o r b i t e r  on a s a f e  r e e n t r y  o r b i t .  
The space  s t a t i o n ,  being modular i n  n a t u r e ,  i s  much more t o l e r a n t  t o  
damage. Damage would g e n e r a l l y  be conf ined t o  one module, and t h i s  could be 
re tu rned  t o  e a r t h  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  f o r  r e p a i r  o r  replacement.  Th i s  could be 
q u i t e  d i f f i c u l t ,  however, i f  t h e  a f f e c t e d  module were t h e  core  module, s i n c e  
a l l  o t h e r  modules a r e  a t t a c h e d  t o  i t .  In  such a case  t h e  space  s t a t i o n  may be 
t empora r i ly  abandoned, and a new c o r e  module brought up i n  due course.  The 
space s t a t i o n  would then be reassembled about t h i s  module, and t h e  damaged c o r e  
module r e t u r n e d  to  e a r t h .  Damage t o  t h e  s o l a r  a r r a y s  ( r e l a t i v e l y  l i k e l y  be- 
cause of t h e  l a r g e  a r e a  exposed) could s i m i l a r l y  l ead  t o  temporary s t a t i o n  
abandonment. 
3.6.2 Free-Flying Module Docking Mode 
The f r e e - f l y i n g  module docking mode has  a ve ry  d e f i n i t e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
personnel  l o s s .  I f  l o s s  of t h e  p ropu l s ion ,  c o n t r o l  o r  l i f e  suppor t  c a p a b i l i t y  
occurs  whi le  t h e  module i s  f r e e  f l y i n g  between o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n  wi th  personnel  
onboard, personnel  l o s s  can occur.  Escape can on ly  be e f f e c t e d  by EVA t o  t h e  
o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n .  Rescue i s  p o s s i b l e  by t h e  o r b i t e r ,  bu t  only  i f  t h e  module 
can s t i l l  be s t a b i l i z e d  ( f o r  docking) and i f  adequate  l i f e  suppor t  c a p a b i l i t y  
remains. The p o s s i b i l i t y  of personnel  l o s s  must, t h e r e f o r e ,  be r a t e d  a s  
r e l a t i v e l y  high.  I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode, l o s s  of 
personnel  can f o l l o w  d i r e c t l y  a s  a consequence of a system f a i l u r e ,  and does 
n o t  depend on a propagat ion of u n l i k e l y  e f f e c t s .  The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  pe r sonne l  
l o s s  appears  t o  be about t h e  same f o r  t h e  i n t e g r a l  systems module, space-based 
mini  tug  o r  ground-based mini  tug. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y  of an  i n a d v e r t e n t  c o l l i s i o n  between t h e  f ree - f ly ing  module 
and t h e  o r b i t e r  o r  space  s t a t i o n  is about a s  l i k e l y  a s  f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  
s t a t i o n  docking mode. The r e s u l t a n t  damage, however, i s  l i k e l y  t o  be much l e s s ,  
f o r  two reasons .  F i r s t ,  t h e  geometry of a s i n g l e  module docking t o  o r b i t e r  o r  
s t a t i o n  i s  much s imple r ,  s o  t h a t  fewer p o i n t s  on t h e  two v e h i c l e s  w i l l  come i n t o  
c o n t a c t .  Secondly, t h e  mass of a f r e e - f l y i n g  module is on ly  about 10  t o  20 
pe rcen t  o f  t h e  mass of e i t h e r  o r b i t e r  o r  s t a t i o n ,  so  t h a t  t h e  energy involved 
i n  t h e  c o l l i s i o n  is  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l .  
The i n f l u e n c e  of s a f e t y  on t h e  des ign complexity of t h e  f ree - f ly ing  module 
docking mode must be judged t o  be a major impact. The requirement f o r  a l i f e  
suppor t  system on t h e  module is n o t  considered as a s a f e t y  requirement,  a s  i t  i s  
needed f o r  t h e  normal v e h i c l e  f u n c t i o n  of t r a n s p o r t i n g  personnel.  The redundancy 
r e q u i r e d  i n  t h i s  system, t h e  added redundancy i n  t h e  c o n t r o l ,  power, p ropu l s ion  
and communication systems,  t h e  EVA s u i t s  and N A  c a p a b i l i t y ,  and t h e  emergency 
l i f e  suppor t  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  however, a r e  d i r e c t l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  s a f e t y .  
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These requirements reduce the  n e t  payload c a p a b i l i t y  of each 6-man f r e e - f l y i n g  
module by 534 kg (1180 l b )  and a v a i l a b l e  f o r  cargo by 3 m3 (106 f t 3 ) .  
3.6.3 Free-Flying Module Docking Mode Used For Unmanned Operat ions  Only 
A cons ide rab ly  d i f f e r e n t  s a f e t y  e v a l u a t i o n  of t t e  f r e e - f l y i n g  module 
docking mode a r i s e s  i f  t h i s  mode is  used only  f o r  t r a n s f e r r i n g  unmanned pay- 
loads ,  and t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  mode is  used when personnel t r a n s f e r  between 
t h e  v e h i c l e s  i s  involved.  Th i s  combined mode could be p r a c t i c a l  i f  a  mini  tug  
has  been developed f o r  o t h e r  purposes and is a v a i l a b l e  f o r  docking unmanned 
payloads,  o r  i f  some o r b i t e r  payloads ,  such a s  a space tug ,  have t h e  p ropu l s ion  
and c o n t r o l  c a p a b i l i t y  b u i l t  i n t o  them, and r e q u i r e  t r a n s f e r  from t h e  o r b i t e r  
t o  t h e  s t a t i o n  and v i c e  ve r sa .  
The advantages compared t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode a r e  those  
of docking a smal le r  mass t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  o r  s t a t i o n ,  and of  t h e  s imple r  geo- 
metry reducing t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  damage on c o l l i s i o n  wi thout  t h e  d isadvantages  
of  a r e l a t i v e l y  h igh p o t e n t i a l  of  personnel  l o s s .  
Th i s  mixed mode, t h e r e f o r e ,  provides  s a f e t y  advantages over  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  
s t a t i o n  docking mode on i t s  own, and o v e r  t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  module docking mode 
on i t s  own. These advantages apply  so  long a s  t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  module is  n o t  
used a t  a l l  f o r  pe r sonne l  t r a n s f e r .  
The disadvantages  of  t h i s  mixed mode a r e  n o t  s a f e t y  d isadvantages ,  but  
a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  with t h e  program complexity of  having two docking modes i n  t h e  
program. 
3.7 EMERGENCY DOCKING CONSIDERATIONS 
The reasons  f o r  emegency docking, e s t a b l i s h  c e r t a i n  requirements  t h a t  w i l l  
determine which of t h e  t h r e e  docking concepts  should be favored from an emer- 
gency docking s t andpo in t .  The reasons  f o r  emergency docking t h a t  appear t o  
cover t h e  m a j o r i t y  of p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a r e  a s  fo l lows:  
. A t ime c r i t i c a l  malfunct ion of a system i n  e i t h e r  mannedlpassive 
o r  mannedlactive v e h i c l e s ,  t h a t  i f  docked t o  t h e  o t h e r ,  would 
provide  succor  o r  permit  miss ion continuance.  
. R e t r i e v a l  of a d i s a b l e d ,  unmanned, f r e e - f l y i n g ,  module o r  
d i s a b l e d  unmanned s t a t i o n  f o r  t h e  purpose of sa lvage  o r  
d e o r b i t  of d e b r i s .  
. Time c r i t i c a l  t r a n s f e r  of d i s a b l e d  crew which could prevent  f a t a l i t y .  
. Time c r i t i c a l  t r a n s f e r  of  s u p p l i e s  which would prevent  crew 
d i s a b i l i t y .  
Emergency dockifig c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  favor  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking 
mode over t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  module mode because c f  its qu icker  t ime response .  
Although t h e  d i r e c t  docking system is t h e  q u i c k e s t  system, t h e  manipula tor  
system h a s  advantages i n  inc reased  s e p a r a t i o n  between the v e h i c l e s  and i n  
c a p a b i l i t y  t o  d e a l  wi th  out-of-control  v e h i c l e s  
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The time c r i t i c a l  emergency docking reasons  (3 o u t  of 4 )  favor  t h e  docking 
system and mode requ i r ing  t h e  s h o r t e s t ,  o p e r a t i o n a l  t ime l ine  f o r  t h e  docking 
maneuver; i . e . ,  t h e  fewest  docking opera t ions .  This  favors  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  
s t a t i o n  docking mode over t h e  f r e e  f l y i n g  module mode, and t h e  d i r e c t  docking 
system over t h e  extendable  tunne l  and manipulator docking systems. The f ree -  
f l y i n g  module mode, i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  considerably  extends  t h e  t o t a l  time from 
i n i t i a t i o n  of t h e  docking maneuver t o  i t s  c o ~ p l e t i o n .  
However, t h e  importance of reducing t h e  docking time i n  eva lua t ing  the  
m e r i t s  of t h e  v a r i o u s  docking systems and modes must be kep t  i n  pe rspec t ive .  
The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  an emergency occurs  when t h e  o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n  can 
i n i t i a t e  a docking maneuver immediately LS very remote. I f  t h e  emergency occurs  
i n  t h e  space s t a t i o n ,  t h e  chances a r e  t h a t  no o r b i t e r  i s  i n  space a t  the  time. 
A s h u t t l e  rescue miss ion may t y p i c a l l y  t ake  t e n  hours from an a l e r t  t o  rendezvous. 
The d i f f e r e n c e  between one method of docking and ano ther  may be 15 minutes ( i n  
an emergency mode), and t h i s  t ime i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  be c r i t i c a l  t o  t h e  success  of 
t h e  rescue.  
When consider ing t h e  two docking modes, t h e  time advantage i s  c l e a r l y  i n  
t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode. In  t h i s  case  t h e  added time f o r  deploying 
and f r e e  f l y i n g  a module t o  t h e  d i s t r e s s e d  v e h i c l e  could be up t o  a few hours ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  a mini tug i s  involved,  and t h i s  could be a s i g n i f i c a n t  a d d i t i o n  
t o  t h e  t o t a l  time a v a i l a b l e .  
The t w ~  emergency docking s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  involve s p a c e c r a f t  systems 
malfunct ions  could be too hazardous f o r  an approach wi th  a d i r e c t  docking 
system. Of t h e  t h r e e  docking systems considered,  on ly  t h e  manipuiator has t h e  
c a p a b i l i t y  t o  add i t s  d e x t e r i t y  t o  t h a t  of t h e  a c t i v e  v e h i c l e  i n  t h e  t a s k  of 
cap tur ing  a malfunct ioning t a r g e t  v e h i c l e .  I f  t h e  emergency c o n s i s t s  of t h e  
p a s s i v e  v e h i c l e  having l o s t  a t t i t u d e  hold c a p a b i l i t y  and it is  e i t h e r  tumbling 
very  slowly,  wi thin  t h e  des ign c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  docking system, o r  i s  s u b j e c t  
t o  unpred ic tab le  motions due t o  ven t ing ,  t h e  d i r e c t  docking system would be 
t h e  least d e s i r a b l e ,  because of t h e  c l o s e  approach of t h e  two v e h i c l e s .  The 
manipulator system would o f f e r  t h e  b e s t  and s a f e s t  method wi th  t h e  extendable  
tunnel  an  in te rmedia te  choice.  
3.8 DOCKING DYNAMICS WITH DOCKING PORTS OFFSET FROM THE CENTER OF MASS 
The c u r r e n t  exper ience of docking on t h e  Gemini and Apollo programs has  
d e a l t  wi th  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which t h e  c e n t e r l i n e s  of t h e  docking p o r t s  were 
e s s e i i t i a l l y  a l igned  with t h e  c e n t s r s  of mass of t h e  two doci.ing veh ic les .  
This  r e s u l t s  i n  minimum angula r  motions upon con tac t .  
The c u r r e n t  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  of t h e  o r b i t e r  and t h e  modular space s t a t i o n  
r e s u l t  i n  docking p o r t  a l ignments  which a r e  o f f s e t  from t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  c e n t e r  
of mass a s  shown i n  Figure  3-9. Th is  l e a d s  t o  an  angular  motion o f  t h e  two 
v e h i c l e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  each o t h e r  upon i n i t i a l  docking c o n t a c t ,  which must be 
cance l l ed  o u t  by t h e  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  systems of t h e  v e h i c l e s  (o r  by t h e  
manipula tor ,  where used f o r  t h e  f i n a l  docking). The d i r e c t i o n  of t h e  angular  
motions (assuming zero angu la r  rates before  c o n t a c t )  w i l l  be i n  t h e  same d i r e c t i o n  
f o r  t h e  two v e h i c l e s  i f  t h e  docking p o r t  l i e s  between t h e  two c e n t e r s  of mass 
(see  Figure  3-lOA), o r  i n  oppos i t e  d i r e c t i o n s  i f  both  c e n t e r s  of mass a r e  on 
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Figure  3-9.  Typica l  O r b i t e r  t o  S t a t i o n  Docking C o n f i g . ~ r a t i o n s  Showing 
R e l a t i v e  P o s i t i o n s  of  Cen te r s  of Mass and Docking P o r t s .  
F igure  3-1O.Directiofi of I n i t i a l  Angular Motions Following Docking. 
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che same s i d e  of the  c e n t e r  of  mass ( see  Figure  3-10B). The angu la r  v e l o c i t y  
of cach v e h i c l e  depends on the  con tac t  v e l o c i t y ,  t h e  v e h i c l e  mass, moments of  
i n e r t i a  and d i s t a n c e  of t h e  c e n t e r  of mass from t h e  docking pors .  The v e l o c i t i e s  
f o r  t h e  two v e h i c l e s  w i l l  i n  g e n e r a l  be d i f f e r e n t  and i f  t h e  necessa ry  correc-  
t i o n s  a r e  no t  promptly app l i ed  by t h e  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  systems, con tac t  ui.th 
t h e  two v e h i c l e s  wi th  consequent darnage w i l l  r e s u l t ,  The dynamics of t h e  
s i t u a t i o n ,  and t h e  ccnsequences of G c o n t r o l  system f a i l u r e  a t  t h e  c r i t i c a l  
moment a r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  of i n t e r e s t  from t h e  s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view. 
The angular  excurs ion  which w i l l  be exqerienced depends on t h e  i n i t i a l  
angu la r  v e l o c i t y  and t h e  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y  a v a i l a b l e  from t h e  v e h i c l e  a t t i t u d e  
c o n t r o l  system. 
The worst  s i t u a t i o n  occurs  when a  l a r g e  o r b i t e r  docks t o  a  l a r g e  s t a t i o n .  
T h i s  obviously  poses geometric problems, bo th  i n  t h e  d e t a i l  des ign  of t h e  dock- 
ing  mechanism i t s e l f  t o  a l l o w  f o r  such angu la r  misalignments,  and i n  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
of i n a d v e r t e n t  c o n t a c t  between t h e  vehzcles .  
T h i s  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  docking v e l o c i t y  and con tpo l  moments is  shown i n  
Figure  3-11. Th i s  c h a r t  shows t h a t  f o r  a  docking v e l o c i t y  of 0.3 mlsec (1 f t l s e c )  
the  s t a t i o n  w i l l  t u r n  through a  32-degree angle.  The s t a t i o n  would r e q u i r e  
72 seconds t o  a r r e s t  t h i s  motion. 
Analys is  has  shown t h a t  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  wi th  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y  about two 
o r d e r s  o f  magnitude g r e a t e r  than t h a t  of t h e  s t a t i o n ,  can coun te rac t  angu la r  
no t ions  p r a c t i c a l l y  sirnultaneouoly,  and does nDt have t h i s  kind  of  problem. 
A s e r i o u s  hazard occurs  i f  t h e  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  system f a i l s  a f t e r  cap tu re ,  
but  before  motion has  been a r r e s t e d  and t h e  v e h i c l e s  s t a b i l i z e d .  I f  t h i s  
happens, t h e  a t t a c h e d  v e h i c l e  w i l l  con t inue  i t s  angu la r  motion, t h e  docking 
i n t e r f a c e  w i l l  be broken, and t h e  v e h i c l e s  w i l l  c o l l i d e  with each o t h e r .  
The recomnended s o l u t i o n  i s  t o  f l y  t h e  o r b i t e r  so that i t  fo l lows  t h e  
space s t a t i o n  motion. Th i s  would invo lve  complex sens ing  d e v i c e s  o r  procedures,  
t o  t r a c k  t h e  s t a t i o n  angu la r  motions,  and p o s s i b l e  minimum impulse a t t i t u d e  
adjus tments  on t h e  o r b i t e r .  Th i s  maneuvering would con t inue  u n t i l  t h e  angular  
motions of t h e  two v e h i c l e s  have been damped o u t  enough t o  enab le  r i g i d i z i n g  
t o  be performed whi le  t h e  cwo v e h i c l e s  a r e  s t i l l  r o t a t i n g  i n  i n e r t i a l  space. 
I f  t h e  manipu la to r s  a r e  used f o r  docking, then  t h e  same problem can a r i s e ,  
and t h e  same c o r r e c t i v e  procedures  app l i ed ,  i f  t h e  c o n t r o l  system f a i l u r e  i s  i n  
t h e  c o n t r o l  system of  t h e  manipulator.  In  t h i s  case ,  however, t h e  motion is  
much l e s o  than f o r  d i r e c t  docking because of t h e  dynamics (as  shown above),  
t h e  manipula tors  could  p o s s i b l y  provide  some damping to rques ,  and t h e  s t a t i o n  
a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  system provides  a  back-up t o  t h e  manipula tor  c o n t r o l  system. 
Th i s  p r ~ b l e m  is,  t h e r e f o r e ,  no t  very  s e v e r e  where manipula tors  a r e  used f o r  
docking. 
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3.9 NON-COLLISION DOCKING APPROACH VECTOR 
A p o t e n t i a l  hazard e x i s t s  when two docking v e h i c l e s  approach each o t h e r  
on a  l i n e - o f - s i t e  course ,  a s  u s u a l l y  planned f o r  t h e  f i n a l  dacking maneuver. 
T h i s  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a  c o l l i s i o n  course ,  and i f  a  con t ro l  system f a i l u r e  o c c u r s  
on t h e  a c t i v e  v e h i c l e ,  so t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  v e l o c i t y  r educ t ions  cannot be achieved,  
a  c o l l i s i o n  w i l l  occur  a t  a  v e l o c i t y  h igher  than t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  docking 
system wi th  consrquent damage. 
In  o r d e r  t o  avoid t h i s  hazard,  a  new procedure is suggested h e r e ,  which 
avo ids  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of an i n a d v e r t e n t  c o l l i s i o n  a t  t o o  high a  v c l o c i t y .  
Th i s  c o n s i s t s  of aiming t h e  approach v e l o c i t y  v e c t o r  no t  a t  t h e  docking p o r t  
of t h e  t a r g e t  v e h i c l e ,  but a t  an  imaginary "pseudo-target" bome d i s t a n c e  t o  
one s i d e  of t h e  t a r g e t  veh ic le .  Th i s  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by Figurz  3-12. The 
pseudo t a r g e t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  t h e  s i d e  of t h e  t a r g e t  v e h i c l e  t h a t  i f  a 
c a n t r o l  system f a i l u r e  should occur ,  t h e  a c t i v e  v e h i c l e  passes  by t h e  t a r g e t  
without t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  c o n t a c t .  Some margin may be allowed f o r  p o s s i b l e  
r o t a t i o n s  and e r r 0  r s. 
This  non-co l l i s ion  approach v e c t o r  i s  maintained whi le  t h e  v e l o c i t y  of 
t h e  a c t i v e  v e h i c l e  is  above t h e  docking systsm a t t e n u a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t y ,  
Dece le ra t ion  through t h e  v a r i o u s  "braking ga tes"  occurs  a long t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .  
The v e l o c i t y  v e c t o r  i s  only  changed t o  be on a  l i n e - o f - s i t e ,  o r  c o l l i s i o n ,  
course  when i t s  v e l o c i t y  has been reduced t o  wi thin  t h e  docking system 
a t t e n u a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t y .  I f  a  c o n t r o l  system f a i l u r e  occurs  now,  he docking 
system can wi ths tand the  col l !s ion without damage. 
Two p o t e n t i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  can be fo reseen  wi th  t h i s  procedure.  F i r s t ,  
t h e  guidance of t h e  v e h i c l e  towards a  non-exis tent  pseudo t a r g e t  i s  a  rn~jre 
complex maneuver than a  simple l ine -o f - s igh t  approach. I t  may be found, 
however, t h a t  a  "bias" can be in t roduced simpiy and r e l i a b l y  i n t o  t h e  o p t i c a l  
system. The angle  of view of tihe t a r g e t  v e h i c l e  w i l l  c o n t i n u a l l y  change, 
however. 
Secondly, t h e  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  system programmi1.g is  more complex, 
p o s ~ ~ b l y  r e q u i r i n g  more p r o p e l l a n t s ,  and more complex computer a ided c o n t r o l s .  
I f  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  of  t h e  a c t i v e  v e h i c l e  i s  maintained c o n s t a n t ,  t h e  braking 
maneuvers r e q u i r e  sim1:lLaneous f i r i n g  of s e v e r a l  j e t s  i n  a predetermined but 
c o n s t a n t  r a t l m ,  and t h i s  i s  a  non-optimum use  of t h e  system. 
Ti-,* s a f e t y  advantages,  of completely avoiding t h e  p o ~ ~ s i b i l i t y  of an in-  
a d v e r t e n t  c o l l i s i o n  a t  a  v e l o c i t y  t o  cause  damage, must be eva lua ted  a g a i n s t  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  d isadvantages  pointed ou t .  Th i s  p re l iminary  e v a l u a t i o n  i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  t h e  advantages may be worth t h e  p e n a l t i e s  involved.  A f u l l e r  e v a l u a t i o n  
of t h e  method, inc lud ing  s imula t ions  wi th  v i s u a l  d i s p l a y s ,  should be made. 
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Figure 3-12, Non-collimion Docking Approach. 
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4.0 PERSONNEl, TRAFFIC PATTERNS, ESCAPE ROUTES
AND ON-BCARD SURVIVABILITY
The purpose of this task was to analyze the personnel traffic patterns,
escape route, and on-board survlvabJlity from a safety standpoint for the
orbiter with crew and passengers, sortie modules, and for the modular space
station. Particular situations investigated were normal operatlons_ emer-
gency operations, IVA and EVA.
Generalized candidate configurations, typical of the many variations
possible and those which have been or are being c_nsidered, were modeled for
the orbiter, sortie modules, and modular space station, and evaluated fcr
their ability to satisfy safety requirements which evolved from ml analysis
of identified credible emergencies.
4.1 CONCLUSIONS AND RECO,_MENDATIONS FOR BASELIB_ ORBITER CONFIGURATION
The safety conclusions and recommendations for the baseline orbiter con-
figuration defined in Phase B studies (Figure &-l) involve compartmenta-
tion_sult provisions, airlock s_zlng, EVA ingress/eg_es_ and operational
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o Qulck-donning pressure suits which do not require prebreathlng
(8 psi suits) should be provided for all on-board personnel.
o The crew/passenger compartment should be divided into two sections
by a partition which can exclude smoke and fumes, and can provide
protection against excessive heat from a fire. Pressure build-up
beyond the capability of the partition can be provided by suitable
pressure relief valves in each section. These sections can provide
temporary _efu_e until corrective measures can be taken.
o All equipment required for return to earth should be capable of
operating in a depressurlzed environment, and of being operated
by the crew in pressure suits.
o Capability should be provided for returning from EVA directly
into the crew/passenger compartment.
o Provided the above recommendations are implemented, the airlock
is not required for safety purposes. It should be available,
possibly as a payload item, on missions for which EVA is planned.
o If the airlock is capable of accommodating all passengers in
emergency shirtsleeve conditions through deorbit and entry, then
8 psi suits are required only for the orbiter crew on those
missions. The passengers have time to return to their seats for
landing after reaching low altitudes.
4.2 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALTERNATE ORBITER CONFIGURATIONS
4.2.1 Configuration with Large Airlock
The airlock requirements for performing EVA are that the airlock be _
sized to accommodate two men in pressure suits with portable life support
systems (PLSS). Such an airlock is likely to be large enough to accommodate
four and possibly six men in shirtsleeves.
The airlock for the baseline orbiter which resulted from the Phase B
study is even larger than this requirement. It is a sphere of 2.4 m (8 ft)
diameter, intercepted by the flat hatches. As shown in Figure 4-2, this
airlock can accommodate at least eight men in hammock-type supports under
emergency shirtsleeve conditions. Enough room is available for four more
men, if desired, making a total of 12 men in the airlock.
Such a large alrlock can be used as a second compartment in the event of
In addition to being sized for two crewmen with PLSS, it must |an emergency.
be capable, in an emergency, of supporting all passengers in a shirtsieeve
environment through deorbit and reentry. This may require in excess of six
hours llfe support capability in the airlock for return to CONUS (Continental
U.S.A.) landing sites. The capability to land with the passengers in the air-
lock is not required because the passengers can return to the crew/passenger
compartment to their respective (or makeshift) landing positions after the
i 76
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o r b i t e r  re-enters  t h e  s e n s i b l e  atri~osphere and the  cabin i s  r e p r e s s u r i z e d  t o  
a  h a b i t a b l e  environment. Passenger e g r e s s  from t h e  a i r l o c k  could occur  a t  
approximately 4500 m (15,000 f t )  a l t i t u d e ,  4 minutes p r i o r  t o  landing.  
S p e c i a l l y  s i z e d  inward b leed  valves  on the  crew/psssenger compartment a r e  
r equ i red  to  e n s u r e  an adequate r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  r a t e .  
Two p r e s s u r e  suits only a r e  r equ i red  i n  t h i s  case  f o r  use by t h e  crewmen. 
These must be quick-donning 8 p s i  s u i t s ,  which do n o t  r e q u i r e  any pre-breathing.  
The a i r l o c k  cannot be used f o r  g e t t i n g  i n t o  t h e  s u i t s ,  a s  t h e  a i r l o c k  ha tch  
cannot be opened when s h i r t s l e e v e  passengers  a r e  i n s i d e  i t  and t h e  atmosphere 
i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  has  been l o s t  o r  contaminated.  The two s u i t s  should  t h e r e f o r e  
be k e p t  i n  t h e  crewlpassenger compartment, no t  t h e  a i r l o c k .  
I t  i s  es t ima ted  t h a t  t h e  time r e q u i r e d  t o  don 8 p s i  s u i t s  i s  7 minutes ,  o r  
equ iva len t  t o  t h e  t ime a v a i l a b l e  i n  a  s h i r t s l e e v e  environment t o  cope wi th  
p ressure  l o s s  through a  one-inch-diameter ho le .  Addi t ional  r e a c t i o n  time can 
be gained by em2loying f iood  flow c o n t r o l ,  which r e p l a c e s  t h e  atmosphere a t  
a p p r ~ x i m a t e l y  the  same r a t e  a t  which i t  is be ing  l o s t ,  t o  mainta in  t h e  atmos- 
phere a t  the  minimum accep tab le  p r e s s u r e  l e v e l .  
For miss ions  i n  which EVA i s  planned as p a r t  of t h e  normal miss ion,  
p r e s s u r e  suits must be  c a r r i e d  f o r  a l l  t h e  passengers ,  a s  w e l l  a s  f o r  t h e  
two crewmen and the  EVA men. These a r e  r equ i red  i n  c a s e  an a i r l o c k  malfunc- 
t i o n  does n o t  a l low r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  of t h e  a i r l o c k  (e .g . ,  t h e  e x t e r n a l  ha tch  
cannot b e  s e a l e d ) .  The crew and passengers  then don t h e i r  suits, t h e  crew/ 
passenger compartment is  then depressur ized ,  and t h e  EVA men can e n t e r .  These 
a d d i t i o n a l  s u i t s  may be much s imple r  than EVA o r  I V A  s u i t s ,  as  no a c t i v i t i z s  
a r e  t o  be performed i n  them. I f  t h e  EVA men p lan  t o  r ed- l ine  t h e i r  oxygen 
supply t o  mainta in  a  few hours  r e s e r v e s  by t h e  t i m e  they r e t u r n ,  t h e s e  addi- 
t i o n a l  s u i t s  can be  3.5 p s i  s u i t s  which r e q u i r e  perhaps two hours  of  pre-  
b r e a t h i n g  b e f o r e  reducing t o  t h e  o p e r a t i n g  p r e s s u r e s .  Otherwise, they shou ld  
be 8 p s i  s u i t s .  
4.2.2 A l t e r n a t i v e  O r b i t e r  C m f i g u r a t i o n  - 
An a l t e r n a t i v e  s a f e t y  approach f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  is s h a m  i n  F igure  4- 3. 
This  conf igura t ion  is s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  b a s e l i n e  wi th  t h e  except ion t h a t  t h e  
forward l o c a t e d  a i r l o c k  is e l i m i n a t e d  w i t h  its volune being absorbed i n t o  a  
s i n g l e  h a b i t a b l e  compartment ; and s p e c i a l  des ign requirements a r e  imposed t o  
use the  f l o o r  of t h e  crew compartment t o  d e a l  w i t h  a  f i r e  o r  a tmospher ic  
contarnination. 
'.me equipment r e q u i r e d  f o r  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  must b e  capable  of  o p e r a t i n g  
and be ing  opera ted  i n  a  depressur ized  cond i t ion ,  as f o r  t h e  b a s e l i n e  config- 
u r a t  ion.  
P ressure  sllits (8  p s i )  must be  c a r r i e d  f o r  a l l  on-board pe r sonne l  f o r  
a l l  mFssions. 
A p o r t a b l e  a i r l o c k  can be  l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  cargo bay f o r  those  miss ions  
i n  which EVA i s  a  planned a c t i v i t y .  S ince  suits a r e  provided f o r  a l l ,  
however, emergency EVA can s t i l l  b e  performed from t h e  crew/passenger com- 
partment.  
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Figure 4-3. Alternative Safety Approach for Orbiter
4.2,3 Ideal Orbiter Configuration
An ideal safety configuration is one in which safety is inherent in the ,
configuration, not through subsystems or time-consuming complicated proced-
ures which may integrally involve personnel. The foremost objectives of such
a configuration are (i) to desensitize the vehicle from the potential effects
of credible emergencies, (2) to desensitize the vehicle from arbitrary cri-
teria, such as vent valve sizing, factored into subsystems design resulting
from a theoretical analysis of the credible er.ergencies, (3) to minimize the
time required to safeguard personnel, and (4) to maximize the time available
to perform corrective action.
One configuration which ideally satisfies these objectives relative to
the credible emergencies and effects considered in this task_ is shown in
Figure 4-4. The configuration consists of a crew compartment, a passenger %
compartment, a two-man airlock, a docking port, three internal hatches, and
three external hatches, one of which is a docking port hatch. Two 3.5 psi
suits are provided for the two crewmen. Requirements include capability for
abort with the passengers in the crew compartment, capability for abort equip-
ment to operate in a vacuum, and capability for abort controls to be operatable











Figure 4-4. Ideal Orbiter Safety Configuration i
4.3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANNED SORTIE MODULES
Conclusions reached from the analysis for manned sortie modules are:
%
o A sortie module consisting of two separate pressurized modules
does not have any significant safety advantages compared to a
single module version. In both cases the orbiter is available
as a separate refuse compartment.
o No safety requirement exists for an airlock between a sortie 1
module and an orbiter, provided it is acceptable to abort a _
particular mission if a depressurization or contamination _-
problem arises in the sortie module. An airlock between
orbiter and sortie module could be useful in providing IVA
maintenance capability in such an event, but also poses the _
additional risk of isolating personnel in either vehicle if
a similar problem arises in the airlock.
Recommendations made are as follows:
o The airlock, if provided, should be configured such that
: isolation of the sortie module crew from the orbiter does
not result during the performance of EVA from the airlock.
i If this is not practical, then the emergency capability to
,:o deorblt all personnel in _he sortie module or in the orbiter
should be provided, or the capability should be provided to
:i transfer personnel in the sortie module to the orbiter via
_ EVA to enable an abort of the mission.
_! o A means of emergency exit (dual egress capability) should be
provided in sortie modules, for example, by longitudinal
_ floor providing independent personnel routes above and below
,,o the floor.
_,
i_ o Emergency acconffinodationshould be provided in the orbiter
:, for all passengers through an abort. !
°_ 80
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o  A means shou ld  be p rov ided  t o  r e l e a s e  t h e  s o r t i e  module from 
t h e  o r b i t e r .  R e l t a s e  is d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  from e j e c t i o n  i n  t h a t  
no  i d e n t i f i e d  c r e d i b l e  emergent-ies r e q u i r e  a  r e a c t i o n  t i m e  
l e s s  t h a n  a  few minutes ,  a s  imp l i ed  by e j e c t i o n .  
4 . 4  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODULAR SPACE STATION 
Conclus ions  reached f o r  t h e  modular  s p a c e  s t a t i o n  a r e :  
o  A two-pressure volume c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  such  as provided  i n  t h e  NR 
des ign ,  p rov ides  maximum o p e r a t i o n a l  f l e x i b i l i t y  ( e . g . ,  m i s s i o n  
c o n t i n u a t i o n )  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  an a c c i d e n t  i n  any one module. 
Adequate s a f e t y  can, however, be provided  w i t h o u t  a two-volume 
arrangement,  b u t  l o s s  of  any one module ( temporary  o r  permanent) 
i n t e r r u p t s  t h e  m i s s i o n  and may need complex o r b i t e r  r e s c u e  oper- 
a t i o n s .  
o  A "c losed"  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  which p rov ides  a t  l e a s t  two independent  
pe r sonne l  r o u t e s  from any one module t o  any o t h e r ,  p rov ides  
s a f e t y  w i t h  s h i r t s l e e v e  o p e r a t i o n s  o n l y .  The NR s p a c e  s t a t i o n  
d e s i g n  p rov ides  such  a  t t c l o s e d t h o n f i g u r a t i o n  by p r o v i d i n g  a u x i  l- 
i a r y  passages  between modules i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t he  main pas s  ageway 
through t h e  c o r e  module. 
o  "Open" c o n f i g u r a t i o n s ,  such  a s  t h e  MDAC d e s i g n ,  r e l y  on a i r l o c k s  
and IVA, EVA o r  o r b i t e r  r e s c u e  t o  e n s u r e  p e r s o n n e l  s a f e t y  i n  
s i t u a t i o n s  r e q u i r i n g  emergency e v a c u a t i o n  of a module. 
0 S p e c i a l  p r e c a u t i o n s  must  b e  t a k e n  du r ing  s p a c e  s t a t i o n  assembly 
t o  a s s u r e  s a f e t y  of pe r sonne l .  f i e s e  p r e c a u t i o n s  i n c l u d e  
r e s t r i c t i n g  acces s  t o  s t a t i o n  compartments which do n o t  have  
d u a l  s h i r t s l e e v e  e g r e s s ,  u n l e s s s  t h e  t ime s p e n t  i n  t h e  compart- 
ment i s  s h o r t ;  p o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous  equipment h a s  been  checked 
p r i o r  t o  e n t r y ;  EVA s u i t s  a r e  provided;  and a buddy sys tem is  
employed. 
o  Space s t a t i o n  r e supp ly  does n o t  p r e s e n t  any unusua l  s a f e t y  
, problems which r e q u i r e  unique  c r i t e r i a ,  r equ i r emen t s ,  o r  s o l u -  
t i o n s .  
The fo l lowing  recommendations are made: 
o  I n t e r c o n n e c t  a l l  modules through an a u x i l i a r y  pas sage  t o  p rov ide  
d u a l  s h i r t s l e e v e  e g r e s s ,  o r  where t h i s  i s  i m p r a c t i c a l ,  provLde a 
f l o o r  i n  t h e  module which p rov ides  f o r  independent  pe r sonne l  
r o u t e s  above and below t h e  f l o o r .  
o  Design a l l  h a t c h e s  t o  b e  o p e r a b l e  from e i t h e r  s i d e  t o  e n a b l e  
e scape  from w i t h i n  o r  r e s c u e  from o u t s i d e  a  module/compartment . 
o I n t e r i o r  h a t c h e s  s h a l l  normal ly  b e  open, w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  
emergency e g r e s s  h a t c h e s  which s h a l l  normal ly  b e  c l o s e d .  
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o  P o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous equipment should no t  be l o c a t e d  i n  o r  near  
a r e a s  where maximum crew congestion is l i k e l y  t o  occur;  e .g . ,  
d i n i n g i r e c r e a t i o n  a r e a s .  
o  P o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous equipment shou ld  not  be l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  
v i c i n i t y  of t h e  module docking i n t e r f a c e .  
4.5 IDENTIFICATION OF CREDIBLE EMERGENCIES 
The assessment of escape r o u t e s  and compartmentation i s o l a t i o n  requ i red  
the  i ' d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of c r e d i b l e  emergencies from which conf igura t ion  o r i e n t e d  
and suppor t ing  requirements could be genera ted through subsequent hazards  
a n a l y s i s .  
Eleven c r e d i b l e  emergencies were i d e n t i f i e d  and used i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  
These a r e  shown i n  Table 4-1, inc lud ing  t h e i r  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  v e h i c l e s .  
Table 4-1. Credible  Emergencies 
A p p l i c a b i l i t y  
F i r e / t o x i c  e wironment 
Explosion 
Emergency evacuat ion 
Loss of p r e s s u r e  
F d i l u r e  t o  open i n t e r n a l  ha tch  between 
p r e s s u r e  i s o l a t a b l e  volumes 
F a i l u r e  t o  open docking ha tch  a f t e r  docking 
F a i l u r e  t o  c l o s e  docking ha tch  b e f o r e  
undocking 
I n a b i l i t y  t o  use  docking h a t c h  f o r  EVA when 
EVA requ i red  
F a i i u r e  t o  c l o s e  e x t e r n a l  a i r l o c k  h a t c h  when 
r e t u n i n g  from EVA 
F a i l u r e  t o  open i n t e r n a l  a i r l o c k  ha tch  when 
r e t u r n i n g  from EVA 
F a i l u r e  t o  c l o s e  I V A  a i r l o c k  ha tch  on 
depressurizedlcontaminated s i d e  o r  t o  
open ha tch  on p r e s s u r i z e d l h a b i t a b l e  s i d e  
when r e t u r n i n g  from EVA. 
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The e f f e c t s  assumed f o r  four  of t h e s e  emergencies,  namely, f i r e l t o x i c  
environment, exp los ion ,  emergency evacua t ion ,  and l o s s  of p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  a r e  
l i s t e d  i n  Table 4-2. This d e f i n e s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  these  emergencies considered 
f o r  a n a l y s i s .  For example, the  type of f i r e  o r  t o x i c  environment considered 
r e q u i r e s  r a p i d  (0.5 min) evacuat ion,  b v t  does no t  r e s u l t  i n  personnel  i n j u r y ,  
and al lows even tua l  r e t u r n  t o  the  a f f e c t e d  compartment. More severe  a c c i d e n t s ,  
which may i n j u r e  pe r sonne l ,  o r  which do no t  a l low s h i r t s l e e v e  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  
- 
a f f e c t e d  compartment, a r e  considered under "explosion" and "emergency 
evacuation".  
Table 4 - 2 .  Assumed E f f e c t s  f o r  Var izb le  Level  
Credible  Emergeqcies 
F i r e  /Toxic Environme.. : 
Explosion 
4.6 SAFETY ANLYSIS OF ORBITER CONFIGURATIONS 
Emergency Evacuation 
Loss of P r e s s u r i z a t i o n  
Seven p o s s i b l e  o r b i t e r  conf igura t ions  were eva lua ted  f o r  t h e i r  i n h e r e n t  
c a p a b i l i t y  t o  cope wi th  t h e  c r e d i t l e  emergencies i d e n t i f i e d .  The fol lowing 
major assumptions were r e q u i r e d  t o  scope t h e  a n a l y s i s  t o  w i t h i n  workable 
bounds. These a r e :  
0.5 
0 
o Emergencies, o rhe r  than ha tch  f a i l u r e s ,  a r e  n o t  considered on 
a i r l o c k s .  
5 
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o Rescue v e h i c l e  is n o t  a v a i l a b l e .  
Yes 
Yes 
o No double emergencies a r e  considered.  
No 
Yes 
o Air locks  a r e  s i z e d  f o r  twc crewmen o r  a l l  crewmen. I f  s i z e d  f o r  











a!!! Space Division North Amrr 1c;~in '3oc:ltw~ll 
o Passage of many personnel  through an a i r l o c k ,  two a t  a  t ime,  
is no t  accep tab le .  
o  Air lock compartment f o r  EVA can be  crew compartment, passenger 
compartment, o r  a i r l o c k .  
o  Planned EVA w i l l  be  accomplished t h r o q h  an a i r l o c k .  
o  S a f e t y  i s  n o t  achieved v i a  EVA. 
Each of t h e  s e v t n  candidate  o r b i t e r  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  was eva lua ted ,  w i t h i n  
t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  of the  assumptions,  t o  determine the  o p e r a t i o n a l  op t ions  a v a i l -  
a b l e  t o  cope wi th  each c r e d i b l e  emergency. Analys is  of t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  op t ions  
r e s u l t e d  i n  secondary c o n f i g u r a t i o n a l ,  subsystems,  and o p e r a t i o n a l  requirements  
necessary  t o  make t h e  op t ion  v i a b l e .  
4.6.1 Candidate O r b i t e r  Conf igurat ions  
The b a s e l i n e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  of t h e  o r b i t e r  is composed of an a i r l o c k ,  and 
a  crew and passenger compartment a s  shown i n  Figure  4-1. This i s  t h e  f i n a l  
conf igura t ion  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  NR Phase B s tudy .  
The seven c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  analyzed a r e  shown schemat ica l ly  i n  Figure  4-5. 
These a r e  based on t h e  number of p r a c t i c a l  ways i n  which t h e  fo l lowing compart- 
ments can b e  ar ranged:  
o  Crew compartment 
o  Passenger compartment 
o  Air lock 
CANDIDATE C C h F I G U R A T I m S  
ml CREWIPAS SERGER COMPARTMEKT 
CREW COMPARTMKT 
1 7 1  PASSENGER COMPARTMNT 
a AIRLOCK 
P i ~ u r e  4. 5, s a n d i d a t e  O r b i t e r  Conf igurat ions  
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A ha tch ,  door,  o r  opeiling may be loca ted  anywhere t h e r e  i s  a s o l i d  l i n e .  
Compartments which a r e  not  h a b i t a b l e ,  such a s  t h e  cargo bay,  a r e  not included.  
4.6.2 Operat ional  Options 
The o p e r a t i o n a l  op t ions  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  four  of t h e  emergency s i t u a t i o n s  
a r e  shown, toge the r  wi th  t h e i r  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  the  s p e c i f i c  o r b i t e r  con- 
f i g u r a t i o n s ,  i n  Figures  4-6 through 4-9. The s i n g l e  o p t i o n ,  which i s  univer-  
s a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a l l  emergencies is  t o  "take t h e  r i s k " .  A program 
d e c i s i o n  not  t o  accept t h e  s a f e t y  recommendations impl ies  t h a t  the  r i s k  
assoc ia ted  wi th  t h e  emergency is  being taken.  
4 .6 .3  Major Sa fe ty  Requirements 
The mul t i tude  of  op t ions  a v a i l a b l e  t o  cope wi th  each emergency l e a d  t o  
d r f f e r e n t  s e t s  of requirements f o r  each compatible o r b i t e r  c o n f i g u r a t i o n .  
These requirements a r e  i d e n t i f i e d ,  c o r r e l a t e d  t o  the  o r i g i n a t i n g  emergency, 
and grouped i n  accordance wi th  t h e i r  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  each o r b i t e r  conf igura-  
c ion.  A l o g i c a l  r educ t ion  of t h e  grouped requirements  is made t o  a r r i v e  a t  
a recommended minimum accep tab le  s e t  f o r  t h e  conf igura t ion .  This  process  
is i l l u s t r a t e d  and documented i n  Figures  4-10 through 4-14. 
Hatch requirements a r e  an important  cons ide ra t ion  b u t  a r e  no t  major con- 
f i g u r a t i o n  d r i v e r s  and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a l l  h a t c h  requirements  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  
parameters of l o c a t i o n ,  dua l  opening (hatch w i t h i n  a  ha tch)  o r  dua l  c l o s i n g  
(back- to-back) a r e  consol idated under t h e  column t i t l e d  "Hatch Requirements". 
These c h a r t s  con ta in  s u f f i c i e n t  informat ion t o  a s c e r t a i n  t h e  impact on 
v e h i c l e  conf igura t ion  of  t h e  e l i : d n a t i o n  of one o r  more requirement op t ions .  
I f ,  f o r  ~ x a m p l e ,  8 p s i  s u i t s  were e l imina ted  a s  a  v i a b l e  requirement op t ion  on 
the  two compartment wi th  a i r l o c k  o r b i t e r  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  due t o  a  programmatic 
d e c i s i o n ,  t h e  remaining v i a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  could r e a d i l y  b e  determined,  a s  
shown by Figure  6-14. 
A summary of  t h e  recommended requirements  f o r  a l l  seven cand ida te  o r b i t e r  
conf igura t ions  is shown i n  Figure  4-15. Only one c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  the  two- 
compartment wi th  an a i r l o c k  i n  between, i s  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  n o t  accep tab le ,  
because a  problem i n  t h e  a i r l o c k  can i s o l a t e  t h e  passengers  from t h e  crew 
compartment. 
4.6.4 Evaluat ion of Configu.rations 
Five b a s i c  op t ions  were i d e n t i f i e d  f o r  comparing t h e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  t o  
a r r i v e  a t  r e l a t i v e  s a f e t y  r a t i n g s .  These r e l a t e  t o  t h e  number and type  of 
s u i t s ;  whether I V A  o r  EVA i s  requ i red  t o  e f f e c t  t r a n s f e r  of personnel  fram 
the  a f f e c t e d  compartment t o  t h e  crew compartment i n  t h e  event  of an 
emergency; and whether a  r e fuge  compartment i s  a v a i l a b l e .  These f i v e  op t ions  
a r e  : 
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Figure 4 - 6 .  Optiono - Fire/Toxic Environment 
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Figure 4-7. Options - Explosion and Emergency Evacuation 
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Figure 5-8. Options - Loss of Pressure 
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Figure 4-9. Options - Failure t o  Close External 
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Figure 4-10. Major Safety Requirements, CrewfPassenger Compartment Only 
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Figure 4-11. Major Safety Rt<.!irements, CrewlPassenger Compartment 
With Airlock Only 
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F igure  4-12. Major S a f e t y  Requirements, Separa te  Crew and Passenger  Compartments 
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F igure  4-13. Major S a f e t y  Requirements, Separa te  Crew, Passenger  and 
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F iqure  4-14. Effect of Elimining 8 p s i  S u i t s  
(Reference Figure 4.2-4D) 
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Figure 4-15. Summary of Reconmended Requirements 
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Trans fe r  Mode 
Pressure  S u i t s  t o  Crew 
Option Quan t i ty  Compartmen t 
-- 
A A 1  1 8 p s i  /A 
B 2 8 " N /A 
C A l l  3 . 5  " I VA 
D 2 3 . 5  'I IVA 







A comparison of t h e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s ,  using these  op t ions ,  as primary paranwcers, 
i s  shown i n  F igure  4-16. An a d d i t i o n a l  parameter,  t h a t  of r e a c t i o n  t ime,  i s  
in t roduced  t o  s i g n i f y  t h e  amount of time a v a i l a b l e  t o  r e a c t  t o  t h e  c r e d i b l e  
emergencies. Seven minutes corresponds t o  t h e  time requ i red  f o r  ob t a i n i n g  
a c c e s s  t o  and donning 8 p s i  s u i t s .  Two minutes is t h e  time r e q u i r e d  f o r  per-  
sonne l  t o  evacua te ,  i n  a  s h i r t s l e e v e  environment, an a f f e c t e d  c o m p a r t n a t  and 
s e e k  re iuge i n  t h e  a d j o i n i n g  compartment. 
The s a f e t y  r a t i n g s  a s  l i s t e d  a r e  based on t h e  r e a c t i o n  t ime and a v a i l a b i l i t y  
of a  r e scue  compartment. Opt ians  which r e s u l t  i n  minimum r e a c t i o n  t ime and ex- 
h i b i t  a  r e scue  compartment a r e  most f avorab le .  The a c c e p t a b l e ,  good, and b e s t  
r a t i n g s  apply  t o  t h e  combination of a  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  and t h e  number acd 
type of p r e s s u r e  suit:s c a r r i e d  on-board. The r a t i n g s  a r e  based on t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
- 
c a p a b i l i t i e s  of t h e  -onfiguration, 'suit  combinations,  a s  fo l lows :  
Sa fe ty  F a c t o r  
React ion  Time Refuge Compartment Sa fe ty  Ra t ing  
7 minutes N o  Acceptab l e  
7 minutes Yes Good 
2 minutes Yes Best  
' PRESSURE SUITS ! SAFETY FACTORS SAFETY 
CONFIGURATION 1 OKIOP~ / QTY. , TYPE REACTION TIME* I REFUGE COMPT. , RATING 
1 . IC  P ' 
' 1 A ALL 9 PSI 7 MINS NO ! ACCEPTABL 
2 .  ;= A ALL 8 PSI 7 hllNS NO ACCE PTABU 
3 . ;  C P 1 6 2 8 Pji 7 MlNS YES GOOD 
C ALL 3.5 PSI I 2 MlNS YES BEST 
I 
4 . j c ~ : p  __ I : D 2 2.5 PSI 1 2 MINS , YES, IF ACCESSIBLE. POOR * *  
! 
0 2 I 8 PSI I 7 tAlNS YES GOOD 
5.-I 
I C 1 ALL , 3.5 PSI 1 2 MlNS 1 YES ! SEST 
D I 2 1 3.5 PSI 1 2MlNS i YES BFST 
B 2 / 8 PSI 7 MINS I YES 1 GOOD 
j 6 . ! t l P a  I I C I ALL '3.5 PSI 2 MlNS YES BEST 
1 
E i 2 ; 3.5 PSI 1 2 MlNs j YES 1 B E I T  
I I (EVA) 1 ! - 
7 .-pl 
I 
D j 2 3.5 PSI 1 2 MINS YES 
I 1 BEST 
"AIRLOCK PROBLEM CAN PREVENT ACCESS TO CREW COMPARTMEPJT 
Figure  4-16. Comparison of Conf igurat ions  
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4.7 SAFETY ANALYSIS OF SORTIE MODULE CONFIGURATIONS 
Evaluat ion of t h e  s o r t i e  module c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  i s  involved wi th  t h e  
e f f e c t s  of t h e  s o r t i e  module c o n f i g u r a t i o n  on o r b i t e r  personnel  and v e h i c l e  
s a f e t y  and,  converse ly ,  wi th  t h e  use of t h e  o r b i t e r  a s  a  r e fuge  volume f o r  
s o r t i e  module personnel .  This  t a s k  cons ide res  only manned s o r t i e  modules 
a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
4 .7 .1  Candidate S o r t i e  Module Conf igurat ions  
The s i x  cand ida te  s o r t i e  module c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  shown i n  Figure  4-17were 
s e l e c t e d  f o r  e v a l u a t i o n .  
0 I'PRES ISOL VOL FOR ALL 
TW-MAN AIRLOCK 
Figure  4-17. Candidate S o r t i e  Module Conf igurat ions  
4.7.2 Opera t iona l  Opt ions  
The o p e r a t i o n a l  op t ions  a v a i l a b l e  t o  cope wi th  t h r e e  c r e d i b l e  emergencies 
a r e  shown f o r  each of t h e  cand ida te  s o r t i e  module conf igura t ions  i n  F igures  
4-18 through 4-20. Again, a s  f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  a n a l y s i s ,  an op t ion  which is 
u n i v e r s a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a l l  emergencies is t o  " t ake  t h e  r i sk" .  A program 
dec i s ion  n o t  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  s a f e t y  recommenaations impl ies  t h a t  t h e  r i s k  
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a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  emergency i s  b e i n g  taken.  A second o p t i o n  which is 
u n i v e r s a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a l l  s o r t i e  module emergencies i s  t o  use  t h e  o r b i t e r  
f o r  r e fuge .  
TO PRES ISOt EXTINGUISH PIRE 
6 PURGE Am 1 
I 
C TO ORBITER EX1 IWCUISH FIRE rx;~r*?. X X X  X X X 
1 
n - 
*Ioolatoa rtaomphere, tut no mignificmt delta-? capnbiilty 
Figure 4-18 Optfonr - Ffrc /Toxic Environment 
1'0 FIRE ISOL 
sn OPT* 
PESCM 6 EVACUATE 
IN.IURED TO SU CMPT 
EXTINGUISH FIKE X X  X X % 
. ~ 
Figure 4-19 Optians-Explosion 
- 
I RESCUE 6 EVACUATE 
INJURED TU ORBITER MORT 
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4.7.3 Malor S a f c t y  Requirements 
The o p e r a t i o n a l  o p t i o n s  of t h e  previous  s e c t i o n  were eva lua ted  t o  a r r i v e  
a t  major s a f e t y  requirements  f o r  each cand ida te  s o r t i e  module c o n f i g u r a t i o n .  
The recommended requirements  a r e  s u m a r i z e d  i n  F igure  4-21, 
X - Requirement 
* - Radundan~ Opening, Closing; Location 
** = A ~ ~ l i e s  onlv i f  EVA is  performed from Sort ie  Module 
. . I*** = Only applie; i f  EVA i s  berforlned or internal hatch i u  normally t.1our.d 
L . - -  - - --- - - -- . - - - - . - . . . . . . . . . .- . . 
F i g u r e  4-21.. Summary of Recommended Requirements 
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Only f o u r  r equ i r emen t s  a r e  involved  i n  t h e  recommendation. These a r e  
p e r s o n n e l  s h i r t s l e e v e  r e f u g e l a b o r t  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  pe r sonne l  s h i r t s l e e v e  
r e f u g e l a b o r t  i n  t h e  s o r t i e  module, EVA t o  and From t h e  o r b i t e r ,  and h a t c h  
r equ i r emen t s .  Of t h e s e  r equ i r emen t s ,  only  one,  t h e  requi rement  f o r  pe r sonne l  
s h i r t s l e e v e  r e s c u e l a b o r t  i n  t h e  s o r t i e  module is n o t  common t o  a l l  con f igu ra -  
t i o n s .  
The only requi rement  which is common t o  a l l  cand ida te  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  and 
recommended s e t s  of r equ i r emen t s  is t h a t  of pe r sonne l  s h i r t s l e e v e  r e f u g e / a b o r t  
i n  t h e  o r b i t e r .  The unde r ly ing  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  recommending t h i s  requi rement  i s  
t h a t  r e g a r d l e s s  of  t h e  s o r t i e  module c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  e x i t  t o  and r e f u g e  i n  the  
o r b i t e r  is the  n a t u r a l  g o a l  f o r  emergencies which do n o t  cut o f f  the normal 
e g r e s s  p a t n  t o  t he  o r b i t e r .  
4 . 7 . 4  Emergency Egres s  t o  O r b i t e r  from S o r t i e  Module 
Three b a s i c  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  concep t s ,  shown i n  F i g u r e  4-22 a r e  a v a i l a b l e  
f o r  p r o v i d i n g  emergency e g r e s s  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  f o r  an  emergency, such a s  a  f i r e  
o r  e x p l o s i o n ,  which has  b locked t h e  normal e g r e s s  r o u t e .  
DOCKING 
_dWK L 
AIR LOC K 
AVOID 
H AZ ARDOIJS 
DUAL A T T A C H  
I N T E R N A L  
FLOOR 
Figure  4-22. Emergency Egres s  From S o r t i e  Module 
The second concept  is recommended as b e i n g  t h e  most p r a c t i c a l  one.  T h i s  i 
is  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  employed on t h e  NR modular  s p a c e  s t a t i o n  modules and uses  
an  i n t e r n a l  f l o o r  t o  d i v i d e  t h e  module h o r i z o n t a l l y  i n t o  two b a s i c  volumes. 1 
Access doors  ( c r  openings)  are p rov ided  i n  t h e  f l o o r  a t  e a c h  end  o f  t h e  module 
w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  c l e a r a n c e  underneath  t h e  f l o o r  t o  a l l c w  s h i r t s l e e v e  person:~el  f 
t o  maneuver t o  t h e  e x i t  a t  t h e  o r b i t e r  i n t e r f a c e  and e g r e s s .  i 
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4 . 8  SAFETY ANALYSIS QF MODULAR SPACE STATION CONFIGURATlONS 
The NR and MDAC modular space  s t a t i o n  conf igura t ions  r e s u l t i n g  From 
Phase B s t u d i e s  were eva lua ted  f o r  t h e  i n h e r e n t  means a v a i l a b l e  t o  cope wi th  
t h e  i d e n t i f i e d  c r e d i b l e  emergencies. Normal o p e r a t i o n s  of t h e  space  s t a t i o n  
i n  between resupply o p e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  space  s t a t i o n  assembly, and t h e  resupply 
opera t ions  were considered.  
The a n a l y s i s  assumes t h a t  each of t!~e c r e d i b l e  emergencies can occur  i n  
any of t h e  modular elements and t h a t  e ~ ~ c h  modular element and the  o r b i t e r ,  
when a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  s t a t i o n ,  is  a  p r e s s u r e  i s o l a t e a b l e  volume compartment. 
The c r e d i b l e  emergencies considered l ead  t o  a n u d e r  of  b a s i c  criteria, which 
a r e  desc r ibed  below. 
4 .8 .1  Dual Egress 
Cer ta in  emergencies i n  a module, such as f i r e  o r  explos ion,  nay cu t  o f f  
the  normal escape r o u t e  t o  a survivable .  a r e a  r e s u l t i n g  i n  entrapment of the 
crew w i t h i n  t h e  a f f e c t e d  module. Tne p o s s i b i l i t y  of i s o l a t i n g  personnel  i n  a 
compartment i n  which an emergency has  occurred can be reduced i f  m u l t i p l e  e g r  ss 
paths  t o  a  s u r v i v a b l e  a r e a  a r e  provided w i t h i n  a  h a b i t a b l e  compartment. The 
d e s i r a b i l i t y  of t h e s e  p rov i s ions ,  from t h e  s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view, l ead  to  t h e  
dua l  e g r e s s  c r i t e r i o n  which is  s t a t e d  as:  
o  Normally h a b i t a b l e  compartments of more than 25 m3 (880 f t 3 )  
i n  volume s h a l l  have two or  more e x i t s  i n t o  a reas  which pro- 
v ide  f o r  pe r sonne l  s u r v i v a l .  
The volume below which t h e  dua l  e g r e s s  c r i t e r i o n  does not. apply,  25 m3 
(880 f  t 3 ) ,  is determined by judgment and is in tended t o  represen t  the  minimum 
compartment volume belaw which the immediately dangerous space  ( h e a t ,  flames, 
d e b r i  ,) i n  a c r e d i b l e  emergency would prevent  crew escape and s u r v i v a l ,  regard- 
l e s s  of  t h e  number of e g r e s s  r o u t e s .  
Pour conceptual  means of s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  dua l  a g r e s s  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  t h e  
modular space  s t a t i o n  a r e  a v a i l a b l e :  
A. Dual s h i r t s l e e v e  e n t r y / e g r e s s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
th rou  h t h e  i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n  of modular e l e lements ,  i n  a c losed  
11 
ring' c ~ n f i g u r a r i o n .  
B. External  connect ing passages,  c a l l e d  a u x i l i a r y  passages ,  
r equ i red  between proximate modules t o  provide t h e  second 
s h i r t s l e e v e  e g r e s s  path .  
C. Module f l o o r s  which provide  escape rou tes  above and below 
t h e  f l o o r .  
D. Air locks  w i t h  docking c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  rescue by t h e  o r b i t e r ,  
o r  wi th  s u f i i c i e n t  s u i t s  f o r  EVA essape l rescue ,  a r e  r equ i red .  
These concept- ,  a i z  . ' , v n  schemat ica l ly  i n  Figure 4-23. 
A. CLOSED RING CONFIGURATION 
C.  E'LOOR I N  MODULE 
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D. AIRLOCKS ON MODULES 
F i g u r e  4-23. Alternate S o l u t i o n s  for S a t i s f y i n g  Dual E g r e s s  C r i t e r i o n  
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Both t h e  N R  and MDAC s t a t i o n s  can meet the  dual  eg ress  
o r  more of the  above means as  can be seen from Figure4-24. 
c r i t e r i o n  by 0r.e 
4,8.2 Dual Ingres  s 
Emergencies may occur which may r e s u l t  no t  only i n  i n c a p a c i t a t i n g  person- 
bu t  a l s o  i n  c u t t i n g  o f f  the  rescue path o r  opening. Because personnel  may 
n j u r e d  o r  i n c a p a c i t a t e d ,  t h e  t ime involved t o  e f f e c t  rescue may be a  
c r i t i c a l  f a c t o r  f o r  crew s u r v i v a l ,  and p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of the  i n j u r e d  personnel  
i n  t h e  rescue opera t ions  cannot be assumed. Considera t ion of these  p o s s i b l e  
e f f e c t s  of c r e d i b l e  emergencies l e a d s  t o  the  d u a l  i n g r e s s  c r i t e r i o n :  
o Access t o  two o r  more s h i r t s l e e v e  e n t r a c e s  i n t o  normally 
h a b i t a b l e  compartments o r  more than 25 m3 (880 f t 3 )  i n  
volume s h a l l  b e  immediately a v a i l a b l e  from each of t h e  
o t h e r  normally i n h a b i t e d  compartments. 
Rat ionale  f o r  the  volume c o n s t r a i n t  on a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of t h e  c r i t e r i o n  i s  iden- 
t i c a l  t o  t h a t  p rev ious l ;~  d i scussed  f o r  dual  e g r e s s .  
The primary d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  dual  e g i e s s  and dua l  i n g r e s s  c r i t e r i a  
i s  t h a t  dual  e g r e s s  can b e  s a t i s f i e d  by IVA o r  EVA, w h i l e  Caal i n g r e s s  can 
only be  s a t i s f i e d  because 3f t ime c r i t i c a l i t y ,  by s h i r t s l e e v e  operation;. 
The i n g  . pathc  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  both  s u b j e c t  s t a t i o n s  a r e  shown i n  Figure  
4-25. As shown, a n  i n c a p x i t a t e d  crewman i n  a  l i f e  suppor t  o r  c o n t r o l  module 
docked t o  t h e  core  on t h e  NF. s t a t i o n  can be reached i n  a  s h i r t s l e e v e  environ- 
ment e i t h e r  by t h e  dock'ng por t  or a u x i l i a r y  passage openings.  On t h e  MDAC 
s t a t i o n ,  an i n c a p a c i t a t e d  crewman i n  e i t h e r  end of t h e  crew/operat ions  module, 
o r  i n  a  modul? docked t o  t h e  c ~ e w / o p e r a t i o n s  module, can b e  reached v i a  only 
one s h i r t s l e e v e  path  and a s  such does n o t  s a t i s f - r  t h e  d. ' i n g r e s s  c r i t e r i o n .  
An emergency i n  a  module/compartment can render  l i f e  suppor t  and s t a t i o n  
cont roZ f a c i l i t i e s  i n  the module/compartment t o t  a l l y  i n o p e r a b l e  and unrepa i r -  
ab le  o r ,  i n  a  l e s s  extreme case,  temporar i ly  inoperab le  u n t i l  r e p a i r s  can b e  
e f f e c t e d .  
This s i t u a t i o n  l eads  t o  a  moidc--/compartment s a f e t y  c r i t e r i o n  as  follows: 
o  Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  t h e  emergency s h i r t s l e e v e  
s u r v i v a l  of  a l l  on-board perscnnel  u n t i l  the  n e x t  resupply 
o r  emergency s h u t t l e  f l i g h t  following t h e  l o s s  of access  t o  
any one module/compartment and t h e  l o s s  of equipment and 
s u p p l i e s  i n  t h a t  module/compartment. If t h e  l o s s  of the  
module/ compartment c"vides t h e  s t a t i o n  i n t o  two o r  more i s o -  
l a t e d  h a b i t a b l e  a e c t i c n s ,  then each s e c t i o n  s h a l l  provide  
the  s u r v i v a l  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  a l l  on-board personnel ,  inc lud ing  
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This  s a r v i v a i  volume can b e  composed of a p r e s s u r e  i s o l a t a b l e  compartment 
w i t h i n  a module, a whole module, o r  a c l u s t e r  of modules. 
Tile l o s s  o f  a module/ -0mpartment c r i t e r i o n  i s  s a t i s f i e d  by t h e  NR s t a t i o n  
cs can  b e  s e e n  from F i g u r e  4 - 2 6 ,  The NR s t a t i o n  is d i v i d e d  i n t o  two s e p a r a t e  
p r e s s u r e  i s o l a t a b l e  volumes by t h e  a i r l o c k  (AL) on t h e  c o r e  module. 
On t h e  MDAC s t a t i o n ,  t h e  s e p a r a t e  volumes o f  t h e  c rew/ope ra t ions  module 
and t h e  genera l -purpose  l a b o r a t o r y  s e r v e  a s  s u r v i v a l  volunes  f o r  one a n o t h e r .  
Access between t h e s e  two modules, s h o u l d  one  become d e p r e s s u r i z e d ,  would b e  
through an IVA a i r l o c k  formed by t h e  h a t c h e s  of each  module a t  t h e i r  docking 
i n t e r f a c e .  
The modular  arrangement does n o t ,  however, s a t i s £ y  v i a  a s h i r t s l e e v e  
environment,  t h e  p a r t  of t h e  l o s s  of  a module/compartment c r i t e r i o n  which 
d e a l s  w i t h  d i v i s i o n  of t h e  s t a t i o n  i n t o  two o r  more i s o l a t e d  volumes. A 
p o t e n t i a l  h a z a r d  w i t h  t h i s  modular  a r rangement  i s  t h a t  l o s s  of  t h e  crewloper-  
a t i o n s  m d u l e  could  i s o l q t e  t h e  crew i n  s e p a r a t e  modules i f ,  f o r  example, 
p e r s o n n e l  were  working i n  t h e  power/subsystems moaule, ca rgo  module, o r  a 
module o r  c l u s t e r  o f  modules docked t o  t h e  end  o f  t h e  c rew/ope ra t ions  module. 
The only  modes a v a i l a b l e  t o  r e u n i t e  t h e  crew would b e  f o r  s t r a n d e d  members t o  
-1erform I V A  through t h e  c rew/ope ra t ions  module u s i n g  t h e  hatch-formed a i r l o c k s  
o r  t o  perform EVA t o  g a i n  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  ger~era-purpose  l a b o r a t o r y  through i t s  
end- loca ted  i n t e r n a l  a i r l o c k .  E i t h e r  r e t u r n  mode is disadvantageous  i n  t h a t  
i t  r e q u i r e s  s t o r a g e  and d i spe r semen t  of  IVAIEVA s u i t s  and c r i t i c a l  equipment 
and s u p p l i e s  throughout  t h e  v e h i c l e .  
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Uncontrol led  tumbling of a  s p a c e c r a f t  fo l lowing l o s s  of i t s  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  
c o n t r o l  i t s  a t t i t u d e  i s  one of t h e  most c r i t i c a l  emergency s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  
could a r i s e  i n  space .  For a  v e h i c l e  wi th  r e e n t r y  c a p a b i l i t y ,  such a s  a  s h u t t l e  
o r b i t e r ,  n e i t h e r  d e o r b i t  nor r e e n t r y  would be p o s s i b l e  under t h e s e  cond i t ions .  
A rescu ing  v e h i c l e  may be unable t o  he lp  t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e  because i t  can- 
no t  dock t o  i t .  Such a  s i t u a t i o n  could ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  be c a t a s t r o p h i c ,  and 
r e s u l t  i n  l o s s  of both  t h e  v z h i c l e  and i t s  occupants.  I f  t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e  
conta ined a  s i z e a b l e  source  of r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l ,  e .g.  i n  a  nuc lea r  r e a c t o r ,  
an unacceptable  r i s k  t o  t h e  popu la t ion  a t  l a r g e  may e x i - t  from t h e  e v e n t u a l  
randon re -en t ry  of t h e  v e h i c l e  i n t o  t h e  e a r t h ' s  atmosphere. 
The purpose of t h i s  t a s k  was t o  examine p o s s i b l e  methods f o r  a r r e s t i n g  
t h e  motion of a n  out-of-control  tumbling s p a c e - r a f t  by means e x t e r n a l  t o  t h e  
v e h i c l e  i n  o r d e r  t o  save  t h e  onboard pe r sonne i  and,  i f  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t ;  
and t o  determine t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  and e s t a b i i s h  requirements  f o r  pe r sonne l  
escape i n  t h e  even t  t h e  tumbling cannot be a r r e s t e d .  The tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  
considered i n c l u d e s  t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ,  t h e  space s t a t i o n ,  and i n d i v i h a l  
modules, c a l l e d  Small Space Vehic les  (SSV1s) f o r  t h i s  s tudy .  S o r t i e  modules o r  
space s t a t i o n  modules a r e  t y p i c a l  of SSV1s i n  s i z e ,  mass p r o p e r t i e s  and geo- 
metry. The tumbling v e h i c l e  was e s s e n t i a l l y  considered d i s a b l e d  and non- 
coopera t ive ,  s o  t h a t  use  of onboard subsystems o r  pe r sonne l  t o  a s s i s t  i n  
a r r e s t i n g  t h e  tumbling was not  considered.  
The rescu ing  v e h i c l e  was considered t o  be a  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  wi th  an 
a p p r o p r i a t e  payload. A l l  t h e  concepts  considered f o r  a r r e s t i n g  t h e  tumbling 
could ,  however, e q u a l l y  w e l l  be used i2  a  remotely c o n t r o l l e d  mode from an 
unmanned tug  brought up i n  a  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r .  Th i s  may be a p p l i c a b l e  i n  c a s e s  
where t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e  p r e s e n t s  an  unacceptable  hazard t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  (e.g., 
i f  Lreakup of t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  o r  a  h igh  r a d i a t i o n  environ- 
ment is p r e s e n t ) ,  o r  f o r  o r b i t s  beyond t h e  o r b i t e r  c a p a b i l i t y .  For t h e  case  
where t h e  onboard personnel  have t o  abandon t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e ,  however, a  
~ h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  o r  o t h e r  r e scue  v e h i c l e  w i t h  l i f e  suppor t  c a p a b i l i t y  w a s  assumed 
t o  be i n  t h e  immediate v i c i n i t y  of t h e  tumbling s p a c e c r a f t .  Also t h e  men were 
assumed t o  be i n  communicatim wi th  t h e  rescu ing  v e h i c l e ,  t o  each have a  pres-  
s u r e  s u i t  wi th  p o r t a b l e  l i f e  suppor t ,  and an operab le  h a t c h  which they  can 
open t o  space f o r  e x t r a v e h i c u l a r  a c t i v i t y  (EVA) t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  rescu ing  
v e h i c l e .  
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5.1 CONCLUSIONS AND RECO~1ENT)ATIONS 
5.1.1 -- Arresting t h e  Motion of a Tumbling Spacecraf t  
Two p r e f e r r e d  concepts f o r  a r r e s t i n g  t h e  motion of tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  
a r e  shown i n  F igure  5-1. These a re :  
. The water  s t ream concept,  i n  which a j e t  of water i s  d i r e c t e d  a t  
t h e  tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  
, The st ick-on rocke t  concept i n  which smal l  s o l i d  r o c k e t s  z r e  
d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  and f i r e  upon con tac t  
General conclus ions  reached are: 
. Feas ib le ,  low development c o s t ,  o p e r a t i o n a l l y  p r a c t i c a l  
concepts  f o r  a r r e s t i n g  t h e  motion of out-of-control  tumbling 
v e h i c l e s  have been i d e n t i f i e d .  
. The p r e f e r r e d  concepts can be operated with an  adequate margin 
f o r  t h e  worst  cases  of tumbling o r b i t e r ,  modular space s t a t i o n ,  
and small manned space v e h i c l e s  considered us ing on ly  one 
emergency s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  launch wi th  t h e  de-tumbling device  
as a payload. 
. The p r e f e r r e d  concepts  a r e  adap tab le  f o r  remote use  on unmanned 
-ugs, t o  reach  and a r r e s t  t h e  motion of smal le r  s a t e l l i t e s  and 
spvcecra f t  i n  o r b i t s  which cannot be reached by t h e  s h u t t l e  
o r b i t e r  alone.  
The water  s t ream concept (Figure  5-1A) appears  t o  be t h e  most 
a t t r a c t i v e  of t h e  concepts i d e n t i f i e d .  It can be developed from 
of f - the -she l f ,  non-spacecraft  hardware; have l a r g e  f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  
and margins t o  minimize t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  ex tens ive  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  
s i n c e  weight i s  n o t  c r i t i c a l ;  i t  c a r  be s t o r e d  a t  t h e  launch s i t e  o r  
s i t e s  of t h e  s h u t t l e  f o r  long p e r i o d s  without any upkeep c o s t s ,  and 
be made ready f o r  use  i n  a m a t t e r  of hours ;  i t  can d e a l  wi th  any con- 
f i g u r a t i o n  and s i z e  of s p a c e c r a f t ;  i t  poses no s a f e t y  problems t~ t h e  
s h u t t l e  o r  t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e ;  i t  should cause  no damage t o  t h e  
tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  except p o s s i b l y  t o  d e l i c a t e  appendages such as 
s o l a r  pane l s ;  i t  tras only minor development r i s k s ;  and i t s  opera t ion ,  
and use  is s imple ,  t o l e r a n t  of e r r o r s ,  and probably r e q u i r e s  l i t t l e  
t r a i n i n g .  
. The s t ick-on rocket  concept (Figure  5-1B) a l s o  appears a t t r a c t i v e .  It 
can use  e x i s t i n g  s o l i d  rocket  motors t o  minimize development 
c o s t s ;  i t  i s  a l i g h t  enough system t h a t  a s i n g l e  s h u t t l e  f l i g h t  
can ensure  a l a r g e  "over-ki l l"  r a t i o ;  a long,  low maintenance 
s t o r a g e  l i f e  i s  p r a c t i c a l  a t  each s h u t t l e  launch s i t e ;  i t  can 
be ready f o r  launch wi th in  hours;  l i k e  t h e  water  stream, i t  can 
d e a l  with any conf igura t ion  and s i z e  of s p a c e c r a f t ;  and i ts 
opera t ion  and use  is  simple,  t o l e r a n t  of e r r o r  and probably 
r e q u i r e s  l i t t l e  t r a i n i n g .  
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Figure 5-1A. Water Stream Concept Used t o  Arrest a Tumbling 
Spale  S t a t i o n  
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Pigure 5-113 Stkk-On Rocket Concept u e d  to Arrert a Tunbliag Space Station 
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. Compared t o  t h e  water s t ream concept ,  the  s t ick-on rocke t  concept 
has  a number of d isadvantages .  Eecause i t  con ta ins  p r o p e l l a n t s ,  
i~ poses a hazard  dur ing  s t o r a g e ,  t o  t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ,  and t o  
t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e ;  i t  r e q u i r e s  t h e  development of some a t t a c h  
mechanism; and t h i s  mechanism could r e s u l t  i n  damage t o  t h e  tumbling 
s p a c e c r a f t .  
The fol lowing recommendations a r e  made, based on t h e  o b j e c t i v e  of t h e  
t a s k  and on t h e  above conclus ions:  
. Analysis  and des ign  s t u d i e s  of bo th  t h e  water stream and t h e  
s t ick-on rocke t  concepts  should be cc.ntinued, wi th  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
of confirming f e a s i b i l i t y  f o r  bo th  manned and unmanned tunb l ing  
s p a c e c r a f t .  
. I f  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  confirm the  f e a s i b i l i t y  and a reasonably  low 
development c o s t ,  t h e  more a t t r a c t i v e  of t h e  two concepts  should 
be developed and produced i n  a t ime frame t o  suppor t  t h e  space  
s h u t t l e  progran,  and t h e  dev ices  h e l d  ready f o r  p o t e n t i a l  use  
a t  t h e  s h u t t l e  l aunch  s i t e ( s ) ,  
. E f f o r t  on t h e  o t h e r  concepts  should be  d i scon t inued  a t  p r e s e n t ,  
bu t  be reviewed i f  t h e  recotmended concepts  appear  u n a t t r a c t i v e  
on f u r t h e r  s tudy.  
5.1.2 Escape From a Tumbling Vehic le  
The conclus ions  reached on personnel  escape from a tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  a r e :  
. Simple procedures  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  p ressure - su i t e2  crewmen t o  
abandon t h e  f o u r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s p a c e c r a f t  examined i n  s imple  
p lanar  motion wi thout  i n t e r f e r e n c e  o r  r e c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  s t r u c t u r e .  
This  may r e q u i r e  pushing o f f  by t h e  crewmen wi th  an  impulse well 
w i t h i n  t h e i r  c a p a b i l i t y .  This concJ~usion is  g e n e r a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  
w i t h i n  t h e  range of tumbling r a t e s  considered.  
. Mult i -axis  tumbling of  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  should s t i l l  a l low ample 
margins f o r  avoiding i n t e r f e r e n c e  o r  r e c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  tumbling 
s p a c e c r a f t .  
. No a p p r e c i a b l e  r educ t ion  i n  crew performance i s  expected due t o  
t h e  tumbling motion a t  t h e  worst  angu la r  rates considered (14.7rpm f o r  t h e  
ssv ) .  The a b i l i t y  of  t h e  crew t o  e v a l u a t e  sensory cues  a s  t o  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of s p i n  motion i n  space  cannot be determined from 
c u r r e n t  da ta .  Determining t h e  c o r r e c t  d i r e c t i o n  i n  which t o  pueh 
o f f  from t h e  spacecrof t i n t o  space  may be d i f f i c u l t ,  ??wever, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  t h e  more s e v e r e  tumbling cases .  1 
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. A number of r e l a t i v e l y  s imple  methods f o r  reducing o r  a r r e s t i n g  
t h e  tumbling of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c r e w e n  a f t e r  they have abandoned 
t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  a r e  poss ib le .  These a l low t h e  c r e m e n  t o  be 
recovered by a standby r e s a l e  s p a c e c r a f t .  The two-man c a b l e  
despin  concept i s  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  one,  wi th  t h e  ex tendab le  c a b l e  
and t h e  extendable  rod desp in  concepts  a l s o  being a t t r a c t i v e  
po t e n t i s l  concepts.  
Recommendations made a r e  a s  fo l lows:  
The two-man cab le  desp in  and extendable  c a b l e  despin  concepts 
(Fig.  5-2 and 5-3) should  t e n t a t i v e l y  be  considered a s  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  
modes f o r  abandoning out-of-control  manned spacecra f t .  
, The sources  of fumbling, p o t e n t i a l  angu la r  r a t e s ,  and t h e  
f e a s i b i l i t y  of crew escape by t h e  methods recommended should be 
re-evaluated a t  a p p r o p r i a t e  mi les tones  i n  t h e  development of t h e  
s h u t t l e  and o t h e r  manned s p a c e c r a f t .  
. Research should be i n i t i a t e d  i n t o  crew men'^ a b i l i t y  t o  e v a l u a t e  
sensory cues  i n  a tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  and yh i l c  rumbling i n  space.  
The o b j e c t i v e  would be t o  determine i f  un t ra ined  personnel  can 
make che d e c i s i o n s  necessa ry  f o r  t h e i r  .xife escape and rescue.  
5.2 TUMBLING CONDITIONS 
5.2.1 Torque Producing Emergencies 
F ive  p o t e n t i a l  sources  of uncon t ro l l ed  torque were considered i n  determining 
worst  c a s e  tumblirlg cond i t ions .  These a r e :  
. C o l l i s i o n s  between two v e h i c l e s  
. Escaping cabin  atmosphere 
. Escaping s t o r e d  g a s  o r  f l u i d  
. Hard-ovez gimbal l e d  engine  
. Malfunctioning r e a c t i o n  c o n t r o l  t h r u s t e r  
It i s  important  t o  r ecogn ize  t h a t  f o r  scme of the  emergencies t h e r e  i s  no 
c l e a r l y  d e f i n a b l e  "worst case". Th i s  i s  so  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  c o l l i s i o n ,  i n  which 
c o l l i s i o n s  a t  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  l a r g e r  v e l o c i t i e s  can be p o s t u l a t e d ;  t h e  l i m i t i n g  
c a s e  i s  when c a t a s t r o p h i c  d e s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  v e h i c l e s  occur.  S i m i l a r l y  wi th  
hard-over gimballed engines  and malfunct ioning t h r u s t e r s ,  enough p r o p e l l a n t s  
a r e  c a r r i e d  on board,  t h a t  r o t a t i o n a l  r a t e s  can r e s u l t  which would cause  
s t r u c t s r a l  f a i l u r e  of t h e  v e h i c l e s ,  and l o s s  of  personnel  from t h e  c e n t r i f u g a l  
f o r c e s .  These s i t u a t i o n s  were, t h e r e f o r e ,  l i - n i t e d  by r a t i o n a l  wi th  a r o i t r a r y  
d e c i s i o n s  a s  fo l lows:  
. C o l l i s i o n  - 1.5 m / s  (5 f t / s e c )  

. Hard-over gimballed engine - 15 seconds f i r i n g  time 
. Malfunctioning r e a c t i o n  cont-ol  t h r u s t e r  - b@ seconds f i r i n g  t ime 
It i s  a l s o  assumed, a s  p a r t  of t h e  emergency, t h a t  a l l  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  
o r  a t t i t u d e  r a t e  c o n t r o l  c a p a b i i i t y  is  l o s t  fo l lowing t h e  b u i l ~ u p  of anguiar  
r a t e .  
5.2.2 Maximum Tumbling Rates 
The maximum cumbling r a t e s  which can occur  from t h e  emergencies zonsidered 
weredetermined i n  a s tudy performed by Pennsylvania S t a t e  Universit; .  This  
s tudy was performed under NASA Grant NGR 39-009-210, and was based on mss 
proper ty  and o t h e r  d a t a  supp l i ed  uy NRISD. 
The r e s u l t s  a r e  summarized il. Table 5-1. 
The worst angular  r a t e  r e s u l t s  from a n  escaping atmosphere on t h e  smal l  
space veh ic le .  The maximum r a t e  of 52 rpm produces an a c c e l e r a t i o n  of over  20 
g a t  the  e x t r e m i t i e s  of t h e  v e h i c l e ,  and would probably r e s u l t  i n  s t r u c t u r a l  
f a i l u r e .  This case  is, t h e r e f o r e ,  not  a c a s e  t h a t  could be survived i f  t h e  
l e a k  cccurred i n  t h e  mrs t  c a s e  cond i t ion  a s  considered here .  
5.3 ARRESTING TUMBLING BY EXTERNAL MEANS 
This  s e c t i o n  i d e n t i f i e s  conceots  f o r  a r r e s t i n g  t h e  motions of rumbling 
spacecra f t  by means e x t e r ~ a l  t o  t h e  tumbling s p a c e c r a f t ,  and analyzes  and 
e v a l u a t e s  t h e s e  concepts.  
C o n c e ~ t s  f o r  Ar res t ing  Tumbling 
- 
Twenty-three d i f f e r e n t  concepts  f o r  a r r e s t i n g  tumblinp by e x t e r n a l  means 
have been i d e n t i f i e d .  These a r e  based on concepts  developed a t  NR/SD on s t u d i c s  
f o r  despinning t h e  ATS-V (unmanned) s a t e l l i t e  by us ing a remote maneuvering 
u n i t ,  and on concepts  i d e n t i f i e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r  t h i s  t a sk .  These a r e  l i s t e d ,  
i l l u s t r a t e d ,  and b r i e f l y  descr ibed i n  Tabie 5-2. The e v a l u a t i o n  of t h e s e  
concepts  i s  presented i n  succeedir4g s e c t  ions.  
Evaluation of Concepts f o r  A r ~ e s t i n g  Tumbling 
Evaluatio-. of the  cand ida te  cciicepcs was performed i n  t h r e e  s t e p s ,  reducing 
t h e  number from 23 t o  15, then  t o  5 ,  and f i n a l l y  t o  t h e  tm s e l e c t e d  concepts.  
The fol lowing s e t  of e v a l u a t i o n  c r i t e r i a  was p o s t u l a t e d  f o r  use i l l  t h e  Zirst 
sc reen ing  of the  concepts :  
S u i t a b i l i t v  f z r  mul t i - ax i s  t u m b l i x  
. Scheme complexity 
. No dynanic i n t e r a c t i o n  wirh manned rescue  v e h i z l e  
. Compat ib i l i ty  with l a r g s  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  
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No. T i t le  7 5  
Tc IRemarks 
Synchronous Docking X 
Mechanism I - Requires prepared passive damper, needs docking rung on c.g, along principal 
axis 
Brake Band * Needs passive damper, does not need docking ring 
Harpoon Requires special structural 
provisions to withstand 
local loads, analysis wi l l  
be diff icult 
Synchronous Fork I 
Towed Net Better to use unmanned tug 
Coarse correct ions, struct- 
ural damage f r ~ m  blast, 
requires frequent reposi- 
tioning of rescue vehicle, 
not suitable for roll on SSV 
Synchronous Col lapsi- Probably physical danage 
to vehicle 
Localized structural damage 
Gimballed Collapsible / 
Basket I Gimbal complexity is high I and benefits unc6ria in I 
Projectiles I J  Potential structural damage I 
-4 - 
Synchronous Clamping X 
Mechanism 
Needs passive damper, 
structural damage, no 
docking ring required 
- 
Probably less structural 
damage than 11 , best of  
grasping types 
E s p i n  Mechanism 
~ i t h  Inflatable Jaws I 
Water Stream 7 Coarse corrections, inefficient I 
Space Division 














Table 5-3. Evaluation of Concepts for Arresting Tumbling (continued) 
I Evaluation Criteria 1 I 





Ti t le X gz 





Cloud o i  Balls V ' /  
Gas Bag 






Net I r / l  
Rope Projectiles / J 






1/ Means satisfactory or unknown 
X Means poor 




Space junk residue, cot 
Bag deployment and 
closure complexity; 
collisions betweel 
vehicle and bag 
Gas stream dispersal, not 
suitable for rol l on SSV 
; 1 1 Vk~~it;~;tiIems in approachir g ~ehic le  after 
!A Space Division North Amertcan Rockwell 
The f i f t e e n  concepts which su rv ived  t h i s  F n i t i a l  sc reen ing  were considered 
f o r  f u r t h e r  s tudy.  I n  t h e  second s t e p  of t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  a p re l iminary  s i z i n g  
a n a l y s i s  of t h e  1 5  concepts r e s u l t e d  i n  r e j e c t i o n  of 10 of t h e  concepts .  The 
r e j e c t e d  concepts  and t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e i r  r e j e c t i o n  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  Table 5-4. 
Table 5- 4. Ra t iona le  f o r  R 
I - Concept 
. Towed n e t  
. Exhaust plume b l a s t  
. P r o j e c t i l e s  
. Cloud of b a l l s  
. Gas bag 
. Gas s t ream 
. Eddy c u r r e n t  damping 1 p r o j e c t i l e s  
Nets and rods  
j ecz ion  of Concepts f o r  Ar res t ing  Tumbling 
Reason f o r  Re jec t ion  
Complex, non-analyzable 
Opera t iona l ly  i m p r a c t i c a l  
Limited A p p l i c a b i l i t y  
Low e f f i c i e n c y ,  space d e b r i s  l e f t  i n  o r b i t  
Conta iner  development, o p e r a t i o n a l  com- 
p l e x i t y ,  p o t e n t i a l  damhge t o  g a s  bag o r  
tumbling v e h i c l e  
Low e f f i c i e n c y ,  high w i g h t  pena l ty  
Excessive power requirements  (hundred o f  
k i l o w a t t s )  
Opera t iona l ly  i m p r a c t i c a l  
Excessive weight 
1 Excessive weight,  ques t ionab le  f e a s i b i l i t y  
I 
The remaining 5 concepts  a r e :  
. Despin mechanism 
. Water s t ream 
. Remotely c o n t r o l l e d  tug 
. Remotely c o n t r o l l e d  n e t  
. Stick-on r o c k e t s  
Some s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e s  of t h e s e  f i v e  concepts a r e  compared i n  Table 5-5. 
I n  t h e  f i n a l  screening,  t h e  fo l lowing s e l e c t i o n  c r i t e r i a  were app l i ed  t o  
t h e  f i v e  p o t e n t i a l l y  accep tab le  concepts  t o  a r r i v e  a t  those  recommended. 
. The p r e f e r r e d  loncept must invo lve  low investment c o s t s  ( i .e . ,  
devei:>;nent and manufacturing c o s t s  before  u s e ) ,  s i n c e  l a r g e  
funding l e v e l s  a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  be made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  such 
cont ingency devices .  
. Operating c o s t s  must be reasonab le  
. She device ,  once developed and b u i l t ,  must be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
o p e r a t i o n s  a t  very  s h o r t  n o t i c e  (hours t o  one day, c o n s i s t e n t  
wi th  a s h u t t l e  emergency f l i g h t ) .  
@A!! Space Division North Amercan Rockwell 
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North Amencan Rockwell 
. The d e v i c e  should  be a b l e  t o  d e a l  wi th  a  wide r ange  of tumbling 
v e h i c l e  s i z e  and c o n f i g u r a t i o n  ( i n c l u d i n g ,  i f  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  many 
unmanned v e h i c l e s  expected  i n  o r b i t ) ,  and o f  a n g u l a r  rates. 
. It should  b s  c a p a b l e  o f  be ing  o p e r a t e d  w i t h  a  minimum of  
t r a i n i n g  and s i m u l a t i o n ,  and p r e f e r a b l y  n o t  r e q u i r e  a  
s p e c i a l i z e d  crew. 
. There shou ld  be good conf idence  t h a t  t h e  sys tem w i l l  be  e f f e c t i v e ,  
w i t h  adequa te  margin f o r  m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  e r r o r s ,  and s p e c i a l  
c o n t i n g e n c i e s .  
The concept  t h a t  i s  judged t o  b e s t  s a t i s f y  t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  i s  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  
concept .  The e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i v e  concep t s  acco rd ing  t o  t h e  above e v a l u a t i o n  
c r i t e r i a  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  a matter o f  judgment. The judgment used is  documented 
i n  Tab le  5-6. 
Tab le  5-6. E v a l u a t i o n  o f  F ive  Concepts  
- 
C r i t e r i a  
Low investment 
c o s t  
Reasonable 
opera t ing  c o s t s  
Operat ional ly 
a v a i l a b l e  a t  
s h o r t  n o t i c e  
Wide range of 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  
Elinimum crew 
t r a i n i n g  
Good confidence 
wi th  adequate 
margins 
Minimum damage 
t o  tumbling 
v e h i c l e  
l e sp in  
tech wi th  
Lnf la table  
Jaws 
Water 
S t  ream 
Xoderate* 
Noderate 
Poor** I Good 
Excel len t  
Good 
Ploderate Excel ien t  
Noderate 1 Good 
Moderate Good 
Remotely 






























* Assume ex i s t ence  of developed tug,  mini-tug, o r  remote maneuvering 
u n i t  
** Not s u i t a b l e  f o r  l a r g e  veh ic l e s  
Space Division 
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Some of t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t he se  judgements a r e  presented  below. 
. The despin  mechanism, remotely c o n t r o l l e d  tug,  and remotely 
c o n t r o l l e d  n e t  r e q u i r e  development of f a i r l y  complex mechanisms 
and/or  propuls ion  systems. The s t ick-on rocke t s  can use  
e x i s t i n g  rocket  motors, but  t h e  a t t a c h  mechanism r e q u i r e s  
developing and t e s t i n g .  The water  s t ream concept  can b a s i c a l l y  
use off- the-shelf  components, bu t  r e q u i r e s  a n a l y s i s ,  development 
and t e s t i n g  of t he  nozz le .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  a s  shown by t h e  a s t e r i s k s  
i n  t h e  t a b l e ,  t h e  despin  mechanism, and t h e  remotely c o n t r o l l e d  
tug a r e  f e a s i b l e  only  i f  a  tug,  mini-tug, o r  remote maneuvering 
u n i t  have a l r eady  been developed and a r e  ava i l ab l e .  
. The ope ra t ing  c o s t s  of each concept a r e  b a s i c a l l y  t h e  c o s t s  of 
one emergency s h u t t l e  f l i g h t .  Addi t iona l  c o s t s ,  such as s p e c i a l  
checkout and ground suppor t ,  a r e  sma l l  r e l a t i v e  to. t h e  s h u t t l e  
c o s t s .  The remotely c o n t r o l l e d  tug, however, does involve  t he  
f l i g h t  f sone k ind  of tug ,  which s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n c r e a s e s  opera- 
t i o n a l  c o s t s  . 
. The w a t e r  stream concep t  can b e  t a k e n  on-board as a 
s h u t t l e  pay load  w i t h  v e r y  l i t t l e  p r e p a r a t i o n ,  and r e q u i r e s  o n l y  
f i l l i n g  o f  t h e  water t ank .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  s t i c k - o n  r o c k e t  concep t  
r e q u i r e s  o n l y  f l i g h t  p r e p a r a t i o n  of  t h e  s o l i d  r o c k e t  mo to r s .  The 
o t h e r  t h r e e  c o n c e p t s ,  however, i n v o l v e  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t  sy s t ems ,  
which r e q u i r e  some t i m e  f o r  l o a d i n g  and checking  o u t .  T h i s  may, 
i n d e e d ,  b e  t h e  l i m i t i n g  f a c t o r  i n  l a u n c h i n g  t h e  s h u t t l e  w i t h  t h e s e  
Concepts  . 
. The despin  mechanism is capable of u se  on t h e  smal l  space 
v e h i c l e  only ,  o r  smal l  unmanned s a t e l l i t e s .  I t  i s  n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  l a r g e  v e h i c l e s ,  such as t h e  o r b i t e r  o r  space 
s t a t i o n .  
. The wa te r  s t ream and s t ick-on  rocket  concepts a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  
s imple  t o  ope ra t e  and, because they a r e  incremental  i n  t h e i r  
a p p l i c a t i o n ,  R l a r g e  degree  of t r i a l  and e r r o r  during use can 
be t o l e r a t e d .  P r a c t i c e  on a  s i m u l a t o r  may even show t h a t  the  
wa te r  s t r eam may be opera ted  i n t u i t i v e l y  (provid ing  v i s i b i l i t y  
and i l l u m i n a t i o n  a r e  adequate) .  I n t e r m i t t e n t  use would al low 
pauses  f o r  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  r e s u l t s .  S i m i l a r  a i m n l i c i t v  of o o e r t  
t i o n  may be poss ib l e  wi th  t he  s t ick-on  rocket  concept.  The 
remotely c o n t r o l l e d  n e t  may a l s o  be very s imple  t o  ope ra t e ,  
r e q u i r i n g  only  c o n t r o l  of the  ne t  t r e j e c t o r y  t o  i n t e r c e p t  t h e  
t a r g e t .  The o t h e r  systems appear t o  r equ i r e  much more t r a i n -  
i ng  and p r a c t i c e ,  however, and would almost c e r t a i n l y  r e q u i r e  
a  s p e c i a l l y - t r a i n e d  crew, w i th  cons iderable  exper ience  on a  
s imu la to r .  
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. The water  s t ream and st ick-on rocket  concepts ,  because of 
t h e i r  s imple  r e l i a n c e  on b a s i c  momentum t r a n s f e r  p r i n c i p l e s ,  
provide  t h e  b e s t  confidence t h a t  they can s u c c e s s f u l l v  a r r e s t  
t h e  tumbling s p a c e c r a f t .  The i r  incrementa l  use ,  aga in ,  adds t o  
t h e  conf idence,  s i n c e  cons ide rab le  e r r o r s  i n  use  can be t o l e r a t e d ,  
The o t h e r  t:hrse concepts  a r e  more complex, and must b a s i c a l l y  
o p e r a t e  t h e  f i r s t  time. A l l  concepts  can be s i z c d  so  t h a t  they 
have a  margin of a t  l e a s t  two o r  t h r e e  t imes t o  a l low f o r  e r r o r s .  
. The water  s t ream concept should r e s u l t  i n  min ina l  damage 
s i n c e  vzry  low impingement p r e s s u r e  a r e  experienced on t h e  
tumbling veh ic le .  The o t h e r  concepts  can r e s u l t  i n  damage, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  appendages. The s t ick-on r o c k e t s  may r e q u i r e  
p e n e t r a t i o n  of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  t o  o p e r a t e  s u c c e s s f u l l y .  
5.4 DESCRIPTION OF RECOMMENDED CONCEPTS 
5.4.1 Water Stream Concept 
The rescue  v e h i c l e  c o n t a i n s  a  water t ank ,  pump, and a  remotely c o n t r o l l e d  
nozzle.  The j e t  of w t e r  i s  d i r e c t e d  by p o s i t i o n i n g  and o r i e n t i n g  t h e  rescue  
v e h i c l e  so  t h a t  t h e  v a t e r  streLm impinges on t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e  s o  a s  t o  
reduce i t s  angu la r  momentum. A s  t h e  s t ream w i l l  be v i s i b l e  and w i l l  move i n  
a s t r a i g h t  l i n e ,  t h e  o p e r a t o r  can e a s i l y  a d j u s t  the  rescu ing  v e h i c l e  o r i e n t a -  
t i o n  s o  t h a t  t h e  s t ream i m ~ a c t s  the  tumbling v e h i c l e  a t  t h e  d e s i r e d  p o i n t ,  
The water can be app l i ed  i n  b u r s t s  t o  maximize e f f i c i e n c y  and t o  a l l o w  evalua- 
t i o n  of t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  r e a l  time. The r e a c t i o n  of  t h e  water  j e t  on t h e  
rescu ing  v e h i c l e  can be counteracted by t h e  a t t l t u d e  c o n t r o l  system. 
A p r a c t i c a l  working range f o r  t h e  water  j e t  v e l o c i t y  is  of t h e  o rde r  of 
30 t o  120 m / s  (100 t o  400 f p s )  wi th  corresponding pump p r e s s u r e s  i n  t h e  range 
of 5 x  lo5 t o  8 x 106 N / r 2  (70 t o  1100 p s i ) .  Nozzle t h r u s t s  should be i n  t h e  
range of  50 t o  500 N (10 t o  100 l b )  wi th  nozz le  a r e a  w i t h i n  t h e  range of 0.05 
cm2 t o  10  cm2 (0.01 t o  1.5 i n a 2 ) .  A s  t h e  f l u i d  s t ream w i l l  t r a v e l  a  f a i r l y  
long d i s t a n c e  b e f o r e  impact--perhaps 60 m (200 f t ) - - the  impact a r e a  w i l l  be 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  expanded from t h e  nozz le  a rea .  A s  a  m a t t e r  of  f a c t  i t  i s  
d e s i r a b l e  t h a t  t h e  s t ream c r o s s  s e c t i o n  expand t o  spread t h e  load over  a l a r g e  
a r e a  and reduce t h e  e f f e c t i v e  impact p ressure .  P ressures  of 5 t o  500 N/m2 
(0.1 t o  1 0  p s f )  and impingement a r e a s  i n  t h e  1 t o  10  m2 (10 t o  100 f t 2 )  range 
a r e  p r a c t i c a l .  The f l u i d  tank w i l l  have a  volume on t h e  o r d e r  of  1 5  m3 
(500 f  t3) .  
An e s t i m a t e  of :he weight of water r equ i red  i s  shown i n  Table 5-7, assuming 
an a p p l i c a t i o n  e f f i c i e n c y  of 50 pe rcen t  and a stream v e l o c i t y  of 122 m / s  (400 
f p s ) .  It is es t ima ted  t h a t  t h e  tankage,  plumbing, pumps, and o t h e r  equipment 
could be provided f o r  another  1350 kg (3000 l b )  . 
The t o t a l  energy raqu i red ,  assuming a stream v e l o c i t y  on t h e  o r d e r  of 
120 m / s  i s  wi th in  t h e  p r e s e n t  suppor t  c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  s h u t t l e  ( l e s s  than 50 
kwhr). Peak power on t h e  o t h e r  hand r e p r e s e n t s  a  p o t e n t i a l  l i m i t a t i o n  on t h i p  
concept.  The p r e s e n t  o r b i t e r  p o w r  t r a n s f e r  c a p a b i l i t y  i s  i n  t h e  1 t o  1 0  kw 
range. The system may r e q u i r e  a  s p e c i a l  power supply f o r  ?be move s e v e r e  
cases.  
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Sa'ale 5-7. he ight  of Water Required t o  A r r e s t  
b r s t  Case Tumbling 
I I n t e g r a l  tank o r b i t e r  I 6500 (14,400) 
Conf igurat ion 
Prop tank o r b i t e r  
Modular space s t a t i o n  
Weight of Water Required 
kg i l b )  
Since only  low impingement p r e s s u r e s  a r e  experienced,  no damage t o  t h e  
I 
tumbling v e h i c l e  i s  a n t i c i p a t e d .  A f i n e l y  atomized s t ream appears  d e s i r a b l e  t o  
minimize high l o c a l i z e d  impingement p ressures ;  l o c a l  impingement p r e s s u r e s  vary 
i n v e r s e l y  a s  the  drop diameter.  T h i s  s t i l l  a p p l i e s  even i f  t h e  drops  a r e  
f r o z . . ~ .  
Small space v e h i c l e  
Since t h e  water expands t o  a vacuum, some evaporat ion may be expected,  and 
t h e  remainder o f  t h e  water w i l l  t u r n  i n t o  i c e .  The lower t h e  i n i t i a l  tempera- 
t u r e  of t h e  water ,  t h e  l e s s  t h e  amount of evaporat ion.  For a water n e a r  t o  t h e  
f r e e z i n g  po in t ,  approximately 14 pe rcen t  w i l l  evaporate  a t  a  maximum. Th i s  g a s  
stream w i l l  s t i l l  be d i r e c t i o n a l ,  however, and w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  momentum 
t r a n s f e r  i f  i t  impinges. 
676 ( 1,490) 
Reaction p r o p e l l a n t  requirements  t o  coun te rac t  t h e  nozz le  t h r u s t  of t h e  
rescuing v e h i c l e  a r e  small  and w i t h i n  normal c a p a c i t i e s .  An a t t r a c t i v e  f e a t u r e  
of t h e  conctpt  i s  t h a t  t h e  working f l u i d  i s  c l e a n  i n  terms of t h e  r e s i d u e  l e f t  
i: o r b i t .  
D e t a i l s  of t h e  water  s t ream k i t  i n s t a l l e d  i n  t h e  rescu ing  o r b i t e r  
a r e  shorn i n  Figure  5-4. The k i t  c o n s i s t s  of a water tank,  a motor/pump/ 
nozzle  assembly, a p r e s s u r i z i n g  g a s  b o t t l e ,  a  f l o o d l i g h t ,  a  b a t t e r y  pack and 
a s s o c i a t e d  con t ro l s .  and a payload r e t e n t i o n  c o n s i s t i n g  of a s imple  welded 
s t r u c t u r e .  Since t h e  whole k i t  is well within  t h e  o r b i t e r ' s  payload capac i ty ,  
a l l  components a r e  designed l i k e  ground equipment r a t h e r  than s p a c e c r a f t  equip- 
ment. Standard m a t e r i a l s  and l a r g e  f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  can be used t o  reduce 
c o s t s  and t e s t i n g .  i'he water tank i s  s p h e r i c a l ,  about 2.8 m (9 f t )  d iameter  
and made of s t e e l .  It c o n t a i n s  a rubber  bladder f o r  p o s i t i v e  expuls ion of ware 1. mis is pressur ized  t o  14000 N / ~ Z  (20 p s i )  from t h e  high p r e s s u r e  (21  x 10; N/m , 
3100 ps i :  n i t rogen  tank. The water pump is  an a x i a l  f low swash-plate p i s t o n  
type,  which a l lows  f o r  a l a r g e  range of f low r a t e  and p ressure .  Th i s  i s  d r i v e n  
by a v a r i a b l e  speed 1 0  kw dc e l e c t r i c  mctor w i t h  s o l i d - s t a t e  c o n t r o l .  The motor 
is water jacketed and is cooled by t h e  water  f lowing through t h e  j a c k e t  as i t  i s  
being p u ~ p e d  through t h e  nozzle.  The whole of t h e  motor and pump is enclosed i n  
a p ressur ized  1 atmosphere a i r  o r  n i t r o g e n  environment t o  avoid des ign  and qual-  
i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a vacuum environment. The t anks  and t h e  motor and pump a r e  insu-  
l a t e d  f o r  thermal p r o t e c t i o n ,  The whole k i t  i s  supported i n  t h e  o r b i r e r  cargo 
bay by a 5-point a t t a c h  system, which f i t s  i n t o  t h e  s t andard  cargo bay a t t a c h  
po in t s .  
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I f  more water i s  required than can be accommodated i n  one k i t ,  two k i t s  
may be loaded i n  t h e  cargo bay. 
5 . 4 . 2  Stick-On Rocket Concept - 
Small s o l i d  rocke t s  a r e  "shot" from a  "gun" on t h e  o r b i t e r  a t  low v e l o c i t y  
toward t h e  tumbling spacecra f t .  These do n o t  have any onboard guidance and a r e  
s p i n  s t a b i l i z e d .  They a t t a c h  themselves on impact, which i n i t i a t e s  i g n i t i o n  of 
t h e  s i n g l e  nozz le  engine ( t h r u s t i n g  toward t h e  a t t a c h  p o i n t ) .  Many r o c k e t s  a r e  
reau i red  t o  accomplish deapin.  Visual  cues and simple computer f u n c t i o n s  a r e  
requ i red  t o  determine tumbling r a t e  and rocket  launch time. Rc k e t s  r e q u i r e  
v a r i a b l e  timers and p o s s i b l y  t h r u s t  t e rmina t ion  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  br ing t h e  tumble 
r a t e  t o  near  zero;  o r  they can be s i z e d  smal l  enough t o  produce t h e  dks i red  
f i n e  con t ro l .  
Ind iv idua l  r o c k e t s  h i c h  may u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y  a t t a c h  on t h e  wrong s i d e  of 
t h e  c e n t e r  of g r a v i t y ,  o r  which become badly d e f l e c t e d  a f t e r  a t t a c h ,  would add 
t o  t h e  momentum i n s t e a d  of reducing it. For t h i s  reason a l o t  of smal l  r o c k e t s  
are p r e f e r r e d ,  wi th  v i s u a l  feedback of where they h i t .  
The rocke t s  were s i z e d  t o  remove a l l  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  tumbling r a t e  spec i -  
f i e d  i n  Table 5-1. The e f f e c t  of impact provides  an a d d i t i o n a l ,  though small, 
despin  impulse. Half t h e  weight of t h e  module w a s  assumed t o  b e  p r o p e l l a n t .  
Modules a r e  envis ioned t o  b e + s o l i d  p r o p e l l a n t  engines weighing approximately 
10 t o  20 kg (20 t o  40 l b )  each.  Weights of t h e  modules presented i n  Table 
5-8 show t h a t  a  p ropu ls ive  means of removing angu la r  r a t e s  is  an o rder  of 
magnitude more e f f i c i e n t  than any o t h e r  means. 
Table 5-8. Weights and Number o f  Stick-On Rockets 
t o  Ar rcs t  Worst Case Tumbling 
A s i n g l e  s i z e  s t i c k - o n  rocke t  i s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  m u l t i a x i ~  tumbling of a  
wide range of conf igura t ions  (except p c s s i b l y  f o r  t h e  r o l l  a x i s  of a symmetric 
conf igura t ion)  and has t h e  lowest  weight of any concept. No dynamic i n t e r a c t i o n  
between t h e  tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  and rescue v e h i c l e  i s  inheren t  i n  t h i s  concept. 
Although recogni t ion  of body r a t e s  from i n e r t i a l  motion observa t ion  may be 
T o t a l  module 
weight, kg ( l b )  





Space Small Space 
S t a t i o n  Vehicle 
304  (670) 32 (70) 
15 - 3 1  2 - 4  
I n t e g r a l  
Tank 
O r b i t e r  
277 (610) 
14 - 28 
Drop Tank 
O r b i t e r  
75 (165) 
4 - 8  
Space Division 
North Arnencm Rockwell 
d i f f i c u l t ,  i t  is  Cel t  t h a t  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  can be overcome wi th  ground simula- 
t i o n  and t r a i n i n g .  Adequate v i s u a l  cues e x i s t  f o r  aiming and launch t iming 
b u t  could be  supplemented by s imula t ion  and t r a i n i n g .  
The major p o t e r i t i a l  t e c h n i c a l  development problem i s  development of t h e  
a t t a c h  mechau i s u .  In t h e  concept shown i n  Figure  5-5, t h e  f l a t  p l a t e  h a .  a  
s e r r a t e d  su rCace  on a pneumatic pad. Th i s  sp reads  t h e  con tac t  load over  i t s  
whole a r e a  ( t o  avoid damage t o  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  s u r f a c e )  and a l s o  provides  a l o t  
of f r i c t i o n  t o  prevent  s l i d i n g  over t h e  s u r f a c e .  A pro t rud ing  t r i g g e r  i n i t i a t e s  
f i r i n g  of the  rocke t  motor immediately upon c o n t a c t ,  and t h e  rocke t  t h r u s t ,  
combined w i t f .  t h e  f r i c t i ~ n  of t h e  pad, ma in ta ins  t h e  i n i t i a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  of t h e  
rocke t  a g o i n s t  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  s u r f a c e .  
The rocke t  i s  s p i n - s t a b i l i z e d  a t  about 5 rpm i n  i t s  t r a j e c t o r y  toward 
t h e  tumbling ap . l cec ra f t .  (This i s  a low enough r a t e  t h a t  i t  does no t  pose any 
problems f o r  a t tachment) .  The shcpe shown f o r  t h e  rocke t  is  designed f o r  good 
dynamic s t a b i l i t y  i n  f l i n h t .  a t  c o n t a c t ,  and dur ing f i r i i ~ g .  The s u r f a c e  con- 
t e c t e d  may vary  by a s  much a s  20 degrees  f r o n  t h e  normal t o  t h e  f l i g i ~ ~  pbth  of 
t h e  rocke t  v i t 5  very  l i t t l e  l o s s  i n  ef fect ive .=.ess  i n  reducing t h e  angular  
momentum. A: l a r g e r  a n g l e s ,  of around 45 d ~ g r e e s ,  t h e  f r i c t i o n  may i n i t i a l l y  
be i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  hold  t h e  rocke t  f i rm,  ar.d i t  may s e t t l e  a t  a n  ang le  t h a t  
in t roduces  unwanted components i n  momentun. Since  a l a r g e  number of r o c k e t s  
w i l l  be r equ i red  t o  s t o p  t h e  tumbling,  however, i t  i s  o n l y  necessa ry  t h a t  they 
a r e  c o r r e c t l y  o r i e n t e d  on t h e  average.  I f  an occas iona l  rocke t  makes con tac t  
on t h e  wrong s i d e  of t h e  c e n t e r  of g r a v i t y ,  o r  misses  a l t o g e t h e r ,  t h e  e f f e c t  
can be c o r r e c t e d  by subsequent rocke t s .  Because of t h e i r  h igh s p e c i f i c  impulse 
t h e s e  r o c k e t s  2 r e  very  e f f i c i e n t  i n  terms of weight and a much g r e a t e r  supply 
than t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  r equ i red  minimum can be c a r r i e d  on a g iven mission.  
Rockets which m i s s  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  w i l l  be f i r e d  by a t imer  t o  reduce t h e  
hazard  of c o l l i s i o n  wi th  a s p a c e c r a f t  a t  a  l a t e r  t ime.  
When t h e  r o c k e t s  a r e  s p e n t  t h e  f r i c t i o n  f o r c e  w i l l  van i sh  and t h e  empty 
motors w i l l  each t a k e  up an independent t r a j e c t o r y ,  away from t h e  s p a c e c r a f t .  
These spen t  r o c k e t s  rhus become space  d e b r i s ,  and a hazard t o  o t h e r  s p a c e c r a f t .  
An a l t e r n a t i v e  rocke t  des ign which avo ids  t h i s  problem is  shown i n  
Figure  5-6. In  t h i s  concept t h e  f r o n t  p l a t e  is  mounted on a b a l l  j o i n t ,  s o  
t h a t  t h e  p l a t e  can a d j u s t  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  s u r f a c e  of t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  immediately 
upon con tac t .  khen a t r i g g e r  i n  t h e  c e n t e r  o f  t h e  p l a t e  makes c o n t a c t  w i t h  
t h e  s p a c e c r a f t ,  t h r e e  t h i n g s  happen s imul taneously .  F i r s t ,  a  number of spr ing-  
loaded p i n s  a r e  sho t  o u t  from t h e  p l a t e ,  p e n e t r a t i n g  t h e  c o n t a c t  s d r f a c e ,  and 
l a t c h e s  i n  t h e  p f n s  l o c k  t h e  p l a t e  a g a i n s t  t h e  su r face .  Secondly, t h e  b a l l  
j o i n t  is locked by a f r i c t i o n  dev ice  s o  t h a t  t h e  rocke t  r e t a i n s  i ts f l i g h t  
p a t h  o r i e n t a t i o n  r e l a t i v e ;  t o  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  s u r f a c e ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  of t h e  
s u r f a c e  angle.  i h i r d l y ,  t h e  rocke t  motor f i r i n g  is  i n i t i a t e d .  A t imer  i s  
aga in  provided t o  f i r ?  r o c k e t s  which m i s s  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t .  
D e t a i l s  of t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  of t h e  rockeEs i n  t h e  rescue  o r b i t e r  cargo bay 
a r e  shown i n  F igure  5-7. The i n d i v i d u a l  r o c k e t s  a r e  s t o r e d  i n  a magazine, and 
are fed  one a t  a  t ime i n t o  a launching device .  T h i s  is  e l e c t r i c a l l y  opera ted ,  
and c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  rescue  o r b i t e r  crew. The r o c k e t s  a r e  p r o p e l l e d  by s p r i n g s  
o r  pneumat ica l ly  a long a guide  ra i l ,  which a l s o  impar t s  t h e  sp in .  
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5.5 ESCAPE FROM A TUMBLING VEHICLE 
This  p a r t  of t h e  s tudy was d i r e c t e d  toward t h e  dynamics a s p e c t s  of 
r e t r i e v i n g  t h e  crew from a d i s a b l e d ,  tumbling s p a c e c r a f t .  It i s  assumed t h a t  
a r e scue  v e h i c l e  cannot dock wi th  t h e  d i s t r e s s e d  c r a f t  and due t o  t h e  tumbling 
motion t h e  rescue  v e h i c l e  must s t a t i o n k e e p  a t  some s a f e  d i s t a n c e .  It is, the re -  
f o r e ,  necessa ry  t o  somehow move t h e  crew of  t h e  d i s a b l e d  v e h i c l e  f a r  enough away 
t h a t  they can be r e t r i e v e d  wi thout  t h e  danger of a c o l l i s i o n  between t h e  tum- 
b l i n g  v e h i c l e  and t h e  rescue  v e h i c l e .  It i s  fur thermore  assumed t h a t  t h e  d i s -  
abled s p a c e c r a f t  does no t  i n c l u d e  any t ) p e  of escape v e h i c l e .  Thus t h e  s tudy  
is  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of t h e  case  where crewmen leave  t h e  v e h i c l e  i n  
p r e s s u r e  s u i t s  wi th  i n d i v i d u a l  l i f e  suppor t  backpacks. Once s a f e l y  away from 
t h e  tumbling c r a f t ,  t h e  crewmen a r e  picked up by t h e  o r b i t e r ,  perhaps with t h e  
a i d  of a manipula tor .  
5.5.1 Crew C a p a b i l i t y  
The crewman upon l eav ing  t h e  tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  w i l l  have t h e  angular  
r a t e  of t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  and a l i n e a r  v e l o c i t y  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  equa l  
t o  t h e  ins tan taneous  v e l o c i t y  of t h a t  p a r t  of t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  r c l a t i v e  t o  i t s  
c e n t e r  of g r a v i t y  a t  t h e  i n s t a n t  of s e p a r a t i o n .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  he w i l l  have 
superimposed whatever motion he is  capable  of impar t ing t o  himself  by p h y s i c a l l y  
pushing o f f  a g a i n s t  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t .  
The crewman i s  a b l e  t o  provide  a r e l a t i v e  s e p a r a t i o n  v e l o c i t y  between 
himself  and t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  by pushing o f f  when l eav ing .  An e s t i m a t e  of t h i s  
v e l o c i t y  i s  made based upon man's a b i l i t y  t o  jump. On e a r t h  t h e  50 t o  95 
p e r c e n t i l e  man i n  good p h y s i c a l  c o n d i t i o n  can r a i s e  h i s  c e n t e r  of g r a v i t y  0.3 m 
( 1  f t ) .  I n  z e r o  g t h i s  is e q u i v a l e n t  t o  pushing o f f  wi th  an i n i t i a l  v e l o c i t y  
of 2.5 m / s  (8.0 f p s ) .  A s  an escap ing  crewman he  w i l l  be  encumbered wi th  a space  
s u i t  and a p o r t a b l e  l i f e  suppor t  system {PLSS), and h i s  s e p a r a t i o n  v e l o c i t y  is  be- 
tween 1.7 a i d  1.8 n/s (5.5 to  5.9 i p s )  f o r  t h e  50 and 90 p e r c e n t i l e  man r e s p e c t i v e l y .  i 
The escaping crewman is  capable  of  changing h i s  tumbling rates by changing 
h i s  i n e r t i a  OX by motion of h i s  e x t r e m e t i e s .  H e  is capable  of  l i t t l e ,  i f  any, 
damping wi thout  a d d i t i o n a l  equipment. I f  t h e  crew could l e a v e  t h e  tumbling 
s p a c e c r a f t  a t  14.7 rpm ( f o r  t h e  SSV) i n  a crouched p o s i t i o n  (which would 
be ve ry  awkward), t h e  b e s t  he could  t o  by extending h i s  e x t r e m e t i e s  would be  
t o  reduce h i s  tumbling r a t e  t o  approximately 5 rpm. Cont inual  motions of t h e  
arms could  reduce t h e  crewnan's head and t r u n k  angu la r  r a t e s ;  however, t e rmina t ion  
of t h e  motion would r e s t o r e  t h e  i n i t i a l  tumbling r a t e s .  Supplementary equip- 
ment is t h u s  r e q u i r e d  t o  reduce t h e  tumbling r a t e s  f u r t h e r  and i f  p o s s i b l e  
permanently . 
5.5.2 Conf igurat ion Evaluat ion 1 
The a n a l y s i s  of t h e  mechanics of escape from complex c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  such 
a s  a r e  involved he re  i s  extremely complex f o r  t h e  g e n e r a l  c a s e  of mul t i -axis  
tumbling because of  t h e  complex geometr ies  involved. As a f i r s t  approach, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  of  t h e  crew t o  escape from t h e  tumblicg v e h i c l e s  as 
they a r e  ins tan taneous ly -  r o t a t i n g  about each of t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  geometr ic  axes  I 
was analyzed.  It i s  f e l t  t h a t  s i n c e  s u f f i c i e n t  s e p a r a t i o n  v e l o c i t y  margins 
i 
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e x i s t  f o r  t h e s e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  c a s e s ,  t h e r e  i s  no th ing  i n h e r e n t  i n  mul t i -axis  
tumbling t h a t  would s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n c r e a s e  those  s e p a r a t i o n  v e l o c i t y  r equ i re -  
ments. 
Each of  t h e  f o u r  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  i s  analyzed s e p a r a t e l y  i n  what fo l lows .  
These ana lyses  show t h a t  t h e  crewmen can escape wi thout  r e c o n t a c t  o r  i n t e r -  
f e rence  w i t h i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  e i t h e r  by j u s t  s t epp ing  o f f ,  o r  w i t h  a  s l i g h t  push- 
o f f  we1.l w i t h i n  t n e  normal p h y s i o i o g i c a l  c a p a b i l i t y ,  assuming t h a t  they can 
make t h e  necessa ry  judgments. 
A. I n t e g r a l  Tank O r b i t e r  
The wors t  c a s e  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n  was assumed t o  be a paw r a t e  of 4 rpm. 
A l l e x i t s  were assumed t o  occur  from t h e  h a t c h  l o c a t e d  on t h e  upper s u r f a c e  
of t h e  f u s e l a g e  behind t h e  cockpi t .  Leaving from t h i s  p o i n t  with no a d d i t i o n a l  
v e l o c i t y  and t h e  nominal c e n t e r  of mass l o c a t i o n ,  t h e  crewman e a s i l y  c l e a r s  t h e  
t a i l  f i n .  The c e n t e r  of mass could be 12 m (40 f t )  f u r t h e r  forward and t h e  
n a t w a l  t a n g e n t i a l  v e l o c i t y  would be adequate  f o r  s a f e  escape.  
I n  t h e  c a s e  of p i t c h  motions, t h e  procedure is  a  func t ion  of t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
of sp in .  For a  nega t ive  p i t c h  motion, t h e  crewman simply s t e p s  o f f  and t h e  
t a n g e n t i a l  v e l o c i t y  p rov ides  adequate  c l e a r a n c e  wi th  t h e  t a i l .  For p o s i t i v e  
p i t c h  motions,  t h e  crewman climbs o u t  and pushes s l i g h t l y  i n  t h e  Y a x i s  d i r e c t i o n .  
The o b j e c t  i s  t o  s l i d e  over  t h e  s i d e  of t h e  fuselage .  Once c l e a r  of t h e  fuese lage ,  
t h e  t a n g e n t i a l  v e l o c i t y  w i l l  p rovide  adequate  a f t  f u s e l a g e  c lea rance .  
For r o l l  motions of t h e  v e h i c l e ,  t h e  crewman e x i s t s  a t  t h e  same p o i n t  but  
pushes away a long t h e  Z a x i s .  
B. Drop Tank O r b i t e r  
The drop t ank  o r b i t e r  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  was analyzed assuming a  s p i n  about t h e  
yaw a x i s  a t  a  r a t e  of 2  rpm. A ske tch  of t h e  conf igura t ion  is bhown i n  F igure  
5-8. For t h i s  v e h i c l e  t h e  crew would escape from t h e  docking p o r t  shown i n  t h e  
sketch.  
lYaw axis 
(69 L 3 6 . 9  m- 
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Figure  5-8. Drop Tank O r b i t e r  Conf igurat ion 
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For nominal, o r b i t a l  c e n t e r  of mass l o c a t i o n s ,  no e d d i t i o n a l  v e l o c i t y  i s  
required.  The t a n g e n t i a l  v e l o c i t y  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  s p ' ?  i s  adequate  t o  
s a f e l y  c l e a r  tLe veh ic le .  The mass c e n t e r  could be 8 m (26 f t )  f u r t h e r  fo r -  
ward be fo re  t h e  t a n g e n t i a l  v e l o c i t y  a lone  was no t  s u f f i c i e u t  t o  p roper ly  c l e a r  , 
t h e  veh ic le .  With a  maas c e n t e r  approximately 13 m (42 f t )  forward of nominal, 
an a d d i t i o n a l  v e l o c i t y  of 0.14 rnlsec (4.6 f p s )  would be requ i red .  Th i s  i s  we l l  
wi th in  a  man's push-off c a p a b i l i t y .  
For a  n e g a t i v e  p i t c h  r a t e  t h e  crewman simply " s t eps  o f f "  and t h e  a n a l y s i s  
presented above f o r  yaw motion is a p p l i c a b l e .  Tangen t i a l  v e l o c i t y  a lone  is  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c l e a r  t h e  t a i l .  For a  p o s i t i v e  p i t c h  r a t e ,  t h e  crewman should 
plush s l i g h t l y  i n  t h e  p l u s  o r  minus Y d i r e c t i o n  such t h a t  he w i l l  s l i d e  along 
t h e  nose of t h e  v e h i c l e .  C o l l i s i o n  wi th  t h e  a f t  f u s e l a g e  w i l l  n o t  occur a s  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  motion computed f o r  t h e  yaw c a s e  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e .  
For r o l l i n g  motion of t h e  o r b i t e r ,  t h e  crewnan would e x i t  a t  t h e  same 
p o i n t  but  push t o  provide  a  v e l o c i t y  toward t h e  nose of t h e  v e h i c l e .  
It appears  from t h i s  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  escape from t h e  drop t ank  o r b i t e r  can 
be ac  omplished with no more than a  s imple  push-off t o  o b t a i n  t h e  requ i red  
v e l o c i t y .  
C. Modular Space S t a t i o n  
For t h e  s p e c i f i c  cases  of s i n g l e  a x i s  motion about nach of t h e  body hxes, 
i t  was determined t h a t  crew escape can be accomplished using t h e  n a t u r a l  
t a n g e n t i a l  v e l o c i t y  of t h e  veh ic le .  In  some c a s e s  a  s l i g h t  push-off i s  advantageous. - 
The s o l a r  a r r a y s  can be pos i t ioned  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  escape.  Although t h e  case  of  
a  random tumble was no t  analyzed,  i t  is  be l i eved  t h a t  a  more d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  
would show t h a t  escape can be accomplished s a f e l y .  
D. Small Space Vehicle (SSV) 
The most c r i t i c a l  c a s e  f o r  t h i s  v e h i c l e  is  t h e  c a s e  where t h e  v e h i c l e  has  a  
s i n g l e  p o r t  nea r  t h e  mass cen te r .  It is necessa ry  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
v e l o c i t y  r equ i red  t o  prevent  a  c o l l i s i o n .  The a n a l y s i s  i s  v a l i d  f o r  t h e  
v e h i c l e  spinning about e i t h e r  t h e  Y o r  2 a x i s .  Ve loc i ty  a d d i t i o n  i n  t h e  
t a n g e n t i a l  d i r e c t i o n  i s  more e f f i c i e n t  than i n  t h e  r a d i a l  d i r e c t i o n .  A 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  ske tch  i s  shown i n  Figure  5-9. Th i s  ske tch  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  
escape process ,  inc luding t h e  p a t h  of t h e  c r e m a n ,  and t h e  c r i t i c a l  p o i n t  
t h e  crewman h a s  t o  c l e a r  t o  avoid a  c o l l i s i o n .  
The r e s u l t ?  of t h e  ana'ysis a r e  presented i n  Figure  5-10. The p l o t  shows 
t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  v e l o c i t y  r equ i red  a s  a  func t ion  of t h e  d i s t a n c e  between t h e  
escape p o r t  and t h e  v e h i c l e  c e n t e r  of mass assuming a  t o t a l  v e h i c l e  l eng th  of 
11.3 m (37 f t ) .  Two tumble r a t e s  a r e  shown. Safe escape occurs  wi thout  
v e l o c i t y  a d d i t i o n  a s  long a s  t h e  v e h i c l e  mass c e n t e r  is  more than about 2 m 
(6.5 f t )  from t h e  escape p o r t .  Assuming a  crewman can push o f f  and o b t a i n  a  
r e l a t i v e  v e l o c i t y  on t h e  o r d e r  of 1.8 m / s  (6 f p s )  then he could s a f e l y  l eave  
from t h e  mass c e n t e r  f o r  tumble r a t e s  of  5  rpm o r  lower. The a d d i t i o n a l  
v e l o c i t y  should be a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  s p i n  p lane  and i n  a  d i r e c t i o n  t o  add t o  t h e  
t a n g e n t i a l  v e l o c i t y  a t  t h e  moment of exi t .  
Point of e x i t  
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Path swept by extremity 
c- - I -r of vehicle  / / / 
/ 
Posi t ion of 
SSV a t  time 
crewman e x i t s  
- Path of  crewman 
I \ 
C r i t i c a l  po in t ,  once crewman c l ea r s  
t h i s  point he i s  c l e a r  of the  vehicle 
Figure 5-9. Crew Escape From a Tumbling h a i l  Space Vehicle (SSV) 
O l  Note: Total vehicle  length 
(37 f t )  
\ 15 RPM 
o 5 i o  to 
Distance fromescape por t  t o  Mass Center m ( i t )  
Figure 5-10. Additional Velocity Required t o  Escape From 
SSV as a Function of Port Location 
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I n  some cases  i t  may be  d e s i r a b l e  t o  push o f f  s l i g h t l y  o u t  of t h e  spi.. 
p lane .  The advantage i s  t h a t  the  crewman need t r a v e l  only  a d i s t a n c e  equa l  
t o  '-he rad ius  of  t h e  v e h i c l e  and he w i l l  be c l e a r .  
5 .5 .3  Crew Tumbling Ar res t  Concepts 
As has  been d i scussed ,  the  crewman cannrc permanently s t o p  h i s  tumbling 
a c t i o n  without a d d i t i o n a l  equipment t o  a i d  him. A number of concepts have 
been devised t o  perform t h i s  func t ion .  These concepts a r e :  
. Manually cranked f lywheel  despin  device  - reduces  t h e  crewman's 
body tumbling r a t e  by hand cranking a f lywheel  
. Reaction c o n t r o l  desp in  device  - uses  a cold  g a s  r e a c t i o n  c o n t r o l  
f o r  reducing t h e  tumbling 
, Two-man cab le  despin  dev ice  - t h e  crew leave  t h e  tumbling 
s p a c e c r a f t  i n  p a i r s  holding haads and then pay o u t  a c a b l e  
between them t o  reduce t h e i r  angular  r a t e .  Rope l e n g t h s  on 
t h e  o rde r  of 3 m (10 f t )  appear t o  provide  t o l e r a b l e  s p i n  r a t e s  
(approximate13 1 rpm). When d e s p n  t o  a c o m f ~ r t a b l e  l e v e l ,  t h e  
crew could r e l e a s e  t h e  cab le ;  howeve,, t h e i r  l i n e a r  s e p a r a t i o n  
r a t e  could pose recovery problems. The r e l a t i v e  t r a n s l a t i o n a l  
v e l o c i t y  of t h e  two men while a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  c a b l e  i s  low 
(approximately 0.3 m / s ,  1 f p s ) ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  crew w i l l  not  
"crash" l n t o  t h e  rescue  veh ic le .  
. Extendable cab le  desp in  'evice - a long c a b l e  with a smal i  mass 
a t t ached  t o  i t s  end is  g r a d u a l l y  extended. 
. Weighted c a b l e  despin  - a c a b l e  with an a t t a c h e d  weight i s  
t w i r l e d  by the  crewman about t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a x i s  t o  b r i n g  h i s  
head-trunk angular  r a t e  t o  zero.  He then lets go of t h e  dev ice ,  
l eav ing  himself  despun. 
. Extendable rod despin  device  - two p a i r s  of rods  extend i n  t h e  
Y and Z d i r e c t i o n s  from t h e  PLSS. The rods  a r e  23 m (75 f t )  
long and each weigh about 1 kg (2 l b ) .  
These dev ices  must be a b l e  t o  absorb t h e  angular  mcrmentum a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  
maximam tumbling r a t e  coceidered (1h.7 rpm) and t h e  crewman leav ing  t h e  tumbling 
s p a c e c r a f t  i n  a s t and ing  p o s i t  ion. 
The concepts  a r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  and s i z i n g  informat ion is 6;i.ven i n  F igures  
5-11 t o  5-18. 
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Figure 5-11. Flywheel Characteristics for
Manually Cranked rlywheel Despin Device
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Figure 5-13. Characteristics for Two-Man Cable Despin Device
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Figure 5-16. Weighted Cable Despin Device
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II.evaluating the six crew tumbling arrest concepts described, the following
evaluation criteria were used:
• The selected concepts should be able to reduce the angular rate
from the maximum expected rate (14.7 rpm) to an acceptable rate
for recovery by the rescue vehicle (assumed to be i rpm or less).
l
• The devices should be simple to operate, require no specialized
training by the crewmen, and pose no additional hazaris to them.
• The devices should preferrably make use of materials and equipment
readily available, rather than consist of equipment specifically
developed for the purpose of arresting tumbling crewmen.
• The devices should not interfere with retrieval of crewmen by the
rescuing vehicle.
• The devices should allow usage by incapacitated or unconscious
cre_nen (with help from fellow crewmen).
Table 5-9 summarizes the evaluation of each of the six concepts considered
against the above criteria. The criteria have been phrased so that "Yes"
answers are favorable to a concept and "No" answers unfavorable•
The table shows that the two-man despin concept satisfies all the evalua-
tion criteria. None of the other concepts meet all the criteria.
It should be noted that this concept does not necessarily need two crewmen
for operation. The second crewman can be replaced by any suitable massive "
piece of loose equipment secured to the cable. The cable similarly is not a
specialized cable, but could be any suitable cable, such as a torn-out length
of electrical cable, secured to the crewman's suits in such a way that it can
gradually be let out. Strength requirements are minlmal_ since only small '
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6.0 ESCAPE,RESCUE,AND SURVIVABILITY
Crew safety is of prime importance in the design of any manne(' system,
and many provisions are incorporated in spacecraft to prevent accidents and
to deal with emergencies. The most desirable type of provisions are those
which prevent hazards or accidents from occurring, followed by provisions to
deal with emergencies when they have occurred and to restore the spacecraft
to a safe operational status. The ultimate safeguard, however, consists of
provisions for escape or rescue from a spacecraft which can no longer safely
sustain the on-board personnel.
The purpose of this task was to review and analyze escape, rescue and
survivability concepts defined in earlier studies, and to determine the
feasibility of these concepts for the shuttle, manned sortie modules and
modular space station. The most applicable of these concepts were to be
identified, and studied for adaptation to crew sizes of up to 6 or 12 men,
appropriate to later sortie missions in the orbiter and to the space station.
Where adaptation of these concepts is not considered practical, new concepts
were to be conceived and their design and operational requirements determined.
Escape, rescue, and survivability are defined as follows: !
o Esc__: The use of a vehicle, without outside assistance, to effect
egress from a manned spacecraft which requires evacuation, and to
return to earth.
o Rescue: The use of outside assistance by means of separately based
vehicles to effect a return of personnel from the distressed or I"
survival vehicle to a permanent safe haven.
o Survlvabilit_: The use of a vehicle or equipment to separate from the
distressed spacecraft and provide a safe haven in orbit for personnel
until rescue can be effected. This is to be distinguished from
" on-board survivability, as discussed in Section 4, which refers to
ability for personnel to survive until restoration of a habitable
environment or until rescue in a separate sectlo_ of the distressed
spacecraft.
Ground rules and assumptions were as follows:
o There is a need for abandonment from each of the three models (shuttle _
orbiter, sortie module, space station) being evaluated. The reasons for !
requiring abandonment are not to be analyzed in this task.
141SD 72-SA-0094-1
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o The shuttle will be in inventory for space station operations.
o The sortie module is always attached to the shuttle orbiter while
manned.
o The escape, rescue or survivability devices are intact and accessible
fcllowing the emergency.
o Crew assignment for each model shall be as follows:
/
o Shuttle - Minimum of 2 crewmen. The maximum number is that which
is compatible with the selected concept(s).
o Shuttle/Sortie Module - 4 to i0 men, including 2 shuttle crewmen.
o Space Station - 6 crewmen for initial station and 12 for growth i
station.
o Adequate time will be available to activate, checkout and deploy any
on-board concept considered.
o Escape and _urvivability concepts allow personnel abandonment of the
distressed vehicle within hours of the emergency. Rescue concepts can
reach the distressed vehicle or the survivability vehicle within a
few days.
No attempt has been made in this study to determine possible causes for
requiring abandonment of the spacecraft, to determine the statistical prcbab-
ility, absolute or relative, of such causes, or to determine how much time is
available to the on-board personnel for escape or rescue. In all the evalu- i"
ations it is assumed that the potential escape, rescue, or survivability devices
are accessible to the personnel, that they are able to operate them, and that
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6.1 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions and recommendations reached are as follows;
o The shuttle orbiter should be the primary vehicle for dealing with
emergencies of manned vehicles in earth orbit. A shuttle orbiter
should be available for rapid emergency rescue whenever manned
earth orbital flight is in progress. This need not be a dedicated
rescue shuttle or orbiter, but normal operational vehicle on which
any of a variety of rescue kits could replace the planned payload in
an emergency.
o If there is a time period at the beginning of the shuttle program
(or during the mature shuttle operational period) when shuttle
rescue is not possible because of the non-availability of a second
shutt]_ for rescue, launch pad, or other reason, an Apollo command
module, called an Escape CM, should be carried in the orbiter cargo
bay as an escape vehicle• This can be a refurbished command module
with up to six seats (as required) and with capability for reentry
from earth orbit and water landing. The CM should be pressurized
at 8 psi, to allow rapid shirtsleeve entry of the personnel without
the danger of getting "bends"• This Egcape CM is the most cost
effective of the escape and rescue vehicles considered•
o If a quicker escape or rescue capability is required from the shuttle
orbiter, sortie modules or space station that can be ?rovided for by
the emergency shuttle rescue, one of the following approaches should
be used:
• The first approach is to include a stripped-down Apollo
command module as a survivability escape, called a Survivability
CM, (i.e., a "Lifeboat") in the orbiter cargo bay. This
will require no heat shield structure or parachute system,
and possibly only a minimum restraint system instead of seats.
• The second approach is to equip a manned sortie module on
the orbiter or two or more modules on the station as
survivability modules. These require separation capa_i!ity,
an emergency life support system, an attitude stabilization
system for coarse attitude hold and for docking, and an
earth communication capability. Survivability will be
needed for a number of days in orbit, until a shuttle
rescue vehicle can pick the survivability capsule up and
return it to earth.
• Another possible approach is to develop a simple, low cost
survivability capsule, called an MSV (Modular Survivability
Module), particularly for use in the orbiter carEo bay. It
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• Refurbished Apollo corm_and modules (Escape CM's) can be
used as escape vehicles. One would be required on shutt_le
missions; the space station would require more than one
to provide access from multiple points. This approach is
only feasible for complements of up to 6 personnel,
.. o At some appropriate time in the shuttle program a study should be
initiated to determine whether escape or survivability capability
will be required. The study should con_ider potential time criti-
calitles of emergencies; availability and time of shutr]e rescue;







The follcwlng eleven escape concepts have been considered:
o Airmat (Goodyear)





o Life Raft (GE)
o Lifting Body (Northrop)
o EEOD (NASA/Lockheed)
o Spherical Heat Shield (NR)
o Apollo Command Module (Escape CM) (NR)
These concepts, which were selected from previous studies, are illustrated
in Figure 6-1, and some of their characteristics _re described. Althourh the
concepts selected for evaluation do not include all concepts deflned in =he
surveyed studies, the7 are representative of the scope of the functional,
operational, dimensional, and weight characteristics of all concepts "eviewed.
The CM was included because a number of used CM's _re expected to be
available in the time period considered, and these could be refurbished and
modified as necessary for use as escape vehicles. The service module is not !
needed, and probably will not be available. A retro-rocket package, as shown
in the sketch of the Escape CM, may however be needed for deorblt.
6.2.2 _escue Cgnce_ts
Two rescue concepts have been considered. _"_ese are:
o The shuttle booster and orbiter
o The Apollo Command and Service Module (called Rescue CSM)
on an S-IB or Titan booster
The rescue shuttle is a normal shuttle booster and orbiter, whose
mission is changed to a rescue mission as soon as the emergency has occurred.
For rescue of personnel in excess of the normal shuttle passenger compartment
capacity, a rescue kit can be added at short notice in the cargo bay.
The Rescue CSM is similar in concept to the use of the CSM as a rescue
vehicle on the Skylab program. In this program a "rescue kit" is kept I
available at the launch site in case of need. This consists mainly of a kit
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Figure 6-1. Candidate Escape Concepts 
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24 KG (588 LB) 
NEW TECHNOLOGY REQUIREME h T !  
MECHANICAL DEPLOYMENT 
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1 M A N  
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Figure 6-1. Candidate &cape Co~cept s  ( ~ o n t )  
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2 M A N  
SHIRTSLEEVE ENVlRGa JMENT 
445 K G  (985 LB ) 
NEW TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS 
NEW HEATSHIELD 
2-6 M A N  
SHIRTSLEEVE 
*= 4500 K G  (10,000 LB) 
NEW TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENT5 
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Figure 6-1. Candidate Escape Concepts (Cont) 
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For use a s  a rescue v e h i c l e  f o r  t h e  s h u t t l e  and space s t a t i o n  o p e r a t i o n s ,  
t h e  CM can be  modified t o  accept  up t o  a t o t a l  of 6 men. With a launch crew 
of 2 ,  t h i s  can b e  used t o  rescue up t o  4 men. 
This Rescue CSM concept i s  p r a c t i c a l  only whi le  a boost  v e h i c l e  is  
a v a i l a b l e .  The s e r v i c e  module is  needed t o  provide power and propuls ion 
from launch through d e o r b i t .  I f  an S-IB b c ~ o s t e r  i s  no t  a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e  Rescue 
CSM could be  launched on a T i t a n .  
Rescue ni a d i s t r e s s e d  v e h i c l e  by a space s t a t i o n  a l ready  i n  o r b i t  does 
n o t  apre3r  p r a c t i c a l  because of t h e  space s t a t i o n  l i m i t e d  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  change 
i ts  n i - This was t h e r e f o r e  no t  considered a s  a p r a c t i c a l  candidate .  
S u r v i v a b i l i t y  Concepts 
Five  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  concepts have been considered.  These a r e :  
o Cocoon 
o S o r t i e  module 
o Space s t a t i o n  module 
o Apollo command module ( S u r v i v a b i l i t y  CM) 
o Mcdular s u r v i v a b i l i t y  v e h i c l e  (MSV) 
The Cocoon i s  a concept by t h e  Geqeral  E l e c t r i c  Company. It c o n s i s t s  of 
encapsula t ing i n d i v i d u a l  s u i t e d  crewmen i n  foamed p l a s t i c ,  t o  a f f o r d  thermal 
and o t h e r  p r o t e c t i o n  u n t i l  r e scue .  This  dev ice  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  l i g h t  and simple 
The s o r t i e  module and t h e  space s t a t i o n  module a s  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  concepts 
would b e  designed and operated s o  t h a t  i n  an emergency they can b e  separa ted  
from t h e  pa ren t  v e h i c l e  ( t h e  o r b i t e r  and t h e  space s t a t i o n  r e s p e c t i v e l y )  and 
provide t h e  necessary  func t ions  f o r  l i f e  suppor t  and f o r  being rescued. 
Refurbished Apollo command modules can be  adapted a s  s u r v i ~ r a b i l i t y  
v e h i c l e s  ( S u r v i v a b i l i t y  CM's). The s t r i p p e d  down S u r v i v a b i l i t y  CM could 
accommodate considerably  more personnel  than t h e  normal complement. Figure  
6-2 shows how 8 men could be accommodated under eaergency condi t ions  and 
s t i l l  a l low s u f f i c i e n t  room f o r  some mobi l i ty  and f o r  p e r s c q a l  hygiene 
purposes.  The f i g u r e  shows t h a t  i t  is p o s s i b l e  t o  accommodate 1 0  men, and 
a s  an extreme upper l i m i t ,  12 men. I f  weight is a l i m i t a t i o n ,  t h e  whole 
of t h e  o u t s i d e  h e a t  s h i e l d  structure could be  removed, and an i n s u l a t i o n  
b lanke t  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  thermal and meteoroid p r o t e c t i o n .  Ex te rna l  s y s t s n s ,  
such as t h e  parachute  acd upr igh t ing  systems, could a l s o  b e  removed. 
The modular s u r v i v a b i l i t y  v e h i c l e  is  a s u r v i v a b i l i t y  concept s p e c i f i -  
c a l l y  adapted f o r  use  on o r b i t e r ,  s o r t i e  missions and on t h e  space s t a t i o n .  
A des ign  concept f o r  t h i s  i s  shown i n  Figure  6-3 and is capable of accommo- 
d a t i n g  up t o  12 men f o r  approximately 2 o r  3 days under emergency condi t ions .  
It is  about t h e  same s i z e  a s  an Apollo CM. The a n a l y s i s  showed t h a t  i f  a 
12-mn capac i ty  i s  requ i red  at  some t i m e ,  i t  does n o t  make sense  t o  consider  
a s m a l l e r  capsule  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  a smaller capsule  f o r  smaller complements. 
The MSV is descr ibed i n  Secr ion 6.6. 
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Figure 6-2. Apollo Command Module Yadified as &Man Survivability CM 
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Ngrn 6-3. '&to- to Rrelve-Mau Modular Survivability Vehicle Concept 
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6.3 EVALUATION 
The preferred concepts in each of the three categories of escape, rescue 
and survivability, were determined on the basis of the following evaluation 
criteria. 
o Shirtsleeve - Shirtsleeve operations axe preferred to suited 
operations since shirtsleeve operations improve personnel reaction 
time and provide better capability to deal with injured or 
incapacitated personnel. 
o Buddy System - Concepts which use the buddy system (i.e, can 
accommodate 2 or more men) are preferred over single man concepts 
since they allow for attending tc injured or incapacitated 
personnel. 
o Cost - The recommendet! --.preach must have a low total cost, i.e., 
development, recurring 2nd operational. Recurring costs include 
costs of manufacturing, testing. 3ni checkout. Operational costs 
include cost of the supporti~~g l a w .  ' -  vehicles and launch facilities, 
and of any required recovery operatims. 
o - Technology - Approaches using state-of-the-art are preferred to 
cries requiring new technology development. 
o Development Risk - Proven concepts are preferred to new ones since 
they reduce program risk. New ccncepts with minimum development risk 
are preferred to concepts with high development risk. 
o Launch Vehicles - Concepts which can be used without a separate 
launch are preferred over those which require a separate launch 
or those which require a dedicated spacecraft and launch vehicle. 
o Recovery - Return of the personnel in an orbiter at the shuttle 
landing site is preferred to a water landing because it does not 
require complex recovery operat ions. 
o Payload Impact - Concepts which have the least impact in restricting 
the orbiter or sortie payloads because of weight or volume are 
preferred. 
The comparative evaluation of the various escape rescue and survivability 
concepts against the evaluation criteria is shown in Table 6-1. Selectio~ of 
the preferred concepts in each of the three categories can be made independently. 
6.3.1 Preferred Escape Concept 
The refurbished Apollo Escape CM with a retro-rocket package is the 
preferred escape concept. 
Comparisc? of the various factors in Table 6-1 indicates that the decision 
lies broadly between the new concepts on the one hand, and the Apollo Escape CM on the 
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Shield,  s ince  t h i s  has a l l  the  des i r ab l e  f ea tu re s  a t  near ly  the  lowest cos t  
of t he  new concepts. The comparison of t h i s  with the  Escape CM i s  summarized 

















The deciding f ac to r  appears t o  be the  importance of the  impact of t he  
weight i n  reducing the  payload capaci ty .  I f  t he  weight of 5,900 kg (13,000 l b )  
can be t o l e r a t ed ,  t he  Escape CM i s  obviously t he  prefer red  escape concept. If 
on the  o ther  hand p o t e n t i a l  reduct ion i n  escape system weight from 5800 t o  
1340 kg (13,000 t o  3,000 l b )  i s  v i t a l ,  t he  Spherical  Heat Shield concept i s  
preferab le .  
6.3.2 Preferred Rescue Concept 
The Shu t t l e  is  t h e  prefer red  rescue concept. The comparison of t h e  S h u t t l e  
rescue and the  A p d l o  CSM rescue concepts i n  Table 6-1 shows t h a t  the  advantages 
a r e  a l l  Ln favor of using the  Shu t t l e  i f  i t  is ava i lab le .  I f  a s h u t t l e  is not  
ava i l ab l e  fo r  use a s  a rescue vehic le ,  escape o r  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  concepts appear 
prefe rab le  t o  maintaining a Rescue CSM capab i l i t y .  
6.3.3 Preferred Surv ivabi l i tv  C o n c e ~ t s  
The recommendation i s  t o  consider four  concepts a s  opt ions f o r  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  
concepts, 1.e. ,:: 
o S o r t i e  Module 
o Space S t a t i on  Module 
o Apollo Su rv ivab i l i t y  
o Modular Su rv ivab i l i t y  Vehicle (MSV) 
Comparison of these  i n  Table 6-1 shows t h a t  a l l  four concepts a r e  p r a c t i c a l .  
The decis ion a s  t o  which, i f  any, i s  the  prefer red  concept can be l e f t  t o  l a t e r  
s t ud i e s ,  when more de t a i l ed  design and cos t  da t a  a r e  ava i lab le .  
Use of the  s o r t i e  module and space s t a t i o n  modules a s  su rv ivab i l i t y  vehic les  
would be  cost  e f f e c t i v e  i f  these modults a r e  i n  any case required t o  have a l a rge  
degree of s e l f  suf f ic iency ,  e.g. ,  i n  t he  environmental ccn t ro l  and l i f e  eupport. 
On the  o ther  hand the re  may be many d i f f e r e n t  s o r t i e  modules i n  t he  program, and 
i t  may impose a l a rge  c o s ~  penal ty  t o  incorpora t s  su rv ivab i l i t y  provis ions on 
each module. I n  such a case i t  may be preferab le  t o  use a s i u g l e  MSV design f o r  
a l l  s o r t i e  miesions. The MSV could a l s o  be  used on o r b i t e r  missions which do 
na t  include a hab i t ab l e  s o r t i e  module. The Surv ivabi l i ty  CM could be a t t r a c t i v e  
i f  a s u r v i v a b i l i t y  vehic le  appears n e c e s s a r j  f o r  a l imi ted  number of missions a t  
r e l a t i v e l y  sho r t  not ice .  Development of t h e  Surv ivabi l i ty  CM from e x i s t i n g  CM's 
could requi re  considerably less lead time than development of a new vehic le  such 
as MSV. 
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6.4 INTEGRATED ESCAPE, RESCUE AND SURVIVABILITY APPROACH 
Having determined the preferred concepts in each of the three categories 
of escape, rescue and survivability, an integrated approach must be synthesized. 
This integrated approach must satisfy the two following criteria: 
o Commonality - The recommended concept or combination of concepts 
must be capable of providing for the survival of all on-board 
personnel on the orbiter, sortie module, or space station following 
an emergency. That is, a recommendation which cannot deal with all 
-
the on-board personnel and all the vehicles i s  not acceptable. 
o Time Criticality - If it is considered desirable to be able to 
abandon the distressed spacecraft within hours rather than days, 
the preferred approach must include escape or survivability concepts 
since rescue may take as long as a few days. Since it is only possible 
to determine whether the time criticality of emergencies may be hours 
or days (or minutes for that matter) on a statistical basis, this is 
treated as a program decision to be made at a later date, and 
recommendations are made for either option. 
The candidate concepts are: 
o Escape: Apollo Escape CM 
o Rescue: Shuttle 
o Survivability: Sortie module, Space Station Module, Apollo Surviv- 
abilitv (3 or Modular Survivability Vehicle (MSV) 
In addition, certain assumptions can be made relating to the expected 
development of the Shuttle, Sortie and Space Station programs. These can 
ba s ~ m r i z e d  as follows: 
o In the early phases of the Shuttle program, the following 
conditions are expected: 
o A shuttle rescue capability may not be available because 
of limited orbiters, boosters or launch pads. 
o The maximum number of personnel in the orbiter will probably 
not exceed 4, possibly 6. 
o The payloads will use less than the full weight or volume 
capacity of the orbiter. 
o The risk of an emergency occurring is greater in this time period. 
o When the Shuttle program matures, personnel complements may increase, 
as a maximum, to about 10 or 12 men. Payloads will generally use 
maximum payload weight capacity, but not maximum volume. Some 
shuttle payloads, such as tugs or large telescopes, may however occupy 
the full cargo bay. 
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o By the  time a  Space S t a t i o n  becomes o p e r a t i o n a l ,  t h e  S h u t t l e  
program w i l l  be o p e ~ a t i n g  on a  r o u t i n e  b a s i s  wirh s u f f i c i e n t  
v e h i c l e s  and f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  emergency rescue opera t ions .  
o  Only a  l i m i t e d  number of Apolio comand modules w i l l  be a v a i l a b l e  
f o r  refurbishment ,  Se rv ice  mo4ules, S-IB's and posoible  T i t a n s  
w i l l  be  even more l i m i t e d  i n  a v e S l a b i l i t y ,  a ~ . d  w i l l  n o t  be 
rep laceab le  i f  used. These propcls ion veh ic le6  w i l l  m l y  b e  
a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  e a r l y  phases of t h e  S h u t t l e  program because 
of p o t e n t i a l  aging problems. 
The l o g i c  used f o r  determining t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  appr0ap.h f s  shown i n  
Figure  6-4. D i f f e r e n t  o p t i o n s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e ,  and d i f f e r e n t  approaches 
recommended, according t o  t h e  answers t o  t b s  two key ques t ions  (shown i n  t h e  
diamonds i n  t h e  f i g u r e ) :  
o  Is S h u t t l e  rescue a v a i l a b l e ?  
o  I f  so ,  is  i t  quick enough t o  reach t h e  d i s t r e s s e d  s p a c e c r a f t  
on t ime? 
A s  pointed ou t  e a r l i e r ,  t h e s e  ques t ions  cannot be answered i n  t h i s  s tudy ,  
and w i l l  remain a s  program d e c i s i o n s  t o  be made a t  a l a t e r  d a t e .  The conclus ions  
a r e  t h e r e f o r e  presented a s  depending on t h e  answers t o  t h e s e  ques t ions .  
A. S h u t t l e  rescue is  a v a i l a b l e  and i s  quick enough t o  reach  d i s t r e s s e d  v e h i c l e  
i n  t i m e  
S h u t t l e  rescue  is  recommended a s  t h e  primary v e h i c l e  f o r  d e a l  wi th  
emergencies of a l l  manned v e h i c l e s  i n  e a r t h  o r b i t  because of t h e  cos r  e f f e c t i v e -  
n e s s  of t h e  S h u t t l e  a s  a  rescue v e h i c l e  ( i f  r e scue  i s  nor needed, c o s t a  a r e  
p r a c t i c a l l y  ze ro) .  
B. S h u t t l e  rescue  is a v a i l a b l e  but  may not-be quick enough t o  reach d i s t r e s s e d  
v e h i c l e  i n  time. 
The s p e c i f i c  concepts  recommended f o r  o r b i t e r ,  s o r t i e  and space s t a t i o n  
vary,  a s  fol lows:  
o  O r b i t e r .  Use t h e  Escape CM as an escape v e h i c l e ;  o r  t h e  Surviv- 
a b i l i t y  CM o r  a  s p e c i f i c a l l y  designed new MSV as a  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  
module. 
o  S o r t i e .  Uee t h e  Escape CM as an eecape v e h i c l e ;  o r  incorpora te  
s u r v i v a b i l i t y  requirements i n  t h e  s o r t i e  module. 
o S t a t i o n .  Use two E s c ~ p e  (24's ae escape v e h i c l e s  ( f o r  a 6-msn 
s t a + i m ) ;  o r  i n c o r p o r a t s  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  i n  two apace s t a t i o n  modules. 
'i;,%, VJL' - h s  are needed f o r  a e t a t i o n ,  because t h e  e t a t i o n  i e  
e..rper,td '.q have two independent volumes, and a  need f o r  
rr'~ar,*ot,seni- ,.it,.*! .' i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a t  least one volume hae become 
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C. S h u t t l e  rescue i s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .  
The Escape CM i s  recommc lded f o r  t h e  o r b l t e r  on s o r t i e  and o t h e r  
missions.  Since t h e  Escape CM can hold 6 men at  a maximum, t h i s  means 
t h a t  f l i g h t s  under such cond i t ions  should be l i m i t e d  t o  a maximum of 
6 men. 
Since i t  has  been assumed t h a t  t h e  Space S t a t i o n  w i l l  only o p e r a t e  
when t h e  S h u t t l e  i s  f u l l y  o p e r a t i o n a l  and a v a i l a b l e  f o r  rescue,  t h e  
quest ion of escape is  n o t  app l icab le .  
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MAXIMUM POSSIBLE LENGTH OF MANNED SORTIE MODULE / ESCAPE CM 
I- 1 3 m  -- (51: jnj (172 in) 
C, - 1 8 . 3  m (720 in) 
Figure 6-5. Escape Apollo Commaml Mcdule in O r b i t e r  Cargo Bay 
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6.5 INTEGRATION OF ESCAPE COMMAND MODULE I N  ORBITER AND SPACE STATION 
Typical  i n t e g r z t i o n  o f  t h e  Apollo command module a s  an escape concept 
i n  an o r b i t e r  w i t h  a m  without  a s o r t i e  payload is shown i n  Figure  6-5. 
For s h u t t l e  s o r t i e  miss ions  wi th  a crew and passenger coniplement of up t o  
6 personnel ,  and wi th  a s c r t i e  module o r  p a l l e t  payload,  a s i n g l e  modified 
Apollo Escape LT can b e  used. 
Figure  6-5 i l l u s t r a t e d  how 6 men can be accommodated i n  an Escape CM. 
Because water  landing can b e  ensured,  only very l i t t l e  s e a t  s t r o k i n g  i s  
requ i red .  
A t y p i c a l  cxzmple of two 6-man Escape C M ' s ,  one a t t ached  t o  each 
volume of a 2 volume NR s t a t i o n ,  i s  depic ted i n  Figure  6-7. For t h e  12- 
r a n  s t a t i o n ,  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  e x i s t s  f o r  two 6-man dev ices  f o r  each 
s t a t i o n  volume. 
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Figure 6 - 6 .  Apollo Command b d u l e  Modified f o r  S i x  Men 
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2, 
A-A SECT ION i 
i 
8 
Figure 6-7. Apollo Escape CM's on 6-Man Space Stat ion 
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6.6 MODULAR SURVIVABILITY VEHICLE (MSV) CONCEPT 
During t h e  course  of t h i s  t a s k ,  i t  became agparent t h a t  t h e  major 
emphasis o f  previous  escape,  r escue ,  and s u r v i v a b i l i t y  s t u d i e s  was placed 
on t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of escape v e h i c l e s .  Only minor e f f o r t  was d i r e c t e d  toward 
d e f i n i n g  a  minimum c a p a b i l i t y ,  o p e r a t i o n a l l y  f l e x i b l e ,  and c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  
s u r v i v a b i l i t y  v e h i c l e  which was f r e e  o f  t h e  p e n a l t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  escape 
v e h i c l e s  such a s  p rov i s ions  f o r  de-orbi t  , e a r t h  e n t r y ,  l and ing ,  and recovery.  
The 2-man modular s u r v i v a b i l i t y  v e h i c l e  conceived i n  t h i s  s tudy (Fig .  
6-8) i s  c y l i n d r i c a l  i n  shape and c o n s i s t s  of t h r e e  major s e c t i o n s  : a 
forward s e c t i o n  i n  which a  docking and viewing p o r t  is f i t t e d  and i n  which 
crew s u p p l i e s  a r e  s t o r e d ;  a c e n t e r  s e c t i o n  which provides  volu f o r  
s h i r t s l e e v e  crew h a b i t a b i l i t y ;  and an a f t  s e c t i o n  i n  which subsystems 
equipment is  mounted. A unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h i s  concept is t h a t  
a d d i t i o n a l  c e n t e r  s e c t i o n s ,  which a r e  c y l i n d r i c a l  s h e l l s ,  can be s tacked t o  
accommodate l a r g e r  crew s i z e s  (Fig.  6-9). 
Dimensional a n a l y s i s  showed t h a t  a minimum v e h i c l e  diameter of 2.3 m 
(90 i n . )  i s  requ i red  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  2  s h i r t s l e e v e  crewmen i n  a  s t and ing ,  
side-by-side p o s i t i o n .  
a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  the  two man a c r o s s  concept is t h e  "four man across ' '  
concept,  a s  shown i n  Fig .  6-3. A rnininum v e h i c l e  diameter of 2.8 m (110 in.! 
no t  only accommodates four  s h i r t s l e e v e  men and is compatible wi th  both t h e  
Nn and MDAC docking concepts ,  bu t  a l s o  r e s u l t s  i n  smaller v e h i c l e  l e n g t h  
f . r  crew s i z e s  g r e a t e r  than two. Because of t h e  fewer s e c t i o n a l  elements 
requ i red  t o  accommodate l a r g e r  crew s i z e s ,  t h e  s h o r t e r  l eng th  w i t h i n  t h e  
s h u t t l e  cargo bay (Fig.  6-10) and c o m p a t i b i l i t y  wi th  both  t h e  NR and MDAC 
docking systems, t h e  four  man a c r o s s  concept i s  p r e f e r r e d .  
Subsystems and equipment requ i red  f o r  a s u r v i v a b i l i t y  module a r e  shown 
i n  Table 6-2. 
A weight summary o f  t h e  4-man-ac--oss MSV is  shown i n  Table 6-3, f o r  
e 12-man, 2-day c a p a b i l i t y .  The s t r u c t u r e  c o n s i s t s  of a  s k i n  s t r i n g e r  
frame w i t h  a  s k i n  th ickness  of 0.5 mm (0.020 i n ) ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a v e h i c l e  
primary s t r u c t u r a l  weight o f  214 kg (475  l b ) .  Systems weights wexe ob ta ined  
from t h e  Aerospace Corporation r e p o r t  (&f .  21).  The- t o t a l  MSV weight ,  
excluding crew, is  1310 kg (2908 l b ) .  
An a l t e r n a t i v e  ve rs ion  would use  a s impler  monocoque s t r u c t u r e  wi th  
a  s k h  th ickness  of 2  nun (0.080 i n ) ,  which r e s u l t s  i n  an a d d i t i o n a l  weight 
of 80 kg (175 l b )  f o r  t h e  MSV. 
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EQ'J'IPYCJT BAY 
Figure 6-8. 2-Man Modular Survivability Vehicle (MSV) 
SD 72-SA-OC"94-1 
(I30 in) + 
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Figure 6-4. 'Jbo-Man Modular Survivability Vehicle (MSV) (bui l t  up to 
S i r  and Twelve-Man Versicms) . 
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12-Man/4-Across Vehicle 
r 
Figure 6-10 Comparison of Two Modular Surv ivabi l i ty  Vehicle (!GV) 
Coacepts as I n s t a l l e d  i n  Crbiter L a q o  E a y  
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Table  6-2, CI%W and Module O p e r a t i o n a l  and Support  Subsystems f o r  
4-Man-Across S a r v i v a b i l i  t y  Veh ic le  
E C S ~ L I F E  SUPPORT 
Thermal c o n t r o l  
Atnos.  p u r i f i c a t i o n  
Humidity con t ro l .  
Atmosphere 
Atmosphere s u p p l y  
Atmos. d i s t r i b a t i o n  
P o t a b l e  w h t c r  
Food 
jJAS TE MAXAGEMENT 
U r i n e  
F e c a l  
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 
28 vdc 
D i s t r i b u t i o n  
L i g h t i n g  ( i n t e r n a l )  
L i g h t i n g  ( e x t e r n a l )  
COMMUNICATION/ISS 
Up/down l i n e s  
O t h e r  
Antennas 
ATTITUDE CONTrcOL 
Cold g a s  s y s t e m  
Cont ro l  mode 
DOCKING 
Alignment 05 mat ing f a c e s  an4 
s e a l i n g  and l a t c h i n g  
CREW SUPPLIES 
S l e e p  
Awake 
O t h e r  
M A I N  CONTROL/DISPLAY PANEL 





Sub l i l n a t o r  (H20) 
LiOH -i p a r t i c u l a t e  f i l t e r  
Condensing h e a t  exchanger  
14.7  p s i  02 + N 2  
High p r e s s u r e  s t o r a g e  v e s s e l  
Duc t ing  + f a n s  
S t o r a g e  t ank  w i t h  b a c t e r i a  c o n t r o l  equ ip .  
Dr ied  - minimal q u a n t i t y  
C o l l e c t i o n  tube  t o  r e c e i v e r  t a n k  and 
odor  c o n t r o l  
Bags + s t o r a g e  compartments + odor  c o n t r o l  
S i l v e r - z i n c  b a t t r  r i e s  (A and B) 
W i r i n g / c i r c u i t  r r o t e c t i o n  d e v i c e s  - 
g e n e r a l  + l o w 1  
General  + l o ~ . j I  
Rendezvous, docking 
Voice 
Cont r o l / J i s p l a y  I t r a c k i i l g  
Rendezvcus/do ck ing  a i d  
0 2  TN2 from c a b i n  a tmosphere  s u p p l y  t ank  
s u p p l y  
+ p i t c h ,  + yaw, 5 r o l l ,  no t r a n s l a t i o r . ,  
- 
dampen module o s c i l l a t i o n s ,  o r i e n t  
module f o r  o r b i t e r  approach and dock ing  
I 
Automatic  upon module t o  o r b i t e r  c o n t a c t  
Orbl ter  and module remotely  s e p a r a b l e  
a f t e r  crew t r a n s f e r  t o  o r b i t e r  
S l e e p  r e s t r a i n t s  
Modif ied s l e e p  rest r a i n  ts 
Minimum hygiene  m e d i c ~ l  s u p p l i e s ,  l o c a l  
l i g h  t i n g / a d j o i n i n g  s t o r a g e  compartmen ts 
Monitor ,  c o n t r o l ,  command s t a t u s  of: 
module subsys tem,  docking,  crew sub- 
sys tem,  e t c .  
Var ied  
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Table 6 - 3 .  Weight Es~imates  - Four Man Across Survivability Vehicle 
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Delta to Monocoque Structure 
6.7 RENOVATION/MODIFICATION OF APGLLO COMMAND MODULE FOR USE AS AN ESCAPE 
OR SURVIVABIL1TY VEHICLE 
The p o t e n t i a l  impact of renovat ing an Apollo Command Module t o  funccion 
a s  escape o r  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  v e h i c l e ,  assuning maximum u s e  of e v i s t i n g  subsys- 
tems is shown iq Table 6-4. 
Although a new re t ro-sys tem is shorm f o r  escape v e h i c l e  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  i t  
may oe p o s s i b l e  t o  ach ieve  t h e  requ i red  delta-ve1ocir.y of approximately 
150 m / s  (500 f / s )  by providing a d d i t i o n a l  RCS p r o p e l l a n t  tanks  w ~ L h j n  t h e  
command module. P resen t  Comqand Module c a p a b i l i t y  is  approximately 2 7  m / s  
(90 f / s )  and r e q u i r e s  approximately 0.24 Kg p r o p e l l a n t  per  m / s  (1.78 It, per 
s This op t ion ,  could resul.: i n  cons ide rab ly  lower c o s t  i n  ach iev ing  
r e t r o  c a p a b i l i t y .  
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockwell 
Table 6 - 4 .  
~enovate/~ew/~odified Items for Refurbished Apollo CM for Use as 
Escape or Survivability Vehicle 
ITEM 
Renovate or replace heat shield 
Modify CM to 6-man entry capacity (if mission requires) 
Replace Earth Recovery System (chutes, mortars, fittings: 
Add new Retro-system 
Renova'e or replace RCS engines 
fieplace Earth Landing System Crushable ribs (if req'd. ) 
Renovate or yeplace Electrical Power System (EPS) 
batteries 
Replace Docking System ((31 probe and adapter ring left 
attached to Lunar ~odule) 
Replace Uprighting System if required (15% probability 
that it will not be used on landing) 
Replace G&N exterior mirror lens and prism elements 
Renovate or repl~re G&N optics heat rhield 
Modify Environmental Control and Life Support System 
(ECLSS) to survivability requirements 
ility 
a) 
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